Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility that point to suspicious script execution, encoded commands, or files located in commonly abused writable directories like Temp or ProgramData. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility that point to suspicious script execution, encoded commands, or files located in commonly abused writable directories like Temp or ProgramData. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms.
Detects the use of the Windows certutil utility to decode Base64-encoded files into executable, library, or script formats. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to decode malicious payloads that were dropped on a system in an encoded form to bypass signature-based security controls.
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to initiate process creation on remote hosts. This is achieved by combining the '/node:' flag (to specify a remote target) with the 'process call create' command. This technique is frequently utilized by adversaries and ransomware operators for lateral movement across a Windows network.
Detects the use of WMIC to invoke XSL files or perform suspicious process creation commands, a technique often used for proxy execution or script-based attacks.
Detects execution patterns indicative of 'ClickFix' social engineering, where a user is tricked into copying a command to their clipboard and executing it directly in a terminal. The rule monitors for processes that read clipboard contents (via PowerShell or clip.exe) and simultaneously invoke shell interpreters to execute the retrieved data.
Detects the use of the wevtutil.exe utility to clear multiple Windows event logs simultaneously. This is a common defense evasion technique used by attackers to hide malicious activity by deleting security, system, application, or setup event logs.
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'CreateObjectTask' via schtasks or PowerShell, which is associated with spawning 'dllhost.exe' as a child process under high-privileged parent processes (svchost, taskeng, or schtasks). This behavior is indicative of potential COM hijacking or privilege escalation techniques leveraging system tasks.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe initiated by wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the task configuration or execution occurs within common user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Downloads). The rule specifically flags behavior involving multiple task invocations in a short time frame, which is indicative of persistence mechanisms used by scripts.
This rule detects the suspicious creation or modification of local user accounts (e.g., 'svc_ipurple') occurring within a short 15-minute window following the execution of Windows Package Manager (Winget) configuration tasks. This behavior may indicate an attacker using automated configuration files (DSC) to establish persistence or escalate privileges on a compromised system.
Detects anomalous child process spawning from common web browsers or productivity applications (e.g., Office, Acrobat) on hosts that have recently communicated with known LLM or code-generation APIs. This behavioral correlation is intended to identify the potential execution of AI-generated exploit code.
Detects network discovery activities including ICMP sweeps, ARP cache checks, and SMB share/session enumeration, which are common tactics used for internal reconnaissance by the threat group APT36 (Transparent Tribe).
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window arguments from explorer.exe, typically indicative of ClickFix social engineering where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks initiated by the WinGet DSC configuration processes, specifically ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe or WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe. This activity is indicative of the abuse of the 'ScheduledTask' resource within a WinGet configuration file to establish persistence via a logon-triggered task.
Detects the use of Windows command shell variable substring expansion to obfuscate commands. Adversaries use this technique to build malicious command lines dynamically, making them less visible to standard keyword-based detection mechanisms by storing parts of strings in environment variables and reassembling them using substring notation (e.g., %var:~start,length%).
Detects the initiation of PowerShell by the Windows Explorer process (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of malicious activity such as lateral movement or execution of scripts originating from user-triggered actions. The rule flags command lines containing obfuscated patterns, bypass arguments, or encoded commands.
Detects the use of net.exe or net1.exe to establish an IPC$ share connection. This is a common method for lateral movement and reconnaissance by attackers to verify administrative access or interact with remote systems via SMB. The rule specifically flags commands involving the IPC$ share, with logic to identify if a specific user was specified or if an anonymous session was attempted.
This rule monitors for two indicators of potentially malicious WinRM activity: first, the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe) originating from the Windows Remote Management host process (wsmprovhost.exe); and second, a 'fan-out' pattern where a single account establishes WinRM/PSRemoting sessions on three or more distinct hosts within a short time window, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement or credential abuse.
This rule detects potentially malicious command execution by monitoring additions to the Windows Explorer RunMRU registry key. It specifically triggers when the registry data contains references to 'powershell', 'curl', or appears to be encoded/base64 strings, which are often used by adversaries to execute malicious scripts or download payloads via the Run dialog.
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