Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Kerberos TGT requests (Event ID 4768) that utilize RC4 (PreAuthType 23) for pre-authentication. This is a common indicator of an Overpass-the-Hash attack, where an adversary uses a stolen NTLM hash to authenticate as a user and request a Kerberos ticket in environments that are typically configured for AES encryption.
Shows all Kerberos authentication activity on domain controllers - TGT requests, TGS requests, and pre-auth failures (4768/4769/4771). Good for hunting credential attacks, AS-REP roasting, weak encryption usage, and account lockout troubleshooting.
Detects multiple Kerberos pre-authentication failures (Event ID 4771) with failure code 0x18, indicating incorrect passwords, originating from the same source address for a specific user account within a ten-minute window, which may suggest brute-force or credential-stuffing activity.
This rule detects Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests made for the 'AZUREADSSOACC$' computer account, which is typically used for Seamless Single Sign-On (SSO) in hybrid Azure AD environments. The rule explicitly excludes known Domain Controllers from triggering the alert to focus on potentially suspicious TGS requests originating from other systems.
This rule monitors Kerberos TGS (Ticket-Granting Service) requests for suspicious patterns indicative of Kerberoasting, specifically looking for the use of weak encryption algorithms (RC4 or DES) and high volumes of service ticket requests for unique Service Principal Names (SPNs). It groups activity by source host and time window, flagging activity that involves DES encryption or a significant number of unique SPN requests. Great for detecting kerberoasting activity from unmanaged or rogue devices
This rule detects Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests made for the 'AZUREADSSOACC$' computer account, which is typically used for Seamless Single Sign-On (SSO) in hybrid Azure AD environments. The rule explicitly excludes known Domain Controllers from triggering the alert to focus on potentially suspicious TGS requests originating from other systems.
This rule monitors Kerberos TGS (Ticket-Granting Service) requests for suspicious patterns indicative of Kerberoasting, specifically looking for the use of weak encryption algorithms (RC4 or DES) and high volumes of service ticket requests for unique Service Principal Names (SPNs). It groups activity by source host and time window, flagging activity that involves DES encryption or a significant number of unique SPN requests. Great for detecting kerberoasting activity from unmanaged or rogue devices
Detects the use of the klist.exe utility with suspicious subcommands ('sessions', '-li', 'get', 'purge') to inspect, retrieve, or clear cached Kerberos tickets, which is indicative of credential discovery or post-exploitation activity.
Detects an abnormally high volume of Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) requests encrypted with RC4 (0x17) from a single source IP. This behavior is indicative of Kerberoasting, an attack where an adversary attempts to extract service account passwords from requested TGS tickets.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by identifying an unusual number of Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) for service principal names (SPNs) ending with '$' from a single client address within an hour. A high count (over 10) is flagged as 'High' suspicion, while a count between 5 and 10 is flagged as 'Medium'. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to obtain service ticket hashes for offline cracking.
This rule detects potential Golden Ticket attacks by looking for multiple successful Kerberos authentication events (EventID 4624) with LogonType 3 (network logon) and a specific TicketEncryptionType (0x17), originating from the same IP address and targeting the same user, within a short timeframe and with a long ticket lifetime. A Golden Ticket attack involves an adversary forging Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) to gain unauthorized access to resources.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting attacks by identifying a high number of Kerberos Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) requests (EventID 4769) for Service Principal Names (SPNs) that are encrypted with RC4 (indicated by TicketOptions containing '0x40810000'). A threshold of 15 or more TGS requests from a single IP address for a target user is used to flag suspicious activity.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by monitoring for Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) and Kerberos-based network logons (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 3) originating from source IP addresses that deviate from an account's established baseline of activity over the previous 14 days.
This rule detects potential Golden Ticket attacks by looking for multiple successful Kerberos authentication events (EventID 4624) with LogonType 3 (network logon) and a specific TicketEncryptionType (0x17), originating from the same IP address and targeting the same user, within a short timeframe and with a long ticket lifetime. A Golden Ticket attack involves an adversary forging Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) to gain unauthorized access to resources.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by monitoring for Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) and Kerberos-based network logons (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 3) originating from source IP addresses that deviate from an account's established baseline of activity over the previous 14 days.
Detects Kerberos service tickets for the 'krbtgt' account that utilize RC4 encryption (0x17) or possess a suspiciously long lifetime (exceeding 10 hours). These conditions are common indicators of Golden Ticket attacks or potential credential manipulation, as legitimate TGTs should not typically exhibit these properties.
This rule detects and summarizes Kerberos authentication ticket requests (EventID 4765) and Kerberos authentication ticket request failures (EventID 4766) by subject username on an hourly basis. A high volume of these events for a single user could indicate credential stuffing, brute-force attempts, or other authentication-related anomalies.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring Windows Event ID 4769 (Kerberos service ticket request). It identifies excessive requests for service tickets using RC4 encryption (0x17) by a single account within a 10-minute window, excluding common service accounts and krbtgt requests.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting attacks by identifying a high number of Kerberos Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) requests (EventID 4769) for Service Principal Names (SPNs) that are encrypted with RC4 (indicated by TicketOptions containing '0x40810000'). A threshold of 15 or more TGS requests from a single IP address for a target user is used to flag suspicious activity.
This rule detects potential AS-REP Roasting activity by monitoring for a single source IP address requesting Kerberos TGTs (Event ID 4768) for multiple distinct user accounts within a 10-minute window. This behavior often indicates an attacker attempting to identify and harvest Kerberos pre-authentication hashes from accounts that do not require pre-authentication, which can then be cracked offline.
Detects Kerberos service tickets for the 'krbtgt' account that utilize RC4 encryption (0x17) or possess a suspiciously long lifetime (exceeding 10 hours). These conditions are common indicators of Golden Ticket attacks or potential credential manipulation, as legitimate TGTs should not typically exhibit these properties.
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