Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application consent to perform sensitive actions in an Azure AD environment. It specifically filters for high-risk scopes (such as Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite, or Directory.ReadWrite) granted to applications with publishers other than Microsoft Corporation, which is often indicative of OAuth consent phishing attacks or malicious application integration.
This rule identifies potential post-Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session hijacking by correlating suspicious initial authentication events (e.g., AiTM indicators, unusual behavioral flags) with subsequent successful sign-ins originating from known residential proxies or anonymization VPN providers within a 24-hour window.
This rule detects when a user registers a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) method from an Autonomous System Number (ASN) that the user has not used for authentication in the previous 30 days. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover or an adversary setting up persistent MFA access from a new location.
This rule detects 'impossible travel' activity performed by users assigned to sensitive Microsoft 365 Communication Compliance roles. It monitors Azure Sign-in logs for successful authentication events occurring within a short timeframe (1 hour) from multiple distinct geographic locations (countries) or different autonomous system numbers (ASNs). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary utilizing stolen session tokens or compromised credentials to access protected administrative functions.
Identifies Azure AD service principal credentials (KeyId) that have been continuously used for 90 or more days without rotation, surfacing long-lived static API keys/credentials that increase exposure risk to token jacking, credential theft, or gray-market resale of AI/API access.
Detects signs of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) token or session replay attacks by correlating device browsing activity on known phishing domains with subsequent user sign-in events. The rule triggers if a sign-in occurs within 10 minutes of a phishing-domain visit from a different, non-corporate IP address, or if a single session exhibits multiple distinct non-corporate IP addresses within that same window.
Detects the creation of a new Service Principal followed by an immediate application of an app role assignment within one hour. The rule specifically targets service principals with names suggestive of automation, AI, or assistant-related roles (e.g., 'copilot', 'llm', 'bot'), which may indicate the use of newly created service principals for potential persistence or unauthorized access.
Detects reuse of the same Entra ID sign-in token for the same user across two sign-ins within 60 minutes combined with impossible travel and either a new device or atypical client, excluding known corporate VPN egress and travel history.
Detects instances where an Azure Automation Runbook interacts with or initiates a sign-in log activity that does not correspond to its own Managed Identity. This anomaly may indicate the abuse of a managed identity token to access unauthorized resources or perform lateral movement within the Azure environment.
This rule detects the addition or update of credentials (certificates and secrets) to Azure AD applications or service principals using AuditLogs. Adversaries often perform this activity to establish persistent access to a cloud environment by 'backdooring' a trusted application or service principal with their own secret, allowing them to authenticate as that identity later.
Detects anomalous session activity where a single authentication session ID is associated with multiple IP addresses and multiple distinct countries within a 20-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking, such as an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack, where a session token is stolen and reused by an attacker from a different location.
This rule identifies Service Principals in Microsoft Entra ID that have successfully authenticated after a long period of dormancy (defined as 90 days or more). Reactivation of dormant service principals may indicate that an adversary is attempting to revive a persistent access method or abuse credentials that were previously set aside.
Detects anomalous session activity where a single authentication session ID is associated with multiple IP addresses and multiple distinct countries within a 20-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking, such as an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack, where a session token is stolen and reused by an attacker from a different location.
Detects instances where an Azure Automation Runbook interacts with or initiates a sign-in log activity that does not correspond to its own Managed Identity. This anomaly may indicate the abuse of a managed identity token to access unauthorized resources or perform lateral movement within the Azure environment.
Detects developer accounts whose daily count of API key creation or model provisioning operations exceeds their own 15-day historical per-user baseline plus several standard deviations, excluding service principals/apps, which may indicate compromised credentials being abused to provision or harvest AI API keys for resale (token jacking).
This rule detects a potential password spraying attack followed by a successful sign-in from a non-UK location. It monitors for a threshold of failed sign-in attempts from distinct source IPs for a specific user within a 4-hour window, followed by a subsequent successful sign-in event from a different geographical location.
Detects Azure AD sign-ins using the OAuth device code authentication flow that are followed by impossible-travel patterns (country change within a short window) or that occur near captive-portal network connections on the same device, consistent with Midnight Blizzard's CaptiveCrunch device-code phishing tradecraft targeting corporate travelers.
This rule identifies successful user sign-ins originating from IP addresses associated with residential or commercial VPN ASNs that have not been observed in the user's historical sign-in data (past 30 days). By comparing current activity against a baseline of known user locations, it flags potentially unauthorized access through masked connections.
Detects anomalous access to the Azure Portal Single Page Application (SPA) by monitoring sign-in logs. The rule flags users accessing this specific application from multiple devices or over an unusually long time span (exceeding 24 hours), which may indicate session hijacking, token theft, or unauthorized access attempts via stolen session tokens.
This rule detects the addition or update of credentials (certificates and secrets) to Azure AD applications or service principals using AuditLogs. Adversaries often perform this activity to establish persistent access to a cloud environment by 'backdooring' a trusted application or service principal with their own secret, allowing them to authenticate as that identity later.
Detects Microsoft Entra device registration events where the device name adheres to the 'Forg365-' prefix naming convention. This pattern is indicative of persistence mechanisms used by the Forg365 Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform, which registers devices to bypass conditional access or MFA.
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