Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,421 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
4,217
105
40
25
13
Contributors
1,327
1,003
725
627
332
Categories
2,253
2,239
1,434
1,144
973
Platforms
4,107
453
295
83
82
Products / Services
10,683
9,759
6,695
4,421
3,750
MITRE Techniques
886
774
552
505
456
CVEs
18
12
12
12
10
IDS Classtypes
1,868
466
446
362
230
IDS Protocols
2,366
846
388
301
93
This rule detects bulk account deletion attempts via LDAP. It triggers when multiple LDAP requests (at least 5 within 30 seconds from the same source IP) are observed on port 389, containing both 'userAccountControl' and 'delete' keywords, indicating an attempt to modify user account control attributes to disable or delete accounts.
This rule detects attempts to exploit applications for denial of service by looking for the string "${jndi:" (case-insensitive) within the HTTP URI. This pattern is commonly associated with JNDI injection vulnerabilities, which can be leveraged for various attacks, including denial of service. The rule is configured to trigger an alert if 10 such attempts are observed from the same destination IP within 30 seconds.
This rule detects a potential SSL/TLS Handshake Exhaustion Attack. It triggers when a high volume of TCP SYN packets (flags:S) are observed targeting port 443 (HTTPS) on the home network within a short timeframe. Specifically, it looks for more than 200 SYN packets to the same destination within a 5-second window, indicating an attempt to overwhelm the server with handshake requests, leading to a denial of service.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication over SMTP by looking for repeated 'EHLO' commands within a short timeframe from the same source IP address. The threshold is set to trigger if 10 'EHLO' commands are observed within 300 seconds (5 minutes) from a single source.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity over HTTP. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests with a content size between 50 and 300 bytes that occur at a regular interval (15 times in 60 seconds) from a single source IP address. This pattern is often indicative of malware communicating with a C2 server.
This rule detects attempts to manipulate application runtime memory via web shell activity. Specifically, it looks for HTTP requests where the URI content contains the string "WriteProcessMemory" (case-insensitive). This string is indicative of an attempt to use a function commonly associated with injecting code or modifying the memory of a running process, often a technique employed by web shells to achieve persistence or execute arbitrary code.
This rule detects attempts to modify stored data within a MySQL database, specifically looking for 'UPDATE' and 'WHERE' clauses in TCP traffic directed to the MySQL default port (3306). It triggers an alert if 50 such events are observed from the same source IP within a 30-second window, indicating potential malicious activity aimed at data integrity compromise.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity where commands are being read from a removable media share over SMB. It specifically looks for SMB traffic containing the string "USBSTOR" (case-insensitive) and ".txt" (case-insensitive), indicating access to text files on a USB storage device. A threshold of 5 occurrences within 30 seconds from the same source IP is applied to reduce false positives.
This rule detects the use of an external proxy service to mask Command and Control (C2) origin. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the 'X-Forwarded-For' header is present and the HTTP method is 'CONNECT'. A threshold of 10 occurrences within 60 seconds from the same source IP is applied to reduce false positives.
This rule detects the use of an internal proxy server to route C2 (Command and Control) traffic. Specifically, it looks for HTTP CONNECT requests within the internal network ($HOME_NET to $HOME_NET) that are established and occur at a high frequency (10 times in 60 seconds from the same source). This pattern is indicative of a system inside the network attempting to tunnel C2 communications through an internal proxy.
This rule detects a potential FTP C2 (Command and Control) channel exhibiting a regular beaconing pattern. It triggers an alert if 10 or more TCP connections are made to port 21 (FTP) from a single source IP address within a 300-second window, indicating established communication from the internal network to an external FTP server. This behavior is characteristic of malware using FTP for C2 communications.
This rule detects non-HTTP traffic being tunneled over TCP port 80. It specifically looks for established TCP connections to port 80 where the application layer protocol is not identified as HTTP and the data payload size is greater than 100 bytes. A threshold is applied to trigger an alert if 10 such events occur from the same source IP within 60 seconds. This behavior is often indicative of command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration attempting to blend in with legitimate web traffic.
This rule detects a high volume of DNS NXDOMAIN (Non-Existent Domain) responses originating from a single source IP address within a short timeframe. This pattern is indicative of Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) activity, often used by malware for command and control (C2) beaconing. The threshold is set to trigger if 20 NXDOMAIN responses are observed from the same source within 60 seconds.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to 'management.azure.com' with a URI containing 'bastionHosts'. This pattern indicates an attempt to establish a direct VM connection via Azure Bastion, which could be used for lateral movement within an Azure environment.
This rule detects network traffic on TCP port 3333, which is commonly associated with the Stratum protocol used in cryptocurrency mining. The rule specifically looks for the initiation of a TCP connection (SYN flag) to this port from the home network to any destination. This activity could indicate the presence of cryptomining malware or unauthorized cryptomining operations within the network.
This rule detects attempts to discover the current user via a web shell by looking for HTTP requests containing the string "whoami" in the URI. This is a common command executed on compromised web servers to gain information about the user context of the web server process.
This rule detects DNS queries to specific domains (connectivitycheck.gstatic.com or msftconnecttest.com) that are commonly used by operating systems and applications to check for internet connectivity. A high volume of such queries (threshold of 10 within 30 seconds from a single source) could indicate a network scan or unusual network activity.
This rule detects a high volume of Registry Hive bulk queries for system reconnaissance activities. Specifically, it looks for 30 or more 'RegEnumKey' operations over TCP port 445 (SMB) within a 30-second window, originating from a single source IP address and directed towards the protected network. This behavior can indicate an attacker attempting to enumerate registry keys to gather information about the system.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate application windows using specific API calls (EnumWindows and GetWindowText) over HTTP. This behavior is often associated with remote access tools or malware trying to gather information about the user's active applications.
This rule detects attempts to query the list of services on a remote Windows host via the Remote Registry service. It specifically looks for the string "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services" over TCP port 445 (SMB/CIFS), which is commonly used for Remote Registry access. A threshold of 10 occurrences within 30 seconds from the same source IP is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate Docker containers via the Docker API by looking for HTTP requests containing the URI '/containers/json'. This activity could indicate an attacker performing reconnaissance on a compromised host to understand the running container environment.
Page 180 of 211