Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to a known Cobalt Strike-compatible C2 server at 45.32.253.166 on port 8088. This activity is indicative of a compromised host establishing a command-and-control connection.
Detects internal SMB traffic indicative of P2P beaconing using the IPC$ named pipe, which is often a sign of lateral movement or command-and-control communication between compromised hosts.
This rule detects malicious network traffic generated by the ClearFake malware, which uses a specific JSON-RPC 'eth_call' request to the Binance Smart Chain (BSC) testnet to retrieve C2 instructions from a designated dead-drop smart contract. This method allows the adversary to maintain persistent command and control communication by leveraging blockchain technology.
Detects network indicators associated with the ClearFake campaign, including connections to known dead-drop resolvers (bsc-testnet-rpc.publicnode.com), use of Cloudflare Workers as C2 infrastructure, and the delivery of malicious fake browser-update/CAPTCHA JavaScript payloads.
Detects outbound HTTP requests where the user-agent starts with 'PHP/' and the URI contains the path for the Admin Menu Editor Pro plugin, suggesting communication between a trojanized WordPress plugin and a remote command-and-control server.
Detects HTTP responses containing a file named 'ClaudeDesktop.exe' served from paths containing '/artifacts/' on the 'claude.ai' host where the request referrer is not 'claude.ai' or 'anthropic.com', suggesting a malvertising or supply chain delivery attempt of a malicious installer.
Detects HTTP responses containing a file named 'ClaudeDesktop.exe' served from paths containing '/artifacts/' on the 'claude.ai' host where the request referrer is not 'claude.ai' or 'anthropic.com', suggesting a malvertising or supply chain delivery attempt of a malicious installer.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, and HTTP host headers associated with the known exfiltration domain 't.m-kosche.com' linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud malware.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, and HTTP host headers associated with the known exfiltration domain 't.m-kosche.com' linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud malware.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, and HTTP host headers associated with the known exfiltration domain 't.m-kosche.com' linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud malware.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to public Telegram Bot API or Slack webhooks, indicative of potential data exfiltration by the npm indexed-btree malware or similar malicious actors utilizing these services for command and control or exfiltration.
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity associated with Xray-core, where the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) field is spoofed to 'dl.google.com' to masquerade malicious traffic as legitimate Google-related traffic.
Detects sustained outbound TCP communication patterns indicative of Xray-core proxy or tunneling activity. The rule monitors for high-frequency established TCP sessions originating from the internal network, which is a common behavior for tools used to maintain persistent network tunnels or proxy command-and-control traffic.
Detects network activity initiated by Node.js processes towards specific Infura and Alchemy RPC endpoints for the Sepolia testnet, including specific JSON-RPC queries containing potential malicious contract addresses. This pattern is indicative of C2 communication using legitimate Web3 infrastructure.
This rule detects network traffic originating from internal hosts to Slack's domain that contains hardcoded Slack bot tokens and specific Slack channel IDs associated with a malicious npm supply chain campaign (indexed-btree). This indicates successful exfiltration of sensitive configuration credentials or data to an attacker-controlled Slack environment.
Detects network traffic associated with the malicious npm package 'indexed-btree', which uses the Telegram Bot API to exfiltrate data. The rules monitor for connections to api.telegram.org via HTTPS and identify specific hardcoded bot tokens and chat IDs associated with the malicious campaign.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting the cdnsuicaches[.]com domain. The rules identify the initial DNS query, the subsequent TLS SNI connection, and the retrieval of malicious JavaScript containing the 'cookie-captcha-complete' overlay signature. This behavior is indicative of a browser-based social engineering attack.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound network traffic attempting to exfiltrate data to Slack or Telegram APIs using hardcoded bot tokens or channel identifiers associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known public Ethereum RPC gateways (Alchemy and Infura) containing embedded, hardcoded API keys or references to specific contract addresses associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign. This pattern indicates a compromised host leveraging legitimate Web3 infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication.
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