Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic leverages alerts from Microsoft Defender O365 Incidents. It aggregates and summarizes these alerts, extracting details such as destination, file name, severity, process command line, IP address, registry key, signature, description, and timestamps. The detection filters out alerts with a verdict of 'Clean' from Microsoft. It dynamically maps MITRE techniques from the alert data and assigns a risk score based on the alert's severity. This rule is designed to correlate Microsoft-provided alerts with other data for risk-based alerting, rather than detecting new activity from raw data.
The following analytic detects instances where Azure AD has blocked a user's attempt to grant consent to a risky or potentially malicious application. This detection leverages Azure AD audit logs, focusing on user consent actions and system-driven blocks. Monitoring these blocked consent attempts is crucial as it highlights potential threats early on, indicating that a user might be targeted or that malicious applications are attempting to infiltrate the organization. If confirmed malicious, this activity suggests that Azure's security measures successfully prevented a harmful application from accessing organizational data, warranting immediate investigation to understand the context and take preventive measures.
The following analytic identifies instances where a single user creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute window in the Office 365 environment. It leverages O365 logs from the Unified Audit Log, focusing on the 'Add service principal' operation in Azure Active Directory. This activity is significant as it may indicate a compromised user account or unauthorized actions, potentially leading to broader network infiltration or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain persistent access, escalate privileges, or exfiltrate sensitive information.
The analytic detects patterns of successful and failed Okta MFA push attempts to identify potential MFA exhaustion attacks. It leverages Okta event logs, specifically focusing on push verification events, and uses statistical evaluations to determine suspicious activity. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to bypass MFA by overwhelming the user with push notifications. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, compromising the security of the affected accounts and potentially the entire environment.
The following analytic identifies a spike in failed authentication attempts within an Office 365 environment, indicative of a potential distributed password spraying attack. It leverages UserLoginFailed events from O365 Management Activity logs, focusing on ErrorNumber 50126. This detection is significant as it highlights attempts to bypass security controls using multiple IP addresses and user agents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within the organization. Early detection is crucial to prevent account takeovers and mitigate subsequent threats.
The following analytic identifies when a suspicious email is detected within the Microsoft Office 365 ecosystem through the Advanced Threat Protection engine and delivered to an end user. Attackers may execute several attacks through email, any detections from built-in Office 365 capabilities should be monitored and responded to appropriately. Certain premium Office 365 capabilities such as Safe Attachment and Safe Links further enhance these detection and response functions.
The analytic detects instances of `regsvcs.exe` running without command line arguments. This behavior typically indicates process injection, where another process manipulates `regsvcs.exe`. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, IDs, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or access to sensitive information.
The following analytic detects the execution of "dsquery.exe" with arguments targeting `TrustedDomain` queries directly from the command line. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it often indicates domain trust discovery, a common step in lateral movement or privilege escalation by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to map domain trusts, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized access to trusted domains.
The analytic detects an Azure AD account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 30-minute window. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify instances where the same user logs in from different IPs in a short time frame. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials being used by an adversary, potentially following a phishing attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.
The analytic detects when a user removes an organization from GitHub Enterprise. The detection monitors GitHub Enterprise audit logs for organization deletion events, which could indicate unauthorized removal of critical business resources. For a SOC, identifying organization removals is crucial as it may signal account compromise, insider threats, or malicious attempts to disrupt business operations by deleting entire organizational structures. The impact could be severe, potentially resulting in loss of source code, repositories, team structures, access controls, and other critical organizational assets. This disruption could halt development workflows, cause data loss, and require significant effort to restore from backups if available. Additionally, unauthorized organization removal could be part of a larger attack campaign aimed at destroying or compromising enterprise assets.
This analytic identifies when a malicious file is detected within the Microsoft Office 365 ecosystem by the Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) engine. Attackers often stage and execute malicious files from within cloud environments like Office 365. Monitoring detections from built-in Office 365 capabilities, such as those enhanced by Safe Attachments and Safe Links, is crucial for identifying and responding to threats.
