Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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ISO Image Mounted
Sigma
This rule detects when an ISO image is mounted on a Windows endpoint. It specifically looks for Event ID 4663 (An attempt was made to access an object) where the ObjectServer is 'Security', ObjectType is 'File', and the ObjectName starts with '\Device\CdRom'. The rule filters out common legitimate files found on mounted ISOs, such as 'autorun.ico', 'setup.exe', and 'setup64.exe', to reduce false positives. This activity can be indicative of an adversary using ISO images to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) protections and deliver malicious payloads.
Detects attempts to access the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory with specific access rights (0x705) and an object type of 'SAM_DOMAIN'. This activity is indicative of tools or techniques used to dump credentials from LSASS, a common method for adversaries to obtain user credentials.
This rule detects PowerShell execution where the command line contains Base64 encoded strings that decode to 'Invoke-' keywords. It specifically looks for both UTF-8 and UTF-16 Little Endian (LE) encodings of 'Invoke-' when PowerShell or pwsh.exe is executed with the '-e' (encoded command) flag. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to obfuscate malicious PowerShell commands.
This rule detects attempts to disable the Microsoft Defender Firewall by modifying specific registry keys. It looks for changes to the 'EnableFirewall' DWORD value to '0x00000000' (disabled) within the FirewallPolicy profiles (DomainProfile, PublicProfile, StandardProfile) under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\.
Detects access to files and shares with specific names and extensions associated with BlueSky ransomware, indicating a potential or active encryption attempt. The rule looks for files ending with '.bluesky' or containing 'DECRYPT FILES BLUESKY' in their names, across both local file access events (EventID 4663, 4656) and network share access events (EventID 5145).
Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario. This rule specifically looks for EventID 5145 (a network share access event) where the target file path ends with `\Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll` and the `SubjectUserName` does not end with a `$` (indicating a machine account, which is filtered out to reduce false positives).
Detects network access to the 'protected_storage' service, specifically targeting the IPC$ share. This activity is often associated with attempts to extract DPAPI domain backup keys from Domain Controllers, a technique used for credential access and lateral movement.
Detects inbound network connections to ports 5985 or 5986, which are commonly used for PowerShell Remoting (WinRM). This rule specifically looks for EventID 5156 (Windows Filtering Platform Connection) with a LayerRTID of 44, indicating an inbound connection.
Detects reconnaissance activity involving attempts to enumerate domain administrator accounts and domain groups. Specifically, it looks for Event ID 4661 (An operation was performed on an object) with an AccessMask of '0x2d' (which indicates a read access attempt) on SAM_USER or SAM_GROUP objects whose ObjectName corresponds to well-known SIDs for the built-in Administrator account (-500) or Domain Admins group (-512) within a domain (S-1-5-21- prefix). This activity is often associated with adversaries using commands like 'net user administrator /domain' or 'net group domain admins /domain' to discover privileged accounts.
Detects modifications to the Windows Defender exclusion registry key. This could indicate a potentially suspicious or even malicious activity by an attacker trying to add a new exclusion in order to bypass security.
Detects PowerShell command line patterns in combination with encoded commands that often appear in malware infection chains. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell or pwsh executable names combined with common encoded command flags (-e, -enc, etc.) and specific Base64 encoded strings frequently seen in malicious payloads.
This rule detects potentially suspicious command-line arguments used with common data compression tools like 7-Zip and WinRAR. The presence of parameters such as '-p' (password), '-hp' (header password), '-sdel' (secure delete after archiving), '-ta', '-tb', and '-dw' can indicate an adversary's attempt to archive collected data, potentially encrypt it, and then remove the original files to cover their tracks. This behavior is often observed during the collection and staging phases of an attack, prior to exfiltration. The rule includes a filter to reduce false positives by excluding processes launched from standard program file paths.
This rule detects the execution of script files with extensions such as .js, .jse, .vba, .vbe, .vbs, and .wsf by the Windows Script Host executables, Wscript.exe or Cscript.exe. This activity is often associated with malicious script execution, including those delivered via phishing or used in post-exploitation phases.
This rule detects attempts by processes to access the microphone and webcam by monitoring specific registry key access events. It looks for EventIDs 4657, 4656, or 4663 associated with registry paths related to the Windows Capability Access Manager's consent store for microphone and webcam access by non-packaged applications. This can indicate an adversary attempting to collect audio or video from the endpoint.
Detects attempts to extract the LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers. This activity is indicative of an adversary trying to gain access to sensitive cryptographic keys that can be used to decrypt DPAPI-protected data across the domain.
Detects failed Kerberos TGT issue operations. This can be a sign of manipulations of TGT messages by an attacker, potentially indicating attempts to exploit Kerberos for credential access or to bypass authentication mechanisms.
Detects when a password-protected ZIP archive is opened or extracted on a Windows system. This is identified by EventID 5379 from the Security log, specifically looking for 'Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename' in the TargetName field. The rule filters out events originating from '
Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook' to reduce false positives.
Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook' to reduce false positives.
Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs. This rule specifically looks for Event ID 4662, indicating an operation on an object, where the ObjectType is 'WMI Namespace' and the ObjectName contains 'subscription'. This combination is indicative of WMI persistence mechanisms being created or modified.
Detects the use of 'reg.exe' to add or copy registry keys within the 'SafeBoot' path. This activity is often associated with ransomware attempting to ensure persistence or functionality in Windows Safe Mode, potentially to bypass security products that do not operate in that mode.
This rule detects when a Windows Event Log has been cleared. This activity is often performed by attackers to remove traces of their presence on a compromised system. The rule specifically looks for Event ID 517 from the 'Security' provider or Event ID 1102 from the 'Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog' provider, both of which indicate that an event log has been cleared. This can be caused by commands like 'wevtutil cl' or other methods of log manipulation.
Detects attempts to back up the Data Protection Application Programming Interface (DPAPI) Domain Master Key. This event is generated at the source machine, not the Domain Controller, indicating a potential attempt to gain access to encrypted data.
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