Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects osascript process execution spawned by launchd/LaunchAgent chains where the invoked AppleScript command line contains obfuscated/encoded content, consistent with EtherHiding's Launch Agent-triggered AppleScript payloads used to query blockchain C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects the execution of the Screaming Frog SEO Spider application followed by outgoing network traffic to web ports (80/443). Screaming Frog is a legitimate web crawler often repurposed by adversaries for internal or external network reconnaissance and site scraping.
Detects processes attempting to enumerate common CI/CD environment variables, a technique observed in the SleeperGem supply chain attack used for sandbox evasion and environment awareness to determine if the malware is running in a CI/CD build environment.
Detects Mach-O ARM64 payloads disguised as legitimate macOS system utilities (CamDriverUpdate.app camera driver updater, Chrome.MediaPatcher) used in the BlueNoroff ClickFix campaign
Detects XCSSET's loader binary staged to /tmp/r and an AppleScript wrapper compiled on the fly at /tmp/p.app, both created and deleted within a short window to erase forensic footprint.
Detects XCSSET's settings_app module installing LaunchDaemon-based persistence via a fake Settings.app located outside standard system paths, which also blocks XProtect features.
Detects short-lived execution of the compiled AppleScript loader from /tmp/p.app, correlated with its rapid creation-then-deletion pattern, the observable proxy for XCSSET's dual-key-encrypted loader architecture.
Detects XCSSET's settings_app module installing LaunchDaemon-based persistence via a fake Settings.app located outside standard system paths, which also blocks XProtect features.
Detects ChonkyChicken's monitor_list enumeration chained with a screen_start command in the same C2 session.
Exact SHA256 match against the two known malicious mrmustard 0.7.4 PyPI sdist/wheel artifacts. Uses full-file (0, filesize) SHA256 equality only, not partial or truncated comparison.
Detects instances where the Claude AI code assistant process initiates a high volume (10 or more) of distinct child processes within a 5-minute window. This behavior could indicate anomalous activity, such as a compromised development environment or an unauthorized automated script execution originating from the assistant.
Detects indicators of the Miasma worm compromise on Windows and macOS systems. This includes the execution of malicious Spectral CLI payloads from npm npx cache directories, the staging and execution of sync.js payloads, the creation of Miasma-specific lock files and Cryptnet cache artifacts, and persistence established via Windows Registry Run keys.
This rule monitors for file-level artifacts related to the ModHeader browser extension, specifically targeting folder paths and file names that match the extension's unique ID. This is typically used to identify the installation or download of this extension, which has been associated with malicious activity.
Detects network connections originating from browser processes to domains associated with ModHeader-related C2 activity, specifically 'stanfordstudies.com' and 'extensions-hub.com'. This pattern is indicative of malicious browser extensions exfiltrating data or reaching out to command and control infrastructure.
This rule detects file-level activity associated with the known malicious version of the ModHeader browser extension (Extension ID: idgpnmonknjnojddfkpgkljpfnnfcklj). It flags the presence of specific indexedDB LevelDB files and temporary directories that are characteristic of the malicious update, which was used for unauthorized data access and browser-based persistence.
Detects instances where the 'claude' or 'claude-code' process initiates network connections to more than 20 distinct destination IP addresses within a short 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a tool performing automated network scanning or discovery activities.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity often associated with credential or sensitive information discovery in development environments. It identifies: 1) Access to configuration files or directories related to AI-powered development tools (e.g., Cursor, Windsurf, Zed) which may store environment variables or API keys; 2) Network connections to common cloud instance metadata endpoints; and 3) Execution of command-line tools attempting to access AWS secrets or configuration management APIs (Secrets Manager, SSM).
This rule detects various common methods of achieving persistence on Linux and macOS systems. It monitors file system changes to systemd unit files and macOS LaunchAgent plist files, as well as the execution of commands related to managing systemd services and user crontab entries.
Detects instances where the Node.js runtime environment (node.exe) accesses sensitive configuration, settings, or message control protocol (mcp) files within directories associated with common developer IDEs and text editors like Claude, Cursor, Windsurf, Zed, and VS Code. This activity may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate IDE configuration, API keys, or environment settings.
This rule monitors for processes, file names, or command lines that contain the string 'telepuz', which is indicative of a specific malware or malicious toolset. It alerts on any occurrence within process image names, process command lines, or file paths.
This rule monitors and aggregates external network connections originating from a specific host. It specifically highlights connections to external domains or IPs that have a low frequency (1-10 connections), which may indicate beaconing activity, command and control (C2) communication, or low-and-slow data exfiltration attempts.
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