Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DNS queries for Storm-2945 Microsoft-impersonating doppelganger domains and traffic to actor-controlled AitM resolver/redirect infrastructure on captive-portal networks.
Detects a high-volume DNS TXT-record query flood (200+ queries in 5 minutes) to a single destination, excluding common legitimate high-volume TXT consumers (SPF/DKIM/DMARC validators), indicative of DNS tunneling.
Detects unusually large outbound data transfers (over 500MB) that may indicate data exfiltration preceding Chaos ransomware deployment, consistent with STAC4749 incidents where data was likely stolen before encryption.
Detects payload callbacks to the Rognar Telegram-bot-linked DOUBLECUP C2 URL (hxxp://67.219.107.181/hgflssvslvidfugvbldiuv).
Detects DNS tunneling via high-entropy subdomains prepended to Microsoft-telemetry-lookalike domains, using a volume threshold to distinguish tunneling from occasional lookups.
Detects HTTP GET requests for sync.dat runtime configuration files with a JSON accept header, consistent with CornFlake RAT's custom C2 protocol, excluding known legitimate cloud-sync/update CDN hosts.
Detects OAuth2 token requests scoped to Google's secureidentity.action, used for passkey/security-domain-secret operations. Chrome's own sync/passkey process routinely requests this scope from the browser, so those requests (identified by a Chrome User-Agent) are excluded. Remaining matches indicate the token request did not originate from the legitimate Chrome browser process (e.g. a non-browser client, script, or tool crafting the request directly), which is anomalous and warrants investigation for possible passkey/security-domain-secret abuse or token reuse across devices.
Detects successful DNS resolution responses, TLS SNI values, and HTTP Host headers referencing known Shai-Hulud/Miasma token-jacking transfer station infrastructure (amutes.com, abb1.life) used by attackers to resell stolen AI/LLM API access via gray-market proxy services.
Detects DNS/TLS/IP traffic to known CaptiveCrunch AitM doppelganger domains and C2/redirect IP infrastructure via exact-match indicators.
Detects unusually large outbound data transfers (over 500MB) that may indicate data exfiltration preceding Chaos ransomware deployment, consistent with STAC4749 incidents where data was likely stolen before encryption.
Detects the Hermes Agent/DeepSeek autonomous CVE-research pivot pattern — proxy traffic showing both a GitHub trending-PoC search sorted by stars and a CVSS/exploitability scoring pipeline query, indicating autonomous vulnerability research and target re-selection after a failed exploitation attempt.
Detects unusually large outbound data transfers (over 500MB) that may indicate data exfiltration preceding Chaos ransomware deployment, consistent with STAC4749 incidents where data was likely stolen before encryption.
Detects a phishing page's /api/config fetch used to stage ClickFix instructions, requiring a Referer indicating an impersonated CRM login page (NetSuite, Odoo, HubSpot, or Salesforce) while excluding requests to the genuine vendor domains.
Detects likely exfiltration of encrypted synced passkey (WebauthnCredentialSpecifics) blobs to external C2 infrastructure, correlated with a prior non-browser read of Chrome's Sync Data LevelDB store, consistent with the collection-and-exfiltration stage of a Pass-ta-key credential-theft chain. Excludes traffic destined to Google's own domains.
Detects OAuth2 token requests scoped to Google's secureidentity.action, used for passkey/security-domain-secret operations. Chrome's own sync/passkey process routinely requests this scope from the browser, so those requests (identified by a Chrome User-Agent) are excluded. Remaining matches indicate the token request did not originate from the legitimate Chrome browser process (e.g. a non-browser client, script, or tool crafting the request directly), which is anomalous and warrants investigation for possible passkey/security-domain-secret abuse or token reuse across devices.
Detects a network connection to Google's passkey enclave or caBLE hybrid-transport domain (*.ua5v.com) that should be correlated with EDR process telemetry to confirm the source process is non-browser, unsigned, or otherwise anomalous rather than the legitimate Chrome browser.
Detects DeviceManager DNS TXT/A tunneling traffic occurring within 60 seconds after an eth_call blockchain RPC request from the same host, consistent with DeviceManager resolving C2 via EtherHiding before tunneling.
Detects DeviceManager's EtherHiding C2 resolution: an eth_call JSON-RPC request using get_data_selector 0x1dcf296b against the known-malicious contract address 0xc027490af56a9d7050fc259ecd03da1580b84aae, excluding requests with a browser-like User-Agent.
Detects an HTTP POST to an IP-literal host occurring after an eth_call blockchain RPC lookup from the same host, consistent with DeviceManager/DOUBLECUP resolving and beaconing to a C2 address extracted from blockchain-sourced configuration.
Detects DOUBLECUP's session polling/telemetry beacon to /session/reg, /session/check, and /session/signal with a sid= query parameter, requiring at least 5 requests within 15 seconds to match the malware's 1.2-3 second polling cadence.
STAC4749 Golang Implant TLS Certificate with Hardcoded CA Issuer (loop-CA/connectify-CA/james-bond-CA)
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