Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
39,252 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
14,996
13,546
2,513
1,803
1,722
Contributors
7,678
6,007
5,306
4,504
4,026
Categories
17,755
9,465
3,749
3,677
3,674
Platforms
39,252
6,892
6,432
3,782
3,524
Products / Services
10,159
9,415
6,493
1,858
1,706
MITRE Techniques
13,649
12,957
7,908
5,843
4,364
CVEs
50
45
30
30
29
IDS Classtypes
214
56
36
24
19
IDS Protocols
177
171
20
17
8
Detects periodic network connection patterns indicative of Cobalt Strike beaconing. The rule identifies low-variance jittered traffic, where the communication interval remains relatively consistent over a defined period, consistent with default Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the 'CSuite' phishing and RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) campaign. It monitors network, DNS, proxy, email, URL click, and file creation telemetry over the past 24 hours to identify interactions with known-malicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes related to the campaign.
This rule detects unauthorized process creation from the SharePoint worker process (w3wp.exe). It specifically monitors for the spawning of command-line shells or scripting engines, which is indicative of exploitation activity such as remote code execution (RCE) attempts against SharePoint services, including deserialization attacks.
This rule performs a point-in-time sweep for known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the NeedyMantis threat actor group. The detection logic searches for specific file, process, and image-load SHA256 hashes, communication with a known C2 domain (tripswithengine.com), and the use of a hard-coded user-agent string (Firefox/21.0) across various telemetry sources within the last 30 days.
Detects .ps1-named files dropped to disk that are never actually executed by a PowerShell interpreter (powershell.exe / pwsh.exe) within a short window afterward. NeedyMantis's second-stage loader (e.g. encryptbase64.ps1) is raw x64 shellcode, not a real script -- it's read and executed directly by the dropping process, so no genuine PowerShell host process ever references the file by name. Replaces an earlier version of this rule that watched DeviceImageLoadEvents for a .ps1 extension: Windows can only emit an image-load event for a file with a valid PE header loaded via the OS loader, and raw shellcode has no PE header and is never mapped that way, so that approach would not have fired on this malware. Caveat: legitimate deployment tooling that stages a script for delayed or remote execution can also produce this create/execute mismatch; tune the window and add known-good deployment-tool exclusions for your environment.
Detects the two Windows-networking-named DLLs the report confirms as sideloaded via the normal OS loader (WinSparkle.dll, libcurl.dll) plus vim64.dll (a filename Vim's real installer never produces at all). Path check now covers any location outside a small allowlist of known-legitimate vendor install folders, not just ProgramData, so it also catches the reported ProgramData\\USOShared, ProgramData\\VIM, and ProgramData\\TightVNC\\VIM placements. Known limitation: the one reported case where the malicious WinSparkle.dll sits at the exact canonical Program Files\\Poedit path cannot be distinguished by path alone -- that specific sideload is instead caught by the companion 'Extensionless Archive Paired with Same-Named DLL Drop' rule via the archive-pairing signal.
This rule identifies installations of TeamViewer software that are vulnerable to specific CVEs (CVE-2026-19743, CVE-2026-92368, CVE-2026-92369, CVE-2026-92370, CVE-2026-92371) by analyzing the 'DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory' dataset. It checks for versioning patterns against known vulnerable build numbers across Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms to pinpoint systems requiring patching.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign, as detailed in Lab52 threat research. It monitors for file and process activity matching known malicious hashes, as well as network connections to specific domains and URLs associated with the campaign's command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain involving PowerShell: first, a script-based download of remote content, followed by in-memory reflection, and finally, suspicious memory allocation or thread manipulation within the same process context. This pattern is characteristic of fileless malware execution chains designed to evade disk-based detection.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
Page 44 of 1870