Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
260 detections
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Detects inbound network connections from external, non-private IP addresses to local ports 6081 and 6082. These ports are used by the PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal, which is actively targeted by CVE-2026-0300.
Detects the execution of commands used to disable the algif_aead module to mitigate CVE-2026-31431 (Copy Fail). This rule monitors for dynamic unloading of the module using 'rmmod' or persistent configuration changes via 'modprobe.d' to disable the module. While this is a mitigation step, monitoring for it ensures compliance and tracks remediation efforts.
Detects inbound network connections from external, non-private IP addresses to local ports 6081 and 6082. These ports are used by the PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal, which is actively targeted by CVE-2026-0300.
Suspicious PAN-OS Captive Portal Access
Cortex XDR
Detects anomalous or repetitive access to PAN-OS Captive Portal HTTP endpoints which may indicate active scanning for CVE-2026-0300 vulnerability exposure.
Identifies network connections targeting port 6082, commonly used by the PAN-OS User-ID portal and specifically targeted in the CVE-2026-0300 PoC exploit to deliver a buffer overflow payload.
CVE-2026-0300 Scanner Tool User-Agent
Cortex XDR
Detects the use of the CVE-2026-0300 scanner tool by its distinct User-Agent string attempting to identify vulnerable PAN-OS Captive Portals.
This rule detects external brute-force attempts against firewall authentication mechanisms. It triggers when 15 or more failed login attempts from a single external IP address occur within a 15-minute window. The rule specifically filters for 'USER_LOGIN' events with a 'BLOCK' or 'FAIL' security result and excludes internal RFC1918 IP addresses to focus on external threats.
This rule detects network traffic to the command and control (C2) domain 'sfrclak.com', which is associated with compromised versions of the Axios npm package (specifically 1.14.1 and 0.30.4). This traffic represents the first stage of activity where dropper scripts on an affected endpoint attempt to communicate with their C2 server.
This detection rule identifies network activity associated with the Torg Grabber infostealer. It specifically looks for connections to known command and control (C2) domains and specific URL paths used by the malware for authentication, data upload, or core functionality. The rule leverages network proxy, firewall, or Zeek HTTP logs to extract and analyze URLs. A match indicates a strong reason to investigate the affected host and user, check for expected access, and review nearby activity for further compromise.
Detects Palo Alto Networks firewall traffic that was allowed despite the destination/source IP being flagged as malicious by Google Cloud Threat Intelligence (GCTI).
This detection rule identifies network traffic associated with the Powercat malware campaign by looking for specific URL patterns or domains mentioned in threat intelligence. It focuses on high-confidence indicators such as 'powercat.dog/(cool|watermelon5)' or 'ce953a0eb08246617b7f849486c4b26a7af37e9d2e8f0e13b3ae1bf0da8a70a.xyz' within network proxy, traffic, or HTTP logs. A match indicates potential communication with Powercat command and control infrastructure or distribution points, warranting further investigation into the source and destination IPs, URLs, and surrounding network activity.
This rule set detects various stages of activity related to the 'OpenClaw' malware family and associated campaigns. It includes detection for OpenClaw process execution, exposure of a specific administrative port, execution of shell commands via curl (ClawHavoc delivery), outbound webhook exfiltration, and infostealer access to OpenClaw configuration files.
This rule detects various stages of an attack chain, starting from an Apache ActiveMQ exploit (CVE-2023-46604) leading to LockBit-style ransomware. It identifies process creation anomalies (java.exe spawning certutil.exe for downloads), network connections to known Metasploit C2 infrastructure, the presence of specific ransomware file hashes, and attempts to clear Windows event logs, all indicative of the described attack scenario.
This rule detects various stages of the CastleLoader malware activity, including C2 communication, process hollowing using AutoIt and jsc.exe, and known malware hashes. It correlates network traffic to a specific C2 server, identifies suspicious process creation patterns where AutoIt launches jsc.exe, and sweeps for known SHA256 hashes associated with CastleLoader.
Detects network and endpoint activity associated with the XWorm LATAM campaign, including C2 communication, payload downloads, CasPol.exe making outbound connections, WMI-spawned PowerShell with Cloudinary fetches and Assembly.Load, and a specific file hash.
Automate daily manual monitoring of Firewall changes that are performed by the Security Engineer. Additionally, this can be fine-tuned (more on that on next upcoming queries) into an automated rule such as Custom Detection Rule in Defender, Analytics Rule in Sentinel, or Saved Search with Alert Actions within Splunk (SPL) to detect potential changes by unknown authorized individual.
There are operation activities that requires me to daily check whether the firewall backup happened as it should have every night after-hours. The issue is that this is a manual task, requires me to go to a specific directory, find the XML files that are by the firewall and open it up to see if the file will have content. We can also check by the file size without actually opening the file since sometimes the backup fails.
Detects successful VPN connections from various common security devices logging to CommonSecurityLog. Monitoring successful VPN logins is crucial for tracking remote access and identifying potential unauthorized access, especially when correlated with other events like logins from unusual locations or impossible travel scenarios.
This is for when we need to investigate user navigation through proxy logs to understand if visit was intentional or if it was a sideload (redirect/iframe/malvertising) causing the navigation.
This rule detects large volumes of outbound network traffic originating from Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) clusters to external destinations over non-standard ports. It specifically looks for traffic allowed by Palo Alto firewalls, excluding common ports like 80 and 443, and flags transfers exceeding a defined data threshold (e.g., 100MB). This behavior can indicate data exfiltration attempts where adversaries use alternative protocols to bypass standard monitoring.
Detects when an Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) worker node initiates an outbound connection to a public IP address over a non-standard or unexpected port. This could indicate data exfiltration using custom tools or protocols.
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