Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
10,670 detections
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Detects reconnaissance commands (whoami, systeminfo) and PowerShell execution spawned as children of remote-access tools (such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer/QuickAssist variants, etc.), followed shortly by an outbound network connection to a .top domain from the same device.
Detects process command lines containing C2 operator start flags or strings alongside reconnaissance tools or platforms like fofa or skynet.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, reconnaissance, and command execution originating from web server and PHP lineage processes, indicating potential webshell activity or compromised web applications.
Detects the correlation of a file creation event in the user Temp folder (such as t.vbs) originating from browser cache or download patterns, followed shortly by the execution of the script via wscript.exe or cscript.exe.
Detects non-browser clients or runtimes (such as curl, python, node, or Electron-based apps) successfully connecting to or referencing compromised eMudhra certificate status checker hosts, indicating systems that still trust compromised intermediate certificates.
Detects potential staging and execution of files from the Microsoft Vault directory within AppData, often associated with adversary tooling or credential theft.
Detects an executable running from the C:\Windows\ directory (excluding known benign applications) that establishes two or more distinct persistence mechanisms within a short timeframe, such as scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts.
Detects correlation between an external Microsoft Teams chat creation and the subsequent launch of a remote access or monitoring (RMM) tool on the same user's device within a 30-minute window, which is indicative of potential social engineering or tech support scam initial access campaigns.
Detects execution of a specific PowerShell remediation script using execution policy bypass, or generic PowerShell activity importing certificates into the LocalMachine\Disallowed store outside of known administrator processes and accounts.
Detects modifications to Certificate Authority (CA) trust stores, configuration files, or blocklists on Linux and macOS endpoints, followed by trust store update commands within a 30-minute window.
Detects a sequence of events on Linux hosts involving a remote interactive or network logon from an external IP, followed within 5 minutes by root-level process execution, and subsequently within 2 hours by an outbound SSH connection to a private or known attacker IP. Also includes a separate branch for direct logons from known malicious IPs.
Detects the execution of the rclone.exe utility with copy, sync, move, or copyto command-line arguments, correlated with outbound network connections to Wasabi S3 or MEGA cloud storage domains.
Detects behavior where PowerShell or pwsh executes msiexec.exe to silently install an MSI file located in a temporary directory with a GUID-prefixed filename, optionally following a recent download from a remote URL.
Detects processes accessing or enumerating multiple cryptocurrency wallet files or directories across common storage paths (e.g., Exodus, Electrum, Coinomi, Ethereum, Atomic, Guarda) within a short timeframe, which is often indicative of wallet theft or credential harvesting malware.
Detects Salat Stealer dropping and executing copies of Lightshot.exe in trusted directories such as Windows NT, Edge, and Chrome application paths, as well as process spawn chains involving masqueraded Lightshot executables.
Detects inbound network connections from known IP addresses associated with PHP2Shell exploitation attempts and malicious tooling infrastructure.
This rule aggregates software inventory, vulnerability assessments, network connection events, and exposure graph data to prioritize patching and identify internet-facing devices running PHP with known vulnerabilities or active web listeners.
Detects the execution of two or more distinct Active Directory discovery, credential extraction, or coercion tools (such as NetExec, Kerbrute, noPac, PetitPotam, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or Impacket scripts) on the same device within a 1-hour window.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects command-line execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA) spawned via Windows Explorer containing download primitives and URLs, followed by immediate external network connections.
Detects Microsoft Word (winword.exe) spawning the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) to execute batch scripts (.bat or .cmd files). This behavior is commonly associated with malicious document macros attempting to drop and execute secondary payloads, excluding common system paths to reduce false positives.
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