Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
210 detections
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Detects login or authentication attempts to a Cisco Firewall Management Center (FMC) management interface from non-authorized source IP addresses. The rule specifically flags connections targeting potential low-privilege or service accounts that may indicate unauthorized access attempts or brute-force behavior directed at critical network infrastructure.
This rule computes a composite risk score for user authentication events across multiple identity and network providers (Okta, Azure AD, VPNs, etc.). It flags suspicious patterns including impossible travel, credential stuffing indicators (multiple failures followed by success), new or unknown devices, and lateral movement attempts (concurrent access to both VPN and SSO services). Only users meeting a risk score threshold of 40 or higher with at least one successful authentication are reported.
This rule detects network communication (DNS, connection, or traffic) with known infrastructure and specific URI paths associated with the SpectralViper threat actor. It enriches these findings by identifying if the communication originated from processes commonly associated with SpectralViper, such as OneDrive Sync services or specific Intel audio service files.
This rule detects successful authentication attempts directed at network devices from sources not explicitly marked as authorized management systems. It identifies users or systems that are not recognized service accounts authenticating against network infrastructure and flags activity that involves multiple unique destination targets as high risk.
This rule identifies potential BRICKSTORM command and control (C2) activity by detecting sustained beaconing patterns to known public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers (8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1) over port 443. It buckets network connections into 10-minute windows and flags source devices exhibiting frequent, repetitive traffic patterns, enriched with asset context to prioritize alerts from edge appliances such as firewalls, NAS devices, or storage sync services.
This rule monitors network logs (from proxies and firewalls) for web traffic (HTTP GET requests) containing suspicious JavaScript code injection patterns in the request context or message fields. It specifically looks for common XSS indicators such as <script tags, eval(), document.write(), fromCharCode(), and atob().
Detects suspicious processes commonly associated with malicious activity establishing outbound network connections to Azure Web Apps domains. The rule aggregates connections to identify potential beaconing behavior by monitoring connection frequency and duration, flagging activity initiated by binaries frequently used for living-off-the-land attacks such as powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, and others.
This rule detects high-volume or repeated outbound connections to Mega cloud storage domains (mega.nz, mega.co.nz, etc.) by processes that are not identified as standard web browsers. Such activity may indicate data exfiltration, automated file staging, or unauthorized use of cloud storage services.
Identifies network connections to known ShinyHunters IP addresses or domains associated with the recent Oracle PeopleSoft exploitation campaign. This rule monitors both endpoint network events and perimeter firewall/proxy logs for outbound communication to the specified malicious infrastructure.
Detects network communication associated with BeepRAT malware, specifically targeting hardcoded TCP connections to destination port 18848 and ICMP packets containing the string 'BEEP', which are used for C2 communication and keepalive signals.
This rule detects network connections to phishing pages hosted on the workers.dev domain that are attempting to interact with EvilTokens device code API endpoints. These pages are known to implement developer hotkey prevention (F12 blocked, context menu disabled) to hinder in-browser analysis, indicating malicious intent.
This rule monitors network logs (from proxies and firewalls) for web traffic (HTTP GET requests) containing suspicious JavaScript code injection patterns in the request context or message fields. It specifically looks for common XSS indicators such as <script tags, eval(), document.write(), fromCharCode(), and atob().
This rule detects successful authentication attempts directed at network devices from sources not explicitly marked as authorized management systems. It identifies users or systems that are not recognized service accounts authenticating against network infrastructure and flags activity that involves multiple unique destination targets as high risk.
This rule detects network connections to phishing pages hosted on the workers.dev domain that are attempting to interact with EvilTokens device code API endpoints. These pages are known to implement developer hotkey prevention (F12 blocked, context menu disabled) to hinder in-browser analysis, indicating malicious intent.
Detects high-cardinality, multi-protocol network scanning behavior characteristic of the JDY botnet. The rule identifies internal hosts attempting to connect to a high volume of unique external destinations across multiple protocols with low average bytes per connection, indicative of automated discovery or probing activity.
This rule detects outbound network traffic from internal IP addresses to known Tor network entry or exit relay ports (9001, 9030, 9050, 9051). It specifically prioritizes alerts where the source host is identified as network infrastructure (routers, gateways, firewalls) or IoT devices, flagging potential unauthorized use of Tor for obfuscated communication or data exfiltration from within the network perimeter.
Detects encrypted WebSocket sessions over non-standard ports or TLS traffic patterns indicative of Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service (PaaS) session token exfiltration to unauthorized command and control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule monitors network logs (from proxies and firewalls) for web traffic (HTTP GET requests) containing suspicious JavaScript code injection patterns in the request context or message fields. It specifically looks for common XSS indicators such as <script tags, eval(), document.write(), fromCharCode(), and atob().
This rule detects external brute-force attempts against firewall authentication mechanisms. It triggers when 15 or more failed login attempts from a single external IP address occur within a 15-minute window. The rule specifically filters for 'USER_LOGIN' events with a 'BLOCK' or 'FAIL' security result and excludes internal RFC1918 IP addresses to focus on external threats.
This rule set detects various stages of activity related to the 'OpenClaw' malware family and associated campaigns. It includes detection for OpenClaw process execution, exposure of a specific administrative port, execution of shell commands via curl (ClawHavoc delivery), outbound webhook exfiltration, and infostealer access to OpenClaw configuration files.
This rule detects various stages of the CastleLoader malware activity, including C2 communication, process hollowing using AutoIt and jsc.exe, and known malware hashes. It correlates network traffic to a specific C2 server, identifies suspicious process creation patterns where AutoIt launches jsc.exe, and sweeps for known SHA256 hashes associated with CastleLoader.
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