Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects outbound network connections to URLs associated with common file sharing services (e.g., Dropbox, Mega, Gofile) or temporary email providers (e.g., Temp-Mail). Such connections can indicate data exfiltration attempts, use of unsanctioned services, or communication with command and control infrastructure.
Detects command line executions from non-standard applications attempting to query the local Azure Arc metadata endpoints (ports 40341/40342), which may indicate an attacker enumerating or exploiting the HIMDS token service (CVE-2026-26117).
Detects processes making HTTP/HTTPS requests to localhost on ports 40341 or 40342 for '/metadata'. This pattern can indicate local service discovery, inter-process communication, or potentially malicious activity attempting to interact with local services, possibly for credential access or privilege escalation.
This rule detects PolyShell webshell activity on Linux systems, specifically targeting Magento e-commerce platforms. It identifies processes executing from or targeting a suspicious media directory (`/var/www/prod/shared/pub/media/custom_options/quote/i/n/`) in conjunction with `curl` processes retrieving payloads from the `gsocket.io` C2 network. The detection logic combines indicators of webshell presence (execution from a specific directory) with C2 communication (curl to gsocket.io).
Detects the execution of a binary from the path /tmp/pglog, which is used as a
dropper location by the malicious sysmon.py script associated with the TeamPCP
Trivy supply chain malware.
dropper location by the malicious sysmon.py script associated with the TeamPCP
Trivy supply chain malware.
Detects DNS queries to Solana RPC endpoints associated with GlassWorm/ForceMemo blockchain-based C2. The malware queries up to 9 Solana RPC endpoints to retrieve C2 instructions from on-chain transaction memos. A Python process resolving any of these domains is anomalous outside of cryptocurrency development environments.
Detects Zimbra SOAP API requests attempting to enable IMAP access by setting zimbraPrefImapEnabled. This is a known persistence technique used by threat actors (such as in Operation GhostMail) to silently enable mail protocols, bypassing the web UI to maintain access using stolen app-specific passwords.
This rule detects network connections to a predefined list of known Microstealer malicious domains. These domains are often associated with malware command and control (C2) infrastructure, phishing, or other malicious activities. Monitoring connections to such domains can help identify compromised systems or active malware infections.
High-fidelity correlation detecting DPRK Contagious Trader npm malware persistence: Node.js process modifying authorized_keys followed by ufw allowing SSH. Targets cryptocurrency traders via poisoned GitHub trading bot repositories.
Detects ELF binaries with suspicious capabilities for privilege escalation, such as shell execution and process capabilities
Detects Cursor IDE spawning download utilities or LOLBins commonly used for
payload staging. Directly maps to the CursorJack technique where a malicious
MCP deeplink encodes a command that downloads and executes a remote payload.
Low false-positive rate — these child processes have no legitimate use when
launched directly by Cursor.
payload staging. Directly maps to the CursorJack technique where a malicious
MCP deeplink encodes a command that downloads and executes a remote payload.
Low false-positive rate — these child processes have no legitimate use when
launched directly by Cursor.
Detects the execution of cat, followed by network connections. Specifically /dev/tcp/ redirection
Detects the creation of an app-specific password named 'ZimbraWeb' via Zimbra SOAP API. This specific persistent credential name is a known mechanism utilized in the Operation GhostMail campaign by a Russian APT.
This rule detects network connections to specific deep link patterns associated with messaging applications like Telegram, WhatsApp, and Signal. Such deep links can be used in phishing attempts or to initiate actions on a user's device through these applications.
Detects the Cursor IDE process spawning shell interpreters or
network utilities. This behavior is associated with the CursorJack technique,
where a malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configuration executes
commands for initial access or payload staging.
network utilities. This behavior is associated with the CursorJack technique,
where a malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configuration executes
commands for initial access or payload staging.
Detects LampoRAT malware based on known file hash execution.
This rule detects successful SSH login attempts from external IP addresses (not within common private IP ranges). It specifically looks for 'Accepted' messages in syslog from the 'sshd' process and filters out internal source IPs.
Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks).
This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign.
This rule detects potential SSH brute force attacks by monitoring syslog for multiple failed SSH login attempts, connection closures, or invalid user attempts from a single source IP address within a short time frame. It specifically looks for keywords like 'error', 'Connection closed', 'authentication failure', and 'invalid user' in SSHD logs.
This rule detects potential SSH brute force attacks by identifying multiple failed password attempts from a single source IP address to a specific computer within a 5-minute window. It specifically looks for 'Failed password' messages in syslog entries from the 'sshd' process.
Detects multiple failed SSH login attempts from a single source IP address, indicating a potential brute force attack. The rule identifies 'Invalid user' or 'Failed password' messages in syslog from the 'sshd' process and groups them by source IP and time to count unique attempted users and total attempts. A threshold of more than 5 attempted users from a single source IP within a 10-minute window triggers an alert.
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