Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,594 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,463
65
36
12
11
Contributors
991
707
594
140
61
Categories
2,159
1,453
1,273
576
444
Platforms
2,418
272
203
71
63
Products / Services
10,683
9,759
6,695
4,421
3,750
2,594
MITRE Techniques
808
512
383
246
210
CVEs
18
12
12
12
10
IDS Classtypes
1,144
447
282
188
105
IDS Protocols
1,378
413
318
209
34
These rules detect behavioral patterns associated with GhostCode-style anti-analysis, including URI-based gate redirection (turnstile checks), automated client filtering (User-Agent scanning), and UI-based spoofing (tab title masquerading) often used to protect malicious infrastructure from automated analysis tools and bots.
Detects HTTP GET requests to a specific path structure /scanna/ which includes a token-like identifier and a check=1 parameter. This pattern is indicative of a bot-filtering relay mechanism often used by malicious scripts or malware to validate or redirect traffic while attempting to evade security scanners.
Detects network activity associated with the 'RatHat' Android malware, specifically identifying attempts to retrieve tunnel configuration, deployment confirmation, and the initial reverse tunnel handshake using the fatedier/frp (Fast Reverse Proxy) tool.
This rule detects network activity associated with the NovaCookies Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing framework, specifically looking for traffic to domains with a .vu TLD, matching a specific URI pattern used for phishing lures in HTTP requests/responses, and related DNS queries.
This rule detects anomalous OAuth authorization requests to Microsoft and Google services where the 'redirect_uri' parameter points to suspicious external domains (specifically ending in .vu) or, in the case of silent Microsoft OAuth requests, points to domains outside of recognized Microsoft/Office 365 infrastructure. Such abuse is often indicative of OAuth consent phishing campaigns designed to steal application access tokens.
Detects network activity associated with Mirage2FA Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rules monitor for HTTP responses containing specific spoofed Microsoft 365 sign-in page content, DNS resolutions for known proxy-associated domain suffixes, and client requests fetching malicious loader scripts from suspected AiTM hosting infrastructure.
Detects network traffic associated with Mirage2FA Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS), including HTTP requests to specific URI patterns characteristic of their backend loader and DNS queries to known malicious domain families (cheecker.store and volatilesour.store), as well as direct TCP connections to identified hosting infrastructure.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kit exfiltration behavior. It correlates the initial victim geolocation lookup via 'api.ipgeolocation.io' with subsequent data exfiltration to the Telegram Bot API ('api.telegram.org') originating from the same host, indicating an automated sequence where victim context is gathered and then exfiltrated by the phishing kit.
This rule detects a two-stage network redirect sequence indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing campaign. The first stage identifies traffic interacting with a Google Ads click-tracker, and the second stage identifies a subsequent request to an AWS S3 bucket, often used to host malicious landing pages or phishing proxies.
This rule set detects multi-stage network patterns indicative of AiTM phishing campaigns. It identifies common redirection techniques, including lookalike domains hosting Microsoft OAuth authorize URLs, DNS resolution of Google ad-tech infrastructure followed by novel domains, malicious use of Google Meet and Google Ads click-tracking endpoints as phishing hops, and references to AWS S3-hosted intermediate landing pages.
Detects network traffic indicating a potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing proxy attempting to relay authentication requests to the legitimate Microsoft login service. The rule triggers when an external host acts as a reverse proxy for login.microsoftonline.com endpoints without being the legitimate Microsoft service itself.
Detects network activity associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits. This includes detection of kit-specific fingerprinting scripts (class_identifier.php), use of specific server banners (openresty), unauthenticated geolocation lookups (api.country.is), setting of geolocation cookies, and proxying of requests to Microsoft OAuth endpoints.
Detects communication patterns associated with the OnyxC2 malware, including host-fingerprint synchronization over HTTP, potential reverse SOCKS5 proxy tunnel initialization, and inbound HTTP responses containing command tasking such as cmd.exe.
Detects high-frequency, unauthenticated Redis PING/AUTH attempts indicative of a reconnaissance scan against the Redis service. This activity typically represents an adversary performing mass fingerprinting or attempting to identify unsecured Redis instances.
Detects attempts to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on a MongoDB server using the deprecated eval command or patterns consistent with sandbox escape techniques (probing for process, load, and require functions).
Detects attempts to bypass the Redis Lua scripting environment sandbox by injecting 'require' and 'dofile' commands within an 'EVAL' request. These commands are typically used to load external modules or files, which, if successful, could allow an attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution on the server hosting the Redis instance.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access the Marimo Notebook terminal via a WebSocket connection, indicative of an exploit attempt targeting CVE-2026-39987.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects a multi-stage phishing redirect chain used in 'EvilTokens' attacks. The rule identifies communication with common serverless hosting platforms (Vercel, Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda/Execute-API) followed by interaction with anti-bot/CAPTCHA gates (Cloudflare Turnstile, hCaptcha, Google reCAPTCHA) and finally reaching known Microsoft device code phishing endpoints (/devicelogin or /common/oauth2/deviceauth).
Detects network activity associated with the KREMLIN browser extension communicating with a known command and control domain (luizestrelhashapr.online). The rule monitors DNS queries, TLS SNI connections, and HTTP WebSocket upgrade requests to identify potential C2 communication.
Page 44 of 124