Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances of the openssl command-line tool being used to encrypt data with AES-256-CBC and RSA OAEP padding. This specific sequence matches the credential encryption pattern observed in the Linux/macOS payload of the malicious telnyx PyPI package attributed to TeamPCP.
Detects the creation or modification of .plist files on macOS systems. This activity can be indicative of various malicious behaviors, particularly those related to persistence or privilege escalation, as .plist files are often used to configure application settings, launch agents, or other system behaviors.
This rule detects network connections and DNS resolution requests to known typosquatted domains used by the TeamPCP threat actor for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. These domains are associated with a compromised Trivy scanner. Detection indicates successful execution of the compromised scanner and attempted exfiltration.
This Logic detects the presence of the malicious Chrome extension FreeVPN[.]One by identifying its unique extension ID across installed browsers. The logic further correlates this presence with network communications initiated by the extension to suspicious or untrusted domains. By combining extension enumeration with traffic analysis, the detection ensures high fidelity with minimal false positives. This layered approach strengthens visibility into malicious browser add-ons masquerading as VPN tools.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to a specific Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) domain and canister ID (tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai.raw.icp0.io or tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai). This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity, where compromised systems communicate with an adversary-controlled server.
This rule detects outbound network connections to URLs associated with common file sharing services (e.g., Dropbox, Mega, Gofile) or temporary email providers (e.g., Temp-Mail). Such connections can indicate data exfiltration attempts, use of unsanctioned services, or communication with command and control infrastructure.
Detects processes making HTTP/HTTPS requests to localhost on ports 40341 or 40342 for '/metadata'. This pattern can indicate local service discovery, inter-process communication, or potentially malicious activity attempting to interact with local services, possibly for credential access or privilege escalation.
Detects DNS queries to Solana RPC endpoints associated with GlassWorm/ForceMemo blockchain-based C2. The malware queries up to 9 Solana RPC endpoints to retrieve C2 instructions from on-chain transaction memos. A Python process resolving any of these domains is anomalous outside of cryptocurrency development environments.
This rule detects network connections to a predefined list of known Microstealer malicious domains. These domains are often associated with malware command and control (C2) infrastructure, phishing, or other malicious activities. Monitoring connections to such domains can help identify compromised systems or active malware infections.
Detects Cursor IDE spawning download utilities or LOLBins commonly used for
payload staging. Directly maps to the CursorJack technique where a malicious
MCP deeplink encodes a command that downloads and executes a remote payload.
Low false-positive rate — these child processes have no legitimate use when
launched directly by Cursor.
payload staging. Directly maps to the CursorJack technique where a malicious
MCP deeplink encodes a command that downloads and executes a remote payload.
Low false-positive rate — these child processes have no legitimate use when
launched directly by Cursor.
This rule detects network connections to specific deep link patterns associated with messaging applications like Telegram, WhatsApp, and Signal. Such deep links can be used in phishing attempts or to initiate actions on a user's device through these applications.
Detects the Cursor IDE process spawning shell interpreters or
network utilities. This behavior is associated with the CursorJack technique,
where a malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configuration executes
commands for initial access or payload staging.
network utilities. This behavior is associated with the CursorJack technique,
where a malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configuration executes
commands for initial access or payload staging.
Detects LampoRAT malware based on known file hash execution.
Detects execution of shell scripts from mounted disk images (DMG), a technique
used to bypass Gatekeeper restrictions after macOS Sequoia updates.
used to bypass Gatekeeper restrictions after macOS Sequoia updates.
This rule detects the execution of specific malicious JavaScript files (`install.js` or `version.js`) associated with the StegaBin campaign, launched by the Node.js runtime. The detection focuses on the exact file paths identified in the campaign to minimize false positives, as these files are part of a harmful developer package designed to hide its next moves behind normal-looking setup work. Successful detection indicates the initial stage of a supply chain attack, potentially leading to secret theft, remote control, or further payload downloads.
This rule set detects components of the StegaBin supply-chain attack targeting npm packages. The first rule, 'stegabin_npm_loader', identifies malicious JavaScript loaders that utilize Pastebin for steganography and Vercel API paths for command and control. It looks for specific strings indicating Pastebin usage, Vercel API endpoints, and unique markers related to the steganographic decoding or payload. The second rule, 'StegaBin_VSCode_Tasks_Persistence', focuses on persistence mechanisms within VSCode's tasks.json files. It detects configurations that automatically execute malicious code upon folder opening, specifically looking for the 'runOn': 'folderOpen' property and references to the 'ext-checkdin.vercel.app' domain and associated API paths. Together, these rules aim to identify both the initial loader and the persistence mechanism used by the StegaBin campaign.
This rule detects DNS queries for reverse lookups, specifically those ending with '.in-addr.arpa' or '.ip6.arpa'. While legitimate, frequent or unusual reverse DNS queries from a specific device or process could indicate reconnaissance activities or attempts to map internal network infrastructure by an attacker.
Detects the execution of a Python stager associated with OmniStealer. The stager uses an inline command to decompress and execute the final payload, a common technique for this malware family.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts targeting Docusign users. It identifies emails containing URLs or network connections to specific domains (page-docusign-[a-z0-9]+\.workers\.dev) which are commonly used in phishing campaigns to mimic legitimate Docusign login pages or related services. The use of 'workers.dev' subdomains often indicates malicious infrastructure.
This rule detects successful outbound SSH (port 22) connections originating from a private IP address on a device to a public IP address. This could indicate unauthorized remote access, data exfiltration, or command and control activity.
This rule detects a high volume of UDP network connections originating from a single process on a device. A count exceeding 50 UDP connections from the same process to the same remote IP address is considered anomalous and could indicate a UDP flood or other denial-of-service attempt.
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