Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe, which can be abused by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions. This rule specifically looks for the string 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe' within the 'ContextInfo' field of PowerShell module logs, indicating its use in a PowerShell context.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell activity involving the mounting of a disk image (like ISO or VHD) and then immediately invoking an item from that mounted image. This technique is often used by adversaries to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) protections, as files extracted or run from mounted disk images may not inherit the MOTW flag, allowing malicious payloads to execute without security warnings.
Detects suspicious patterns in PowerShell command lines that indicate the use of `Invoke-Expression` (IEX) for potentially malicious code execution. This rule looks for various obfuscated or unusual ways IEX might be invoked, often in conjunction with base64 encoded strings, to execute arbitrary commands or scripts.
Detects the presence of a potentially XOR encoded PowerShell command by looking for the 'bxor' operator in conjunction with common PowerShell command elements like 'ForEach', 'for', '-join', and '[char]'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to obfuscate malicious scripts.
Detects the creation of a new Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) job by PowerShell. Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs for persistence, execution, or data transfer, and using PowerShell to create these jobs is a common method.
Detects PowerShell scripts that use the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet to compress folders and files, storing the output in suspicious temporary locations often used by malware for exfiltration. Adversaries may compress collected data (e.g., sensitive documents) prior to exfiltration to make it portable and minimize network transfer.
This rule detects PowerShell scripts that enumerate directories using `Get-ChildItem` and output the results to a file using `Out-File -append`. The detection logic specifically looks for the combination of `foreach`, `Get-ChildItem`, `-Path`, `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue`, `Out-File`, and `-append` within the PowerShell script block text. This behavior has been associated with MAZE ransomware for directory discovery.
Detects specific command-line patterns associated with Empire PowerShell UAC bypass methods. These patterns involve PowerShell commands designed to retrieve and execute content from the 'Update' registry key within 'HKCU:Software\Microsoft\Windows Update', which is a known technique used by Empire for privilege escalation.
Detects PowerShell command-line obfuscation techniques, specifically those associated with Invoke-Obfuscation, by looking for patterns like backticks, string concatenation, and format string abuse in process command lines. It also includes a specific pattern for obfuscated environment variable access.
Detects the execution of PowerShell cmdlets 'Get-NetFirewallRule' or 'Show-NetFirewallRule' to enumerate local firewall rules on a host. This activity is often performed by adversaries during the discovery phase to understand network configurations and potential egress/ingress points.
This rule detects the use of 'powercat' or 'powercat.ps1' within PowerShell classic logs. Powercat is a PowerShell-based network utility similar to Netcat, often used by adversaries for network communication, including reverse shells, bind shells, and file transfers, potentially bypassing traditional network controls. This activity is indicative of command and control communication or lateral movement using non-application layer protocols.
This rule identifies attempts to clear the PowerShell console history. Adversaries often clear command history to remove traces of their activities on a compromised system, making forensic analysis more difficult. The rule specifically looks for the 'Clear-History' cmdlet or the deletion of the 'ConsoleHost_history.txt' file, which stores PowerShell command history.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to modify Access Control Lists (ACLs) on files or directories within the Windows system folders. This activity is suspicious as it can be used by adversaries to gain persistence, elevate privileges, or evade defenses by modifying critical system file permissions.
This rule detects suspicious patterns in program names or command-line arguments that are commonly associated with malicious samples, hacktools, or exploit kits. It looks for specific keywords and file names in the 'Image' (executable path) and 'CommandLine' fields. Examples include CVE-related strings, common exploit/artifact names like 'poc.exe', 'meterpreter', and various PowerShell scripts often used in post-exploitation such as 'inject.ps1', 'Invoke-CVE', 'mimikatz.ps1', and 'powercat.ps1'.
This rule detects the initiation of a remote PowerShell session by looking for specific strings in PowerShell Classic logs. Specifically, it identifies events where 'HostName=ServerRemoteHost' and 'wsmprovhost.exe' are present in the log data, indicating that a remote host is interacting via Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to execute PowerShell commands.
Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
Detects the usage of the PowerShell `Set-Mailbox` cmdlet to configure an SMTP forwarding rule for a mailbox. This can be indicative of an adversary setting up automatic email forwarding to an external address for data exfiltration or continued access to communications.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing patterns commonly associated with Mimikatz, a tool used for dumping credentials. The rule looks for specific strings related to Mimikatz functionalities like 'DumpCreds', 'DumpCerts', 'sekurlsa::logonpasswords', and 'crypto::certificates' in conjunction with 'CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE'.
Detects the use of the PowerShell `New-MailboxExportRequest` cmdlet to export a mailbox to a remote or local share, which has been observed in ProxyShell exploitation scenarios. This activity indicates an attempt to exfiltrate mailbox data.
Detects PowerShell execution that includes base64 encoded WMI class names such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", "Win32_Process", "Win32_UserAccount", or "Win32_LoggedOnUser" in the command line. This technique is often used by adversaries to obfuscate their actions and evade detection.
This rule detects the installation of a root certificate from suspicious locations using PowerShell's `Import-Certificate` cmdlet. Adversaries may install root certificates to bypass security warnings when connecting to their controlled web servers, facilitating man-in-the-middle attacks or credential harvesting. The rule specifically looks for the `Import-Certificate` cmdlet targeting `Cert:\LocalMachine\Root` and originating from common temporary or user-writable directories like `AppData\Local\Temp\`, `Windows\TEMP\`, `Desktop\`, `Downloads\`, `Perflogs\`, or `Users\Public\`.
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