Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects rapid, successive successful interactive sign-ins for the same user account that each satisfy MFA requirements, but originate from geographically and technically distinct environments (different IP locations, ASNs, and device IDs) within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) or Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) frameworks.
This rule detects successful authentication events using the Microsoft OAuth device code flow, which is often abused in phishing campaigns to hijack user sessions. It flags authentication attempts that match specific device authorization URLs, include signs of bypassing security warnings, or indicate a lack of direct user authentication interaction.
Detects successful modifications to user MFA methods (StrongAuthenticationMethod) where the associated device details are missing or indicate a software-only token activation. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary adding their own MFA device to a compromised account to maintain persistent access or bypass MFA requirements.
Detects high-volume, sustained or burst-like access, download, or deletion activity by a single user across SharePoint, OneDrive, or Exchange services. This behavior is indicative of potential data staging, exfiltration, or bulk malicious activity by a compromised account or insider.
This rule detects potential reconnaissance activity against Microsoft Graph API endpoints, indicative of an adversary enumerating tenant resources such as users, groups, applications, and directory roles. It monitors for high volumes of diverse Graph API queries originating from a single user or application identity within a short time window, which is a common behavior pattern for automated discovery tools.
This rule monitors cloud and identity logs to detect a single user identity exhibiting multiple stages of suspicious activity (authentication, reconnaissance, and exfiltration) within a 24-hour period while utilizing distinct, non-overlapping source IP addresses for each stage. This behavior is indicative of an account compromise where different stages of the attack chain originate from different infrastructure.
Detects anomalous, high-volume mailbox access across multiple distinct Exchange Online mailboxes within a short timeframe (1 hour) initiated by a single user account. This behavior is indicative of automated email reconnaissance, content scraping, or bulk exfiltration, often associated with post-credential compromise activity where an attacker iterates through mailboxes to identify sensitive information such as financial or administrative data.
This rule detects high-volume, burst-pattern email distribution associated with a 'New VM Received' subject line, originating from non-authorized or non-corporate domains. This behavior is indicative of potential mass phishing or spam campaigns mimicking automated voicemail notifications.
This rule monitors for various types of events (user logons, network connections, API audits, cloud app events, and email traffic) originating from a specific CIDR block (160.79.104.0/21), which is flagged as suspicious or unauthorized.
This rule monitors for a multi-stage attack pattern involving two potential indicators: first, it identifies phishing emails containing a 'Google Docs' link combined with an attachment named 'API Logic Flaw'. Second, it detects browser activity involving the paste of JavaScript code or suspicious browser clipboard activity, which may indicate an attacker attempting to execute malicious scripts directly in the user's browser context.
Detects incoming EXTERNAL emails containing subject lines indicative of meeting invitations or call records, which include external URLs pointing to non-standard or unverified cloud storage providers, combined with explicit remote-access/support solicitation language. Requiring the remote-access/support signal and excluding internal-to-internal mail narrows this to callback-phishing style lures rather than routine meeting correspondence.
Detects phishing emails containing URLs with IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g., [::ffff:192.168.0.1]). Adversaries use this obfuscation technique to bypass security filters that may not correctly parse or normalize IPv6-mapped addresses within URLs.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
This rule detects email-based business fraud (BEC) targeting the organization, specifically looking for executive impersonation paired with financial lure terminology and sender domain mismatches. It utilizes both a blocklist of known fraudulent sender indicators (domains and addresses) and a heuristic approach analyzing discrepancies between the envelope sender domain and the header sender domain combined with executive titles in display names and invoice-related keywords.
Detects attempts to disable audit logging features in Microsoft 365, specifically mailbox auditing (via Set-Mailbox) or unified audit log ingestion (via Set-AdminAuditLogConfig). Disabling these features can be a precursor to unauthorized activities, as it prevents the capture of user actions and administrative changes.
Detects high-volume, potentially programmatic search activity in Microsoft 365 SharePoint, characterized by iterative pagination requests using the 'indexdocid' parameter. This behavior may indicate an automated effort to crawl or systematically exfiltrate document metadata or content via the SharePoint search interface, often associated with post-exploitation discovery or unauthorized data collection.
Detects high-volume, potentially programmatic search activity in Microsoft 365 SharePoint, characterized by iterative pagination requests using the 'indexdocid' parameter. This behavior may indicate an automated effort to crawl or systematically exfiltrate document metadata or content via the SharePoint search interface, often associated with post-exploitation discovery or unauthorized data collection.
Detects anomalous, high-volume email access patterns (more than 200 mail items accessed per hour) by specific Client or Azure AD App IDs, which may indicate automated data collection or exfiltration by an adversary using compromised or unauthorized applications.
Detects anomalous, high-volume email access patterns (more than 200 mail items accessed per hour) by specific Client or Azure AD App IDs, which may indicate automated data collection or exfiltration by an adversary using compromised or unauthorized applications.
This rule detects email activity involving DocuSign-themed messages that contain attachments and also coincide with URL click events that redirect users to Microsoft-related login portals (e.g., login.microsoftonline.com or teams.microsoft.com) containing 'redirect' or 'redirect_uri' parameters. This behavior is indicative of a phishing attempt designed to capture credentials or perform OAuth consent phishing by mimicking legitimate document-signing workflows.
This rule identifies emails containing URLs associated with known suspicious or malicious domains (secboxes.com, msbenefit.com, attcdn.com, brianwilli.com). It filters for instances where the sender's domain is not one of the identified suspicious domains to reduce noise from potential email spoofing or miscategorized communications, flagging potential phishing attempts.
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