Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects modifications to AI assistant configuration files by suspicious processes like package managers (npm, yarn) or shell interpreters (bash, powershell). This activity is indicative of a supply chain attack, specifically the SANDWORM_MODE campaign, where an attacker injects a rogue Model Context Protocol (MCP) server entry to hijack AI tools. This enables automated source code and secret theft via prompt injection.
Detects Microsoft PowerPoint spawning a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) to perform suspicious file operations. This behavior was observed in an APT36 campaign where a malicious PowerPoint Add-in (.ppam) was used to create staging directories and extract embedded payloads.
Detects the presence of files matching the SHA256 hashes of known RESURGE malware components, including the main 'libdsupgrade.so' library, the 'liblogblock.so' log tamperer, and the 'dsmain' utility. This rule identifies the creation or modification of these specific files on a device.
Detects Microsoft PowerPoint spawning a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) to perform suspicious file operations. This behavior was observed in an APT36 campaign where a malicious PowerPoint Add-in (.ppam) was used to create staging directories and extract embedded payloads.
Detects LOLBin processes (mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) making outbound network connections to non-standard ports. This behavior is characteristic of the PeckBirdy framework's C2 communication.
Detects the execution or presence of files associated with the Muddled Libra threat actor's toolkit. This includes tools for tunneling (Chisel), Active Directory reconnaissance (ADRecon, ADExplorer), and the initial tool archive (goon.zip). The rule identifies process execution by hash, filename, or command line arguments, and file creation events for specific hashes.
Detects outbound network connections to known command-and-control (C2) and payload delivery infrastructure associated with the Rekoobe campaign. The rule specifically looks for connections to the IP address 154.84.63.184 or domains img.spoolsv.cc, img.spoolsv.net, spoolsv.cc, and spoolsv.net.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling or data exfiltration by identifying high volumes of DNS queries with unusually long subdomains from a single process on a device. It aggregates DNS connection inspection events, extracts the subdomain length, and then summarizes the count of queries, unique domains, and average subdomain length within a 10-minute window. An alert is triggered if the query count exceeds 100 or if more than 50 unique domains are observed, combined with subdomain lengths greater than 30 characters.
Detects the creation of a Ruby runtime environment in unusual ProgramData subdirectories and the renaming of the Ruby interpreter to masquerade as a USB utility, a technique used by APT37's SNAKEDROPPER malware. Specifically looks for file events in 'C:\ProgramData\usbspeed' or 'C:\ProgramData\ruby3' where the filename is 'usbspeed.exe' or the previous filename was 'rubyw.exe'.
This rule detects the installation of known malicious browser extensions associated with the ChatGPT Stealer campaign. These extensions are designed to steal AI session tokens and conversation data by monitoring file creation or renaming events in directories where browser extensions are typically installed.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptocurrency mining pools or processes associated with cryptocurrency mining. It identifies suspicious activity based on remote URLs, process names, and remote ports commonly used by miners.
Detects the MSHTA utility (mshta.exe) executing a remote script which then spawns a .NET registration utility (RegAsm.exe or RegSvcs.exe). This specific execution chain is a high-confidence indicator of malware loaders like XWorm and Lumma Stealer, often delivered via ClickFix social engineering lures.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task configured to execute a VBScript from a user's AppData folder. This technique is used by adversaries, including the Dead#Vax campaign, to establish persistence via an indirect execution flow, often to evade detections focused on direct PowerShell or cmd.exe task actions.
Detects the execution of legitimate Windows binaries from suspicious public or shared locations, a technique used by the Dohdoor malware campaign to sideload a malicious DLL.
Detects a Node.js process accessing sensitive files such as environment configuration files (.env) or browser credential/session stores. This behavior was observed in a developer-targeting campaign where attackers exfiltrated secrets from compromised developer machines.
This rule detects suspicious processes (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe) making outbound network connections to public IP addresses on non-standard ports. This behavior can indicate command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration attempts, as adversaries often use non-standard ports to evade detection.
This rule detects activity associated with the DYNOWIPER malware. It identifies the malware through specific SHA256 file hashes, known filenames (dynacom_update.exe, source.exe, schtask.exe, dynacon_update.ps1, exp.ps1), and process names (dynacom_update.exe, source.exe, schtask.exe, powershell.exe). Additionally, it flags network connections to or from a set of known malicious IP addresses (185.200.177.10, 31.172.71.5, 193.200.17.163, 185.82.127.20, 72.62.35.76) which are associated with VPN logins or exfiltration reverse proxies used by DYNOWIPER.
Detects instances where 'nslookup.exe' is initiated by 'explorer.exe'. This activity can be indicative of an adversary performing DNS queries for reconnaissance or command and control (C2) staging, especially when not part of a legitimate administrative script or user action. The rule excludes a common false positive related to conhost.exe.
Detects the execution of legitimate .NET framework utilities (Aspnet_compiler.exe, RegAsm.exe, vbc.exe) launched by scripting engines like PowerShell or WScript. This behavior is a known TTP for process hollowing, as seen in Agent Tesla campaigns, where malware injects its code into a trusted process to evade defenses.
Detects a command-line pattern associated with the Metasploit 'getsystem' command. This technique involves echoing a string into a named pipe to elevate privileges to SYSTEM, often executed via a newly created service.
This rule detects potential port scanning activity from a single host. It identifies scenarios where a device attempts to connect to a large number of unique remote ports (20 or more) or a large number of unique remote IP addresses (25 or more) within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to discover open ports or active hosts on a network.
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