Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the ClickFix TDS (Traffic Direction System) gate, which uses browser-based JavaScript to perform anti-analysis and anti-instrumentation checks. Specifically, it looks for the unauthorized hooking of Array.prototype.includes and the use of canPlayType as a tripwire to detect sandboxes or debuggers, correlated with signs of developer tool usage or prototype property modifications.
This rule detects potential attempts to bypass macOS Gatekeeper security checks by identifying the removal of the 'com.apple.quarantine' extended attribute using the 'xattr' utility, or by changing file permissions using 'chmod' on files marked with the 'com.apple.verified' attribute. Adversaries use these techniques to ensure malicious or untrusted binaries execute without user prompts or security warnings.
This rule detects unauthorized or unexpected processes accessing sensitive browser data files, specifically 'Login Data' (password databases) and 'Cookies' files, located in standard macOS browser paths for Google Chrome and Firefox. By excluding legitimate browser and system update processes, the rule identifies potential credential dumping or session hijacking attempts.
Detects cloudflared launched with 'tunnel --url' against localhost or api.trycloudflare.com without managed-tunnel authentication flags, indicating deployment of an ad-hoc Cloudflare Quick Tunnel exposing a local service to the internet.
Detects curl reusing a captured cookie jar (-b /tmp/lhr_c) against a known tunnel domain, indicating session-cookie replay to hijack an authenticated session exposed via a reverse tunnel.
Detects curl POSTing hardcoded username/password-style credentials to a /login endpoint on a known tunnel domain (ngrok, Cloudflare Quick Tunnel, or localhost.run), indicating credential submission to an attacker-exposed tunnel endpoint.
Detects a process other than Claude Code or a recognized backup/editor/IDE tool writing to a Claude project's durable MEMORY.md file, indicating unexpected tampering with the coding agent's persistent memory store.
Detects the execution of the Bun JavaScript runtime by npm or node.js during lifecycle tasks (preinstall, postinstall, etc.). This behavior is highly indicative of the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud supply chain worm, which uses npm lifecycle scripts to download and execute a second-stage payload using the Bun runtime.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by a process identifying itself as 'HeadlessChrome' within the User-Agent string. This behavior is indicative of a headless browser being misused as a proxy for Command and Control (C2) communication, as observed in msaRAT infections.
Detects a sequence of events where a user visits a known ClickFix Traffic Direction System (TDS) domain and subsequently executes an obfuscated 'curl' command via the Terminal application on macOS. This pattern is indicative of a ClickFix campaign where users are socially engineered into pasting malicious code snippets to resolve fake browser errors.
Detects sustained outbound Stratum mining-protocol connections to Monero mining pools from a compromised host (5+ connections within 5 minutes), consistent with post-exploitation cryptomining following Screen Sharing compromise.
Correlates quarantine-attribute removal (xattr) with ad-hoc code re-signing (codesign) on the same process lineage within 5 minutes, indicating preparation of a downloaded or unsigned binary for execution while evading Gatekeeper.
Detects execution of a generically-named a.out binary from a non-standard path (/tmp or Downloads) or any command line referencing ngrok, indicating an ngrok reverse-tunnel binary disguised under a default compiler output name.
Detects execution of a generically-named a.out binary from a non-standard path (/tmp or Downloads) or any command line referencing ngrok, indicating an ngrok reverse-tunnel binary disguised under a default compiler output name.
This rule detects when Microsoft Defender SmartScreen identifies and blocks or warns users about access to known 'ClickFix' phishing landing pages. These pages often attempt to social engineer users into executing malicious commands via copy-paste actions (e.g., in a terminal or Run dialog) as a deceptive remediation step for fake browser errors.
Detects Apple-signed python/python3 or osascript referencing the same /tmp/*.js file path twice in one command line (drop-then-execute), indicating LOLBin abuse to stage and immediately re-run a JavaScript payload from a world-writable directory.
Detects Visual Studio Code or Node.js processes checking for common CI/CD environment variables (such as GITHUB_ACTIONS, JENKINS_HOME, or GITPOD_WORKSPACE_ID) or specifically testing for the existence of CI environments via 'process.env.CI'. This behavior is characteristic of malicious extensions attempting to identify if they are running within a sandboxed CI/CD build environment to potentially evade detection or adjust their payload delivery.
Detects a shell spawned by Claude.app or Cursor.app with the --allow-dangerously-skip-permissions flag, indicating the coding agent's safety/permission prompts have been bypassed, widening the blast radius of subsequent agent-driven commands.
Detects curl POSTing hardcoded username/password-style credentials to a /login endpoint on a known tunnel domain (ngrok, Cloudflare Quick Tunnel, or localhost.run), indicating credential submission to an attacker-exposed tunnel endpoint.
This rule detects the execution of scripts or processes containing command-line arguments indicative of a cryptocurrency wallet drainer (e.g., 'DRAIN', 'DRAIN_PCT') targeting specific cryptocurrencies (bitcoin, ethereum, etc.). These scripts are commonly used by threat actors to exfiltrate funds from victim crypto wallets.
This one's the interesting bit they're using Ethereum RPC calls as a C2channel and dumping stolen secrets to attacker-owned public repos tagged "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again". Also flags Claude/VS Code config file writes dropped by the worm for lateral persistence across dev machines.
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