Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where the Windows 11 Notepad process (Notepad.exe) spawns unexpected child processes. This behavior is a primary indicator of the CVE-2026-20841 exploitation via malicious Markdown links, which allows for remote code execution.
Detects Notepad.exe initiating outbound network connections, specifically over SMB (port 445) or to public IP addresses over HTTP/S. This behavior is highly anomalous and can indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2026-20841 to trigger an NTLM relay attack for credential harvesting or to download a remote payload.
This rule detects the installation and activation of the ClawdBot extension, likely within Visual Studio Code. It looks for the creation of specific files (extension.js, package.json, run.bat) within known VS Code extension paths and correlates this with the execution of 'Code.exe' or 'code.exe'. The rule specifically triggers when at least two of these files are found in the specified paths, indicating a potential extension installation.
Detects a specific two-step HTTP pattern characteristic of OysterLoader's initial C2 communication. The malware first sends a registration request containing a 'WordPressAgent' User-Agent string, followed by a login request with a 'FingerPrint' User-Agent string to the same destination. This version checks for the User-Agent strings in the 'AdditionalFields' column.
This rule detects suspicious Python script execution via svchost.exe. Specifically, it looks for svchost.exe processes running from a user's profile directory that execute Python commands containing 'import', 'requests', 'exec(', and a URL (http:// or https://). This pattern is indicative of a Python interpreter being used to download and execute malicious code, potentially masquerading as a legitimate svchost process.
Detects Notepad++ installer and portable files where the file hash does not match a list of known legitimate hashes. This could indicate a malicious file masquerading as Notepad++.
This rule detects the creation or modification of Chrome extension files (.crx) on a device, correlating it with browser extension installation/update events and file prevalence. It flags extensions that are rare, unsigned, small in size, or have suspicious IDs, indicating potential malicious activity or unauthorized installations.
This query identifies outbound network connections made by the notepad++.exe process. This is useful for hunting for suspicious activity, such as connections to malicious update servers or C2 channels, by baselining normal update and plugin activity.
This KQL query identifies file creation events within common Windows startup directories and enriches them with Windows Shell Link (shortcut) creation activity.
Startup folders are frequently abused by adversaries for persistence since files or shortcuts placed here automatically execute at user login. The query covers both system-wide and user-specific startup paths and can exclude known legitimate items via an exclusion list to reduce false positives.
Startup folders are frequently abused by adversaries for persistence since files or shortcuts placed here automatically execute at user login. The query covers both system-wide and user-specific startup paths and can exclude known legitimate items via an exclusion list to reduce false positives.
Detects file operations involving known malicious hashes associated with a Notepad++ supply chain compromise. The rule identifies files with specific SHA1 hashes and provides contextual information such as action type, device name, file path, and initiating process details. The enhanced version further categorizes risk levels, enriches data with Notepad++ specific context, and aggregates events for a summary view, including threat metrics and prioritization for response actions.
Detects the Notepad++ updater process (GUP.exe) spawning a child process named 'update.exe'. This behavior was observed during the Lotus Blossom supply chain attack where the Notepad++ update infrastructure was compromised to deliver the Chrysalis backdoor.
This rule detects activity related to the Chrysalis Backdoor, which is associated with the Lotus Blossom threat group. It identifies malicious activity through three main components: 1. File and process events matching a list of known malicious SHA256 hashes. 2. Network connections to known malicious IP addresses or domains. 3. Suspicious execution of 'svchost.exe' from non-standard Windows directories with specific command-line arguments, indicating potential masquerading or malicious execution.
Detects the use of curl.exe to upload data to the temp.sh file-sharing service. This technique has been observed in post-compromise reconnaissance activities, including those following Notepad++ compromises.
This rule detects the execution of suspicious Visual Studio Code extensions, specifically those associated with known malicious extensions like ClawBot. It identifies instances where the VS Code executable initiates a process with command-line arguments containing keywords related to these malicious extensions.
This rule detects the use of unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools by identifying network connections to RMM-related URLs that have not been observed in a baseline period (last 7 days) but are observed in the last hour. It specifically filters out connections to approved RMM domains and known initiating processes (like web browsers) to reduce false positives. The rule leverages an external list of RMM domains to identify suspicious activity.
This rule detects network connections to domains and IP addresses associated with the malicious OpenClawCLI campaign, which uses social engineering to trick users into running obfuscated commands.
This rule detects the execution of 'node' with 'install' and 'openclaw' in its command line, or any process command line containing 'https://openclaw.ai/install.'. This indicates an attempt to install or execute the 'openclaw' tool, potentially for malicious purposes or unauthorized software deployment.
This rule correlates multiple indicators of compromise (IOCs) across file, network, and process events to detect potential advanced persistent threats (APTs) or sophisticated malware. It looks for specific file paths associated with tools like Lightshot, ScreenConnect, or suspicious VS Code extensions, combined with network connections to known malicious domains/IPs or unusual ports, and the execution of suspicious processes like 'Code.exe' outside of its legitimate VS Code path or 'ScreenConnect' related executables. A high threat score is assigned if multiple types of these indicators are observed on the same device and account within a 30-day window.
Detects the execution of Active Directory enumeration tools (ADRecon, ADExplorer) that result in the creation of 'ComputerSPNs.csv'. Muddled Libra uses this file to identify critical services (Veeam, MSSQL, Exchange) for targeting via their Service Principal Names (SPNs).
Detects the execution of a Python interpreter that has been renamed to a common system process name, such as 'svchost.exe'. This is a known TTP used by malware like PXA Stealer to evade detection and blend in with normal system activity. The rule also attempts to correlate this activity with network connections to identify potential C2 communication.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to a predefined list of malicious domains. These domains are likely associated with typosquatting or other malicious infrastructure used by adversaries.
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