The analytic identifies hosts receiving an unusually high volume of network traffic from an email server. It leverages the Network_Traffic data model to sum incoming bytes to clients from email servers, comparing current traffic against historical averages and standard deviations. This activity is significant as it may indicate data exfiltration by a malicious actor using the email server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data access and potential data breaches, compromising sensitive information and impacting organizational security.
The analytic identifies discrepancies between the source and response events for Okta Verify Push requests, indicating potential suspicious behavior. It leverages Okta System Log events, specifically `system.push.send_factor_verify_push` and `user.authentication.auth_via_mfa` with the factor "OKTA_VERIFY_PUSH." The detection groups events by SessionID, calculates the ratio of successful sign-ins to push requests, and checks for session roaming and new device/IP usage. This activity is significant as it may indicate push spam or unauthorized access attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could bypass MFA, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems.
The following analytic identifies attempts by users to access Okta applications that have not been assigned to them. It leverages Okta Identity Management logs, specifically focusing on failed access attempts to unassigned applications. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate potential unauthorized access attempts, which could lead to exposure of sensitive information or disruption of services. If confirmed malicious, such activity could result in data breaches, non-compliance with data protection laws, and overall compromise of the IT environment.
The following analytic detects the addition of new service principal accounts in O365 tenants. It leverages data from the `o365_management_activity` dataset, specifically monitoring for operations related to adding or creating service principals. This activity is significant because attackers can exploit service principals to gain unauthorized access and perform malicious actions within an organization's environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to interact with APIs, access resources, and execute operations on behalf of the organization, potentially leading to data breaches or further compromise.
This analytic detects when Microsoft Office 365 Data Loss Prevention (DLP) rules have been triggered. DLP rules are configured for security, regulatory, or business compliance reasons. Detections from this analytic should be thoroughly evaluated to determine the security relevance of the underlying DLP events. The accuracy of this analytic depends on the upstream DLP configuration.
The following analytic identifies when an O365 email account sends and then hard deletes an email to an external recipient within a short period (within 1 hour). This behavior may indicate a compromised account where the threat actor is attempting to remove forensic artifacts or evidence of exfiltration activity. This behavior is often seen when threat actors want to reduce the probability of detection by the compromised account owner.
The following analytic identifies unusual authentication activity in an O365 environment, where a single user account experiences more than 8 authentication attempts using 3 or more unique application IDs and over 5 unique user agents within a short timeframe. It leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on authentication events and applying statistical thresholds. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary probing for multi-factor authentication weaknesses. If confirmed malicious, it suggests a compromised account, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. Early detection is crucial to prevent further exploitation.
The following analytic identifies the creation of new email forwarding rules in an Office 365 environment via the UpdateInboxRules operation. It leverages Office 365 management activity events to detect rules that forward emails to external recipients by examining the OperationProperties for specific forwarding actions. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized email redirection, potentially leading to data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, attackers could intercept sensitive communications, leading to data breaches and information leakage.
The following analytic identifies instances where a user has denied consent to an OAuth application seeking permissions within the Office 365 environment. This detection leverages O365 audit logs, focusing on events related to user consent actions. By filtering for denied consent actions associated with OAuth applications, it captures instances where users have actively rejected permission requests. This activity is significant as it may indicate users spotting potentially suspicious or unfamiliar applications. If confirmed malicious, it suggests an attempt by a potentially harmful application to gain unauthorized access, which was proactively blocked by the user.
The following analytic detects multiple failed login attempts in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. It leverages Office365 management activity logs, specifically AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon records, aggregating these logs in 5-minute intervals to count failed login attempts. This activity is significant as it may indicate brute-force attacks or password spraying, which are critical to monitor. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to Office365 accounts, leading to potential data breaches, lateral movement within the organization, or further malicious activities using the compromised account.
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