Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detection of known Cloudflare Workers subdomains used as dead-drop resolvers for C2 communication by the QUICSILVER QUICAgent malware. The rule monitors for specific DNS queries to resolve these domains and subsequent HTTP GET requests used to retrieve C2 instructions.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known ClickFix campaign command-and-control infrastructure, identified by specific malicious domains (grandenoid.org, mootornot.com) and associated IP addresses.
Detects a specific network handshake pattern characterized by the string 'REVERSE_PROXY|' within the first 16 bytes of an established TCP connection, consistent with the x47.c Fast-Flux botnet command and control (C2) communication protocol.
Detects network traffic consistent with the x47.c bot performing a SOCKS5 reverse-proxy handshake to a command-and-control (C2) server. The rule triggers on the specific 'REVERSE_PROXY|' string signature within established outbound TCP connections.
This rule detects outbound TLS traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with Max Messenger covert telemetry beaconing behavior. The rule inspects the Server Name Indication (SNI) field in the TLS handshake for the specific domain string.
This rule detects outbound TLS traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with Max Messenger covert telemetry beaconing behavior. The rule inspects the Server Name Indication (SNI) field in the TLS handshake for the specific domain string.
This rule detects outbound TLS traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with Max Messenger covert telemetry beaconing behavior. The rule inspects the Server Name Indication (SNI) field in the TLS handshake for the specific domain string.
Detects network traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with the 'Max Messenger' malware's concealed telemetry and C2 channel. The rules monitor for TLS connections to this domain, including instances where the certificate subject contains 'VK LLC' and 'Moscow'.
Detects network traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with the 'Max Messenger' malware's concealed telemetry and C2 channel. The rules monitor for TLS connections to this domain, including instances where the certificate subject contains 'VK LLC' and 'Moscow'.
Detects network traffic to the domain 'trace-flow.ru', which is associated with the 'Max Messenger' malware's concealed telemetry and C2 channel. The rules monitor for TLS connections to this domain, including instances where the certificate subject contains 'VK LLC' and 'Moscow'.
Detects high-frequency outbound TLS connections to 'api-gost.oneme.ru', which is indicative of potential bulk contact list uploading, possibly related to unauthorized data collection by the Max Messenger application.
Detects high-frequency outbound TLS connections to 'api-gost.oneme.ru', which is indicative of potential bulk contact list uploading, possibly related to unauthorized data collection by the Max Messenger application.
Detects high-frequency outbound TLS connections to 'api-gost.oneme.ru', which is indicative of potential bulk contact list uploading, possibly related to unauthorized data collection by the Max Messenger application.
Detects high-frequency outbound TLS connections to 'api-gost.oneme.ru', which is indicative of potential bulk contact list uploading, possibly related to unauthorized data collection by the Max Messenger application.
Detects large and sustained outbound TCP data transfers to external networks, which may indicate mass data exfiltration. The rule monitors established sessions and uses a threshold to identify unusual outbound traffic volume over an extended period.
Detects network activity associated with a VBScript-based dropper attempting to retrieve payloads from known malicious infrastructure (cdn.imageurlgenerator.com) or abusing legitimate file hosting services (filemail.com) to bypass traditional security filters.
Detects an attempt to exploit a quote-injection vulnerability within the SharePoint ToolPane.aspx page, specifically targeting the Register directive to bypass SafeControls restrictions. This pattern is commonly used for remote code execution or unauthorized application behavior modifications by manipulating server-side parsing.
Detects network activity associated with the ORAX control-plane panel and management service. The rule identifies HTTP traffic containing OraxManage or OraxRDP service strings, SignalR negotiate handshakes directed to common ORAX management ports, and connections to identified ORAX C2 infrastructure domains and IP addresses.
This rule detects interaction between an internal host and the Vapi.ai API, typically used for automating AI-based voice phishing (vishing) calls. It identifies the initiation of a call via POST requests to the Vapi.ai API and subsequent callbacks from Vapi.ai to an attacker-controlled webhook endpoint used for tracking call status.
This rule detects a specific HTTP request pattern associated with the JWR-family Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. The detection looks for a WebSocket handshake initiation (GET request with specific URI segments 'webSocket/QT/' and a known hardcoded string) and an 'Upgrade' header, which are indicative of a command-and-control (C2) channel establishment.
Detects network activity associated with the GhostCode phishing kit, including HTTP requests to specific access-prefixed subdomains and DNS lookups for those domains. Additionally, it detects HTTP responses containing specific spoofed browser tab titles often used in these phishing campaigns.
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