Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2026-0300 in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS. It identifies suspicious network connections to User-ID Authentication Portal ports (6081, 6082) from external IP addresses, excluding RFC1918 and loopback ranges. Additionally, it looks for a specific anomalous User-Agent string associated with the CL-STA-1132 threat actor, which has been observed during exploitation of this vulnerability.
This rule detects an inbound HTTP POST request targeting the Langflow AI pipeline application, specifically looking for attempts to exploit CVE-2026-33017. The detection logic focuses on specific URI paths and keywords within the HTTP request body that indicate an attempt to inject code, such as 'import '.
This rule detects an inbound HTTP POST request targeting the Langflow AI pipeline application, specifically looking for attempts to exploit CVE-2026-33017. The detection logic focuses on specific URI paths and keywords within the HTTP request body that indicate an attempt to inject code, such as 'import '.
Detect .NET hollowing technique
Suricata
.NET hollowing technique - external fetch of InstallUtil.exe (rare)
Intellexa PREYHUNTER - HTTP
Suricata
Intellexa PREYHUNTER - HTTP response contains distinctive iOS build/artifact strings
COLDRIVER ROBOT chain - DNS lookup for TI delivery/C2 domains
UNC5142 CLEARSHORT - injected Web3 + BSC contract addresses in HTTP response
Triofox CVE-2025-12480
Suricata
Triofox CVE-2025-12480 - localhost Host header to admin setup pages
DPRK EtherHiding (UNC5342) - DNS lookup for blockchain explorer APIs (multi-provider)
This rule set detects various stages of activity related to the 'OpenClaw' malware family and associated campaigns. It includes detection for OpenClaw process execution, exposure of a specific administrative port, execution of shell commands via curl (ClawHavoc delivery), outbound webhook exfiltration, and infostealer access to OpenClaw configuration files.
This rule detects various stages of an attack chain, starting from an Apache ActiveMQ exploit (CVE-2023-46604) leading to LockBit-style ransomware. It identifies process creation anomalies (java.exe spawning certutil.exe for downloads), network connections to known Metasploit C2 infrastructure, the presence of specific ransomware file hashes, and attempts to clear Windows event logs, all indicative of the described attack scenario.
Detects network and endpoint activity associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign, including C2 communication, payload downloads, CasPol.exe making outbound connections, WMI-spawned PowerShell with Cloudinary fetches and Assembly.Load, and a specific file hash.
This rule set detects various stages of the OysterLoader malware activity, including its registration and login attempts to a command and control (C2) server, specific C2 communication patterns via HTTP URIs, and connections to known OysterLoader C2 domains and IP addresses. The rules look for specific HTTP URI paths like "/reg" and "/login" combined with distinct User-Agent strings ("WordPressAgent" and "FingerPrint"), as well as specific API paths under "/api/" and hardcoded C2 domains and IP addresses.
This detection identifies network connections from non-browser processes to known Large Language Model (LLM) API endpoints. While some connections may be legitimate developer or application traffic, unexpected processes connecting to these services could indicate unauthorized data exfiltration, corporate espionage, or misuse of AI services.
This rule detects attempts to exploit Ivanti EPMM vulnerabilities CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428. The first signature identifies requests to the '/api/v2/featureusage' endpoint containing patterns indicative of remote code execution (e.g., '${', 'Runtime', 'getRuntime', 'exec'). The second signature detects requests for a '.jsp' file named '403', which could indicate a backdoor or web shell deployment post-exploitation.
This rule detects HTTP requests for 'install.sh' from the domains 'clawd.bot' or 'openclaw.ai'. These domains are associated with the OpenClaw/Clawd malware, indicating an attempt to download a malicious installation script.
This rule set detects network communication associated with macOS infostealers, including C2 infrastructure, SHub stealer heartbeat and exfiltration, and ClickFix staging and landing pages. It identifies specific hostnames and URI paths used by these malicious campaigns.
ET TROJAN Microsoft ClickFix IOC IP
ET PHISHING Microsoft ClickFix Landing Domain
ET PHISHING Microsoft ClickFix Landing Domain
Detects a high frequency of ICMP Echo Request (Type 8) packets, which could indicate a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
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