Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

338 detections

Detects the exploitation of OMIGOD (CVE-2021-38647) which allows remote execute (RCE) commands as root with just a single unauthenticated HTTP request. Verify successful exploitation by viewing the HTTP client (request) body to see what was passed to the server (using PCAP). Within the client body is where the code execution would occur. Additionally, check the endpoint logs to see if suspicious commands or activity occurred within the timeframe of this HTTP request.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0038
Detects the remote installation of a print driver, which is a possible indication of the exploitation of PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675, CVE-2021-34527). The occurrence of print drivers being installed remotely via RPC functions should be rare, as print drivers are normally installed locally or through group policy.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0031
Detects attempts to download executable files via WebDAV. This activity has been observed in campaigns attributed to APT29, where adversaries leverage WebDAV to transfer malicious tools into a compromised environment.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0030
Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger NTLM authentication from machines with the spooler service enabled, often as part of NTLM relay attacks or credential harvesting.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
1029
This rule detects DNS queries for specific domains associated with the WannaCry ransomware killswitch. The presence of these queries indicates a potential WannaCry infection attempting to resolve its killswitch domain. If the domain resolves, the ransomware may cease its encryption activities.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0027
This rule detects the first-time observation of remote named pipe connections, excluding a predefined list of common and legitimate named pipes. This behavior is often indicative of lateral movement or remote execution using named pipes, which attackers commonly leverage to move within a network or execute code on remote systems. The rule specifically looks for connections to '\\*\IPC$', a common administrative share used for interprocess communication over a network. By filtering out known legitimate named pipes, the rule aims to reduce false positives and highlight potentially malicious activity.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0026
Detects the presence of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0022
NKN is a networking service using blockchain technology to support a decentralized network of peers. While there are legitimate uses for it, it can also be used as a C2 channel. This rule looks for a DNS request to the ma>
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0020
This rule detects the execution of PsExec or PAExec when the service name has been renamed from its default 'PSEXESVC'. It specifically looks for SMB file access events (smb_files) in Zeek logs where the path contains '\IPC$' and the name ends with '-stdin', '-stdout', or '-stderr', but filters out events where the name starts with 'PSEXESVC'. This helps to identify potentially malicious use of PsExec-like tools that attempt to evade detection by altering the service name, while reducing noise from legitimate PsExec usage or other PsExec clients.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0020
This rule detects HTTP PUT requests where the User-Agent header contains 'WebDAV' and the destination IP address is not a private or loopback address. This activity could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data to an external WebDAV share.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0019
Detects suspicious DNS queries using base64 encoding
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
002
Detects strings used in command execution in DNS TXT Answer
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects executable access via webdav6. Can be seen in APT 29 such as from the emulated APT 29 hackathon https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
A General detection for WebDav user-agent being used to PUT files on a WebDav network share. This could be an indicator of exfiltration.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Transferring files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using network shares
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects kerberos TGS request using RC4 encryption which may be indicative of kerberoasting
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
001
Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
Detects wannacry killswitch domain dns queries
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
The DNS Z flag is bit within the DNS protocol header that is, per the IETF design, meant to be used reserved (unused).
Although recently it has been used in DNSSec, the value being set to anything other than 0 should be rare.
Otherwise if it is set to non 0 and DNSSec is being used, then excluding the legitimate domains is low effort and high reward.
Determine if multiple of these files were accessed in a short period of time to further enhance the possibility of seeing if this was a one off or the possibility of larger sensitive file gathering.
This Sigma query is designed to accompany the Corelight Threat Hunting Guide, which can be found here: https://www3.corelight.com/corelights-introductory-guide-to-threat-hunting-with-zeek-bro-logs'
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL. Based on the SIGMA rules/windows/builtin/win_impacket_secretdump.yml
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
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