Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects high-volume Microsoft Graph API and SCIM endpoint enumeration consistent with employee directory scraping, potentially by threat groups like BlackFile/Cordial Spider. This rule identifies suspicious activity based on a high count of directory queries or distinct URIs accessed within a short time frame, originating from non-Microsoft/Google/Amazon/IBM ASNs and using common scripting/API user agents.
Phishing-as-a-Service kit abusing OAuth device code flow against Microsoft 365
Device Code Phishing Attempt
Cortex XDR
Detects attempts to abuse the device code flow targeting Microsoft Office and Authentication Broker applications from unmanaged, non-compliant devices with unbound tokens. This activity is indicative of a phishing attack where an adversary is trying to gain access to a user's application access token.
This rule detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Office 365 that involve email forwarding or redirection to external domains. It calculates a risk score based on whether the action occurred outside of typical business hours (08:00-18:00 local time/weekends) and whether the user is performing this action from a previously unseen IP address, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to exfiltrate or redirect emails.
This rule identifies potential mass phishing campaigns by monitoring O365 email activity for high-volume outbound mail from newly registered or observed domains. It specifically flags senders that have no prior historical activity in the last 90 days, have a domain age of less than 30 days, and exhibit a low variation in email subjects across a large volume of recipients, which is characteristic of automated bulk phishing.
Detects Microsoft 365 OAuth access tokens issued via device_code grant — the mechanism abused by the EvilTokens phishing kit — followed within 1 hour by mailbox forwarding rule creation for the same account, indicating persistent BEC access post-compromise.
Correlates phishing email delivery with subsequent communication to attacker-controlled domains.
This rule detects emails containing macro-enabled documents (.docm, .xlsm, .pptm). It specifically looks for instances where a sender sends two or more such emails within an hour, which could indicate a targeted phishing attempt using malicious macros.
Detects suspicious emails with attachments originating from external senders, characterized by urgent or action-oriented subject lines, and sent in bulk (5 or more emails within an hour). This pattern is indicative of phishing attempts.
Detects a suspicious spike in Microsoft Teams external meeting or chat invitations directed at a single user within a 30-minute window. This behavior is consistent with UNC6692 tactics, where attackers impersonate internal IT helpdesk staff via Teams to perform vishing and social engineering attacks.
This rule detects activities associated with the NotDoor malware used by APT28 for email-based exfiltration. It specifically monitors for the creation of staging files in temporary directories, the use of Outlook.exe to establish external SMTP connections on common mail ports, and the transmission of emails to known adversary-controlled addresses.
Detects changes to Microsoft Entra (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies. This includes additions, updates, or deletions of these security policies, which could indicate an attacker attempting to weaken authentication requirements, bypass multi-factor authentication, or establish persistence within the identity environment.
Detects changes to Microsoft Entra (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies. This includes additions, updates, or deletions of these security policies, which could indicate an attacker attempting to weaken authentication requirements, bypass multi-factor authentication, or establish persistence within the identity environment.
Detects sign-in events using the device code authentication flow (OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant) where the originating IP address is external to the organization's private network. This flow is often abused by attackers to bypass traditional MFA or interact with headless environments via common HTTP client libraries like Python requests, Go-http, or Axios.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Office 365/Exchange that configure email forwarding or redirection to external domains. Attackers often use these rules to exfiltrate email data or maintain persistence within an environment by redirecting communications to attacker-controlled accounts.
Detects when an administrator explicitly disables Unified Audit Log (UAL) ingestion for Exchange Online using the Set-AdminAuditLogConfig cmdlet. This action effectively stops the generation of audit records for Exchange administration and user activity, a critical defense evasion tactic used to conceal malicious operations.
This rule detects anomalous high-volume file download activities from Microsoft SharePoint and OneDrive for Business, which may indicate data exfiltration. The rule aggregates download events by user and IP address over 10-minute intervals and triggers when the download count exceeds 200, excluding known service/backup accounts.
This rule detects when users access or download suspicious file types (specifically .xlsm, .docm, or .ics) from Microsoft SharePoint, Teams, or Exchange, where the filenames contain keywords associated with common phishing lures such as credentials, invoices, payroll, or password resets. This monitors for indicators of potential spearphishing attempts involving malicious documents or calendar invites within the M365 environment.
This rule detects when multiple versions of files are deleted within SharePoint by a single user. This could indicate an attempt to remove historical data or cover tracks.
This rule detects when a user adds mailbox permissions to three or more mailboxes within a one-hour window in Exchange Online. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to gain persistent access to multiple mailboxes, often for data exfiltration or further compromise.
Detects signs of a session hijacking attack using the OAuth device code grant flow, specifically identifying the initial device code authorization followed by suspicious post-authentication activity like mass data access via Microsoft Graph API or the creation of mailbox forwarding rules.
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