Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Azure AD user sign-ins from multiple distinct IP addresses or countries within a 1-hour window. This is a common heuristic used to identify potentially compromised credentials or impossible travel scenarios, where a single user account authenticates from geographically distant or disparate network locations in an unrealistic timeframe.
Detects phishing emails containing suspicious URLs pointing to PaaS platforms (Azure Static Web Apps, Cloudflare, Firebase) that exhibit credential harvesting characteristics (branded keywords or base64 patterns). The rule correlates these emails with subsequent clicks and a successful M365 sign-in by the same user within 30 minutes of the click, indicating a probable successful credential compromise.
Detects inbound .ics calendar invite attachments that contain URLs, originating from sender domains not previously seen within the organization over the last 90 days, and distributed to 10 or more recipients. This pattern is indicative of a mass-distributed phishing campaign using calendar invites as a lure.
This rule detects mass phishing campaigns by identifying HTML/HTM email attachments that contain embedded URLs. It monitors for a pattern where the same sender distributes these attachments to multiple recipients, a common behavior for HTML smuggling delivery vectors where malicious payloads are constructed client-side to bypass static email gateway inspection.
Detects newly consented OAuth applications that immediately perform mass access or exfiltration of mail and file data across multiple mailboxes or drives within a short period, potentially indicating an attacker utilizing a malicious OAuth application.
Detects inbound emails where the sender domain or embedded URLs use Punycode (xn--) or homoglyph-based lookalikes of trusted brand domains (e.g., Microsoft, Google, DocuSign). The rule further prioritizes alerts where the email subject contains urgency-based social engineering language typically used in credential harvesting campaigns.
Detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) fraud involving AI voice-cloning. The rule correlates external or unrecognized Microsoft Teams activity (calls/chats) directed at finance users with high-value financial transactions or vendor bank detail updates occurring on the same day, specifically when these transactions lack evidence of legitimate out-of-band or second-approver verification.
Detects instances where a user grants consent to an unverified OAuth application requesting high-privilege scopes (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All). This behavior is characteristic of consent phishing attacks aimed at obtaining persistent access to sensitive data and mailbox contents.
Detects a multi-stage Telephone-Oriented Attack Delivery (TOAD) campaign. The first stage identifies phishing emails containing billing or security-themed subjects and phone numbers without links or attachments to evade automated analysis. The second stage monitors for the subsequent installation or execution of common remote-support tools (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect). A final correlative rule detects these events occurring sequentially on the same host, indicating a high-confidence indicator of a successful callback phishing social-engineering attempt.
Detects high-volume, individually-tailored spear-phishing campaigns likely assisted by Generative AI. The rule monitors for a single sender targeting a high number of unique recipients with distinct, non-identical email subjects within a short timeframe. It specifically flags activity involving newly registered look-alike domains and interactions with credential-harvesting patterns in URLs.
Single-source Sigma proxy for the authentication-persistence stage of the multi-stage device-code-phishing-to-Graph-collection chain (see the companion KQL correlation rule "Passkey Persistence: Device-Code Phishing to MFA Takeover and Graph Collection" for the full, threshold-gated, cross-table detection). Sigma has no join, temporal-windowing, or aggregation support, so this rule fires on the authentication-persistence event alone and does NOT enforce the device-code sign-in precursor or the subsequent Graph-activity burst - both required by the full correlation. Scoped to the two highest-signal operations only (new security-info registration, and any admin-initiated registration on another user's account) to cut noise from routine self-service profile edits.
Hunts network, HTTP, and email-URL telemetry for known ARToken infrastructure (operator backend IPs and phishing/panel domains). Bounded to a 30-day lookback and tiers matches by confidence: domain hits are high-confidence (attacker-registered infrastructure), while IP hits are medium-confidence since the IPs sit on shared DigitalOcean hosting that can be reassigned to unrelated tenants once ARToken's infrastructure is taken down. Empty/unparsed indicator fields are excluded to avoid spurious matches in the HTTP event parsing branch. No known file hashes are associated with this intel.
This rule identifies potential phishing attempts by correlating email delivery events with known suspicious sender addresses and URLs containing typosquatting domains impersonating legitimate organizations.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects the Sauron Loader vishing chain: a mailbox hit by a high-volume, high-distinct-sender email bombing burst (raised from 20 to 50 emails/hour and now requiring 15+ distinct senders, to exclude single-sender retry loops or broken automation), followed within 2 hours by the same user launching Quick Assist or AnyDesk — consistent with an attacker posing as IT support after the flood. Also fixes a schema bug where EmailEvents was queried with TimeGenerated instead of Timestamp, and a post-join column reference bug.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule detects a suspicious monetization pattern where a user account experiences a high-risk sign-in event, followed shortly (within 2 hours) by the creation or modification of inbox rules. This pattern is often indicative of account compromise, where an adversary configures mailbox rules (e.g., forwarding or redirection) to facilitate data exfiltration or financial fraud.
This rule detects a suspicious monetization pattern where a user account experiences a high-risk sign-in event, followed shortly (within 2 hours) by the creation or modification of inbox rules. This pattern is often indicative of account compromise, where an adversary configures mailbox rules (e.g., forwarding or redirection) to facilitate data exfiltration or financial fraud.
This rule detects the presence of files matching known SHA256 hashes associated with the GhostCode phishing kit. It monitors for these files both in email attachments and on local device filesystems to identify potential delivery and execution of malicious phishing payloads.
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