Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential indicators of compromise related to the 'ATodaPotencia' campaign by monitoring email URL logs, process command-line arguments, and general device events for the string 'ATodaPotencia'. The rule searches across multiple data sources to identify where this specific handle or artifact appears within an environment.
This rule detects activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with recent Russian espionage campaigns, including malicious domains, IP addresses, email senders, file names, and file hashes. It monitors network, sign-in, email, process, and file events across enterprise systems.
Detects incoming email messages containing specific suspicious attachment types (.img, .iso) associated with known malicious sender addresses, domains, or specific subject lines indicative of phishing attempts.
Detects anomalous administrative activity within Microsoft Exchange by identifying accounts performing multiple suspicious operations within a short timeframe. This rule flags activities like modifying transport rules, virtual directories, or management role assignments, which are often indicative of malicious persistence or configuration tampering, while excluding known authorized service accounts.
Detects instances where a user account experiences multiple failed sign-in attempts followed by a successful sign-in from a different, geographically distant location within a short timeframe, indicating impossible travel and potential credential compromise.
This rule detects potential social engineering attacks where an attacker initiates a Microsoft Teams call from an external domain while impersonating an internal IT support or help desk entity. The detection specifically correlates this event with a recent preceding email bombing campaign (exceeding 20 emails) targeting the same user within the last 3 hours, indicating a coordinated attempt to pressure or confuse the victim.
Detects high-volume mailbox access (exceeding 50 items) performed by a specific API/Client ID pair associated with known mailbox exfiltration tools. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized automated data collection or harvesting from an Office 365 Exchange environment.
This rule monitors incoming emails by cross-referencing sender addresses against a hardcoded list of known malicious or suspicious email accounts. It associates these emails with any potential attachments to provide context for further investigation.
Detects anomalous privilege reconnaissance activity where an account queries Microsoft Graph API endpoints (such as directory roles or member/transitive member lists) multiple times in a short window, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to enumerate Global or Exchange Administrator role memberships.
Detects anomalous privilege reconnaissance activity where an account queries Microsoft Graph API endpoints (such as directory roles or member/transitive member lists) multiple times in a short window, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to enumerate Global or Exchange Administrator role memberships.
Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
This rule detects potentially malicious outbound email activity sent through Microsoft Graph or Exchange APIs using unknown or infrequently seen client applications. It identifies scenarios where these applications send emails containing financial keywords (e.g., 'invoice', 'wire transfer'), which is a common indicator of Business Email Compromise (BEC) and 'EvilTokens' style mail-vault activity where attackers intercept or inject themselves into existing financial threads.
Detects anomalous privilege reconnaissance activity where an account queries Microsoft Graph API endpoints (such as directory roles or member/transitive member lists) multiple times in a short window, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to enumerate Global or Exchange Administrator role memberships.
Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
This rule monitors Office 365 SharePoint file operations and search queries for patterns indicative of automated discovery and exfiltration of sensitive content. It specifically identifies high-frequency search queries involving wildcard parameters used in SharePoint content indexing, which may suggest an adversary is systematically crawling or enumerating organizational documents.
This rule identifies emails containing URLs associated with known suspicious or malicious domains (secboxes.com, msbenefit.com, attcdn.com, brianwilli.com). It filters for instances where the sender's domain is not one of the identified suspicious domains to reduce noise from potential email spoofing or miscategorized communications, flagging potential phishing attempts.
This rule detects high-frequency account and email address enumeration attempts. It monitors syslog data for SMTP commands such as VRFY, EXPN, or RCPT TO, and analyzes Microsoft Entra ID (SigninLogs) for authentication failures specifically associated with error code 50034 (user not found). Both behaviors are indicative of an adversary attempting to validate user identities within an environment, often as a precursor to targeted phishing or brute-force attacks.
This rule detects email-based business fraud (BEC) targeting the organization, specifically looking for executive impersonation paired with financial lure terminology and sender domain mismatches. It utilizes both a blocklist of known fraudulent sender indicators (domains and addresses) and a heuristic approach analyzing discrepancies between the envelope sender domain and the header sender domain combined with executive titles in display names and invoice-related keywords.
Detects high-volume or multi-mailbox activity in Exchange Online, indicative of automated mailbox collection or unauthorized bulk data access via Graph or REST APIs. The rule monitors for a threshold of operations across multiple mailboxes or high event counts originating from specific API clients.
Detects signs of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks targeting cloud authentication. The rule monitors for access to suspicious domain patterns often used in AiTM phishing kits, specific MFA interruption errors (50074/50140) characteristic of proxy-based flows, and rapid successful logins from different IP addresses within a 15-minute window, suggesting session token theft and replay.
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