Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,651 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,772
374
351
273
255
Contributors
908
676
593
359
164
Categories
1,505
1,172
782
528
524
Platforms
39,960
7,270
6,537
3,868
3,651
Products / Services
809
512
432
340
300
MITRE Techniques
1,181
584
528
506
438
CVEs
17
16
9
8
7
IDS Classtypes
41
15
10
6
5
IDS Protocols
47
24
3
2
1
Detects high-volume outbound network connections (exceeding 10MB) originating from processes associated with AI-driven chatbot or productivity applications (e.g., ChatGPT, Perplexity). This rule identifies potential data exfiltration occurring over legitimate, expected software channels.
Detects the execution of Node.js where the command line arguments reference a .woff2 font file. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute a malicious payload disguised as a legitimate font file, a technique previously associated with the PolinRider campaign.
Detects network traffic attempting to modify SSH authorized_keys or the sshd_config file using SCP or SFTP protocols, which is a common technique used by attackers to maintain persistence on compromised systems.
Detects the AWS CLI being spawned by processes associated with AI coding extensions (e.g., VS Code extension hosts, Cursor, Windsurf) while executing commands indicative of cloud credential discovery or harvesting (e.g., sts, get-caller-identity, configure export). This activity is indicative of a supply chain compromise or exploitation where an adversary leverages an AI coding tool environment to access cloud credentials stored on the developer's workstation.
Detects anomalous outbound network traffic from Firefox processes indicative of CVE-2025-15661 exploitation. The rule monitors for communication with a specific non-standard port (8765) associated with a SmartWindow PoC server, or requests containing suspicious URI query parameters ('u0', 'u1', 'u2', 'source=history') frequently used for exfiltrating private browsing tabs and history via the '/leak' endpoint.
Detects outbound network connections from common package managers (pip, npm) or utility tools (node, wget, curl) to destinations that are not related to official package repositories or local network ranges. This behavior may indicate an adversary using legitimate tools to download malicious payloads or establish command and control channels.
Detects the presence of malicious Chromium browser extension artifacts related to the 'Search for perplexity ai' extension. This extension abuses Manifest V3 declarativeNetRequest permissions (such as declarativeNetRequestFeedback and declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess) to intercept and redirect network requests to the attacker-controlled domain 'perplexity-ai.online'. The rule specifically identifies the extension's rule resource files (e.g., perplexity-rules.json) and specific file paths associated with the extension ID.
Detects the execution of setup scripts (e.g., install.sh, Makefile) by shell interpreters that were spawned from common developer-oriented applications (e.g., IDEs, code editors, Python) within a short window after a git clone operation. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain compromise or malicious project initialization.
Detects known suspicious (default) user-agents related to scanning/recon tools
Detects Node.js processes attempting to access sensitive files or environment variables associated with Claude AI (e.g., Anthropic API keys, .claude configuration files), which may indicate credential harvesting activity by malicious code.
This rule detects a high volume of UDP network connections originating from a single process on a device. A count exceeding 50 UDP connections from the same process to the same remote IP address is considered anomalous and could indicate a UDP flood or other denial-of-service attempt.
This rule detects outbound network connections to URLs associated with common file sharing services (e.g., Dropbox, Mega, Gofile) or temporary email providers (e.g., Temp-Mail). Such connections can indicate data exfiltration attempts, use of unsanctioned services, or communication with command and control infrastructure.
Detects unexpected crashes of critical macOS system processes such as sharingd, nsurlsessiond, airplayd, AirPlayXPCHelper, and NetAuthSysAgent. Frequent crashing of these components can indicate instability or potentially malicious attempts to interfere with system services.
This rule detects file system artifacts and network activity associated with a malicious Chromium-based browser extension (ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd). The extension utilizes service workers to intercept browser search queries and capture keystrokes, subsequently exfiltrating the data to an attacker-controlled domain.
Detects the presence of a malicious Electron-based backdoor disguised as the Franz messaging application, commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign. The rule identifies indicators such as a specific C2 endpoint, automated persistence via Electron login item settings, arbitrary JavaScript execution through a 'task.e' sink, and the creation of local persistence files like 'readme.txt' and 'setup.txt'.
This rule detects when a single process modifies or creates three or more YAML files ('.yaml' or '.yml' extensions) within folders containing 'config' or 'pipeline' in their path, within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate an attacker modifying configuration or deployment files, potentially for persistence, defense evasion, or impact.
Detects unusual DNS requests initiated by common development, scripting, and administrative tools (e.g., node, python, powershell, curl) to domains that follow patterns often used for webhooks, relays, or command-and-control services. The rule specifically excludes common package management or source code repositories to reduce noise.
Detects a multi-stage execution chain associated with the 'Contagious Interview' campaign, where Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) spawns a shell process (cmd, powershell, bash, or sh) that uses network retrieval utilities (curl, wget, or http) to download content from known Lazarus group staging domains within a two-minute window.
Detects the installation of known malicious npm packages designed to impersonate the legitimate 'rollup-plugin-polyfill-node' dependency. This pattern is associated with Lazarus Group supply chain attacks targeting developer environments and CI/CD pipelines.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of a specific property list file ('com.apple.system.services.activity') within the macOS LaunchAgents directory, a common technique used by attackers to maintain persistence on compromised systems.
Detects the 'codesign' utility being invoked with flags '-fs' (force sign) and '--deep' (recursively sign) triggered by a shell process spawned from 'Script Editor'. This pattern is often used to bypass macOS Gatekeeper or attempt to re-sign malicious applications after tampering.
Page 92 of 174