Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a multi-stage communication pattern involving an initial request to a URL-mirroring or shortening service with a long base64-encoded path, followed by a request to a screenshot/rendering API, and culminating in the reception of an image file. This chain is indicative of command and control (C2) communication where command output or exfiltrated data is encoded into images rendered by external web services to bypass traditional network security filters.
This rule monitors for two related scenarios targeting the RubyGems legacy API-key endpoint. First, it identifies suspicious responses indicating an API key might have been served from a CDN cache, potentially leading to cross-user credential leaks. Second, it flags a high volume of requests to the same endpoint using gzip compression, which is a known technique associated with edge-cache poisoning attacks.
Detects HTTP responses containing patterns associated with a malicious HTA stager hosted on Cloudflare Pages. The rule looks for specific URL structures often used in phishing campaigns that attempt to deliver malicious payloads, specifically involving a cloned Gmail attachment widget.
Detects outbound network traffic to domains and infrastructure known to be associated with the UAT-11587 Antino delivery chain. This includes specific Cloudflare Pages/R2 project URLs and CloudFront staging infrastructure often used for malicious payload hosting or staging.
Detects outbound network communication to known malicious hosting infrastructure used for the distribution of Antino Stage 2 payloads, specifically targeting CloudFront and Cloudflare R2 object storage locations.
Detects Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) exploitation attempts by monitoring for malformed TLS heartbeat requests (undersized payload) followed by oversized responses from the server that indicate potential memory disclosure.
Detects Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) exploitation attempts by monitoring for malformed TLS heartbeat requests (undersized payload) followed by oversized responses from the server that indicate potential memory disclosure.
Detects SQL injection exploitation attempts against MOVEit Transfer targeting the CVE-2023-34362 vulnerability, followed by the deployment and subsequent interaction with the 'human2.aspx' webshell associated with Cl0p ransomware mass-exploitation campaigns.
Detects network requests to specific GitHub, Blogspot, and Telegram endpoints, which are known to be used by the 'VPN-for-X' extension to fetch proxy configuration files. This behavior is indicative of C2 channel configuration retrieval.
Detects network traffic attempting to connect to known proxy farm fallback hostnames using TLS SNI or HTTP CONNECT methods. These hostnames are often associated with command-and-control infrastructure designed to proxy traffic and mask the true destination of communications.
Detects HTTP GET requests for the path '/wmglb', which is indicative of a SectopRAT stage-two module download (specifically WbElevation.dll) from a Command and Control server.
Detects network activity associated with SectopRAT malware. The rule identifies C2 beaconing behavior on a non-standard port using a custom protocol with a specific 5-byte length header and 16-byte initialization vector, filtering out standard HTTP/TLS traffic.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed to the URI path '/api/credentials' over the non-standard TCP port 8133, which is indicative of AMOS (Atomic macOS) Stealer exfiltrating stolen credentials to a C2 server.
This rule detects high-frequency HTTP GET requests containing abnormally long Base64-encoded strings within the URI. This pattern is often indicative of automated payload assembly or exfiltration where data is fragmented across multiple requests, or the use of URL-shortener services to facilitate C2 communication.
Detects network activity (TCP, DNS, TLS, HTTP) associated with the UNC6240 threat actor's infrastructure, specifically targeting communications with known malicious IP addresses and domains used in a campaign leveraging PeopleSoft-related lures.
Detects established, bidirectional TCP connections between internal hosts and known infrastructure associated with the SIDEEYE backdoor on specific control and data ports (3333 and 3334).
Detects network activity associated with the LONGTALE malware family (attributed to APT31/JungleBamboo). This includes identification of specific malicious browser extension IDs in HTTP traffic and signature-based detection of periodic HTTPS/HTTP beaconing patterns indicative of session or cookie exfiltration.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards the suspicious domain 'corp.tripswithengine.com', which is associated with the NeedyMantis malware C2 infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with the NeedyMantis malware, specifically identifying C2 beaconing behavior. The rule looks for HTTPS GET requests to specific URI paths ('/library/zip/') with a WebSocket upgrade header and suspicious cookie patterns, as well as TLS SNI traffic targeting the hardcoded domain 'corp.tripswithengine.com'.
Detects HTTP beaconing and WebSocket command-and-control (C2) communication associated with the AgtaBackup RAT. This includes identifying specific check-in URIs, hardcoded 'X-Agent-Secret' header authentication, and the initialization of a WebSocket connection.
Detects network requests to known domains (acrobat-reader-installer.com, 03webzoominvite.us) masquerading as Microsoft Store resources to deliver malicious MSI installers. This activity is associated with RMM-based RAT deployment chains.
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