Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network traffic and HTTP requests originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious infrastructure associated with 'Corp MDM'. The traffic includes C2 communication patterns, specific API URI paths, and potential login interactions on non-standard ports, consistent with phishing, malware delivery, or unauthorized administrative access.
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the 'Corp_MDM' Android spyware, specifically heartbeat check-ins, command polling, and result reporting to a known malicious C2 IP address.
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the 'Corp_MDM' Android spyware, specifically heartbeat check-ins, command polling, and result reporting to a known malicious C2 IP address.
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the 'Corp_MDM' Android spyware, specifically heartbeat check-ins, command polling, and result reporting to a known malicious C2 IP address.
Detects HTTP beaconing and command-and-control (C2) communication patterns consistent with the 'Corp_MDM' Android spyware, specifically heartbeat check-ins, command polling, and result reporting to a known malicious C2 IP address.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the authentication bypass vulnerability in Dahua firmware (CVE-2021-33045) via the JSON-RPC interface. The attacker attempts to manipulate the 'loginType' and 'ipAddr' fields, specifically using 'Loopback' as the login type and '127.0.0.1' as the IP address to bypass security controls.
Detects network communication associated with the SectopRAT/ArechClient2 remote access trojan, specifically identifying its characteristic length-prefixed, AES-encrypted command-and-control handshake on non-standard ports. The rule matches traffic containing a specific length-prefixed packet structure starting with null bytes, typically seen during C2 check-in.
Detects network activity related to the SectopRAT malware downloading a secondary module named 'WbElevation.dll' from a known command and control (C2) server. This module is typically associated with browser credential theft functionality.
Detects network activity related to the SectopRAT malware downloading a secondary module named 'WbElevation.dll' from a known command and control (C2) server. This module is typically associated with browser credential theft functionality.
Detects anomalous C2 traffic associated with SectopRAT that leverages JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods on 'binance.org'. The detection monitors for a specific POST request pattern followed by a response containing 'START' and 'FINISH' markers within the result field, indicating command-and-control communication disguised as blockchain interactions.
Detects anomalous C2 traffic associated with SectopRAT that leverages JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods on 'binance.org'. The detection monitors for a specific POST request pattern followed by a response containing 'START' and 'FINISH' markers within the result field, indicating command-and-control communication disguised as blockchain interactions.
Detects anomalous C2 traffic associated with SectopRAT that leverages JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods on 'binance.org'. The detection monitors for a specific POST request pattern followed by a response containing 'START' and 'FINISH' markers within the result field, indicating command-and-control communication disguised as blockchain interactions.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests) associated with identified 'ShipmentsFree' scam domains. These domains are typically used in phishing or credential harvesting campaigns to trick users into visiting fake account or tracking pages.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests) associated with identified 'ShipmentsFree' scam domains. These domains are typically used in phishing or credential harvesting campaigns to trick users into visiting fake account or tracking pages.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests) associated with identified 'ShipmentsFree' scam domains. These domains are typically used in phishing or credential harvesting campaigns to trick users into visiting fake account or tracking pages.
This rule detects network communication (DNS queries and TLS connections) to known actor-controlled Slack workspace subdomains, as well as the presence of a specific hardcoded public key in Slack API traffic, suggesting the use of Slack as a Command and Control (C2) channel.
Detects HTTP GET requests to external services 'trycloudflare.com' or 'workers.dev' that return a file content starting with the 'MZ' and 'PE' header signatures within the first 256 bytes, indicating a Windows executable payload download often associated with AvisLoader activity.
Detects HTTP GET requests to external services 'trycloudflare.com' or 'workers.dev' that return a file content starting with the 'MZ' and 'PE' header signatures within the first 256 bytes, indicating a Windows executable payload download often associated with AvisLoader activity.
Detects HTTP GET requests to external services 'trycloudflare.com' or 'workers.dev' that return a file content starting with the 'MZ' and 'PE' header signatures within the first 256 bytes, indicating a Windows executable payload download often associated with AvisLoader activity.
Detects a sequence of Tox P2P protocol packets consisting of a Cookie Request, Cookie Response, and Crypto Handshake within a single network flow. This pattern is indicative of the Tox P2P protocol, which is sometimes abused by malware (e.g., AvisLoader) for command-and-control (C2) communications to evade traditional network inspection.
Detects HTTP PUT requests that follow a specific pattern associated with MacSync Stealer's exfiltration mechanism. The rule identifies multipart data transmission by looking for specific URI parameters ('upload_id', 'chunk_index', 'total_chunks') used to piece together stolen ZIP files over an established HTTP connection.
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