Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,087 detections
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The analytic detects the use of the Windows InstallUtil.exe binary with the `/u` (uninstall) switch, which can execute code while bypassing application control. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious code without administrative privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to further system compromise or persistence within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the execution of msdtc.exe with specific command-line parameters (-a or -b), which are indicative of the PlugX malware. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because PlugX uses these parameters to masquerade its malicious operations within legitimate processes, making it harder to detect. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access, exfiltrate data, and conduct espionage, severely compromising the affected system.
The following analytic detects the modification of the Windows registry using the regedit.exe application with the silent mode parameter. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because the silent mode allows registry changes without user confirmation, which can be exploited by adversaries to import malicious registry settings. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to persist in the environment, escalate privileges, or manipulate system configurations, leading to potential system compromise.
The following analytic detects changes in a service security descriptor where a new deny ace has been added. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for any process execution involving the "sc.exe" binary with the "sdset" flag targeting any service and adding a dedicated deny ace. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to escalate their privileges, blind defenses and more.
The analytic identifies instances where `control.exe` is spawned by a Microsoft Office product. This activity can indicate exploitation attempts, specifically related to CVE-2021-40444, where `control.exe` is used to execute malicious .cpl or .inf files. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects instances where the PaperCut NG application (pc-app.exe) spawns a Windows shell, such as cmd.exe or PowerShell. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is pc-app.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access or execute malicious commands on the system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, or further compromise of the affected environment.
This analytic identifies the use of the "remotesigned" execution policy for PowerShell scripts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing "remotesigned" and "-File". This activity is significant because the "remotesigned" policy allows locally created scripts to run without restrictions, posing a potential security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute unauthorized scripts, leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.
The following analytic identifies instances where the regsvr32.exe binary has been renamed and executed. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, specifically focusing on the original filename metadata. Renaming regsvr32.exe is significant as it can be an evasion technique used by attackers to bypass security controls. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary DLLs, potentially leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe) spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where msra.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because msra.exe typically does not spawn command-line interfaces, indicating potential process injection or misuse. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised system.
This analytic identifies the creation of a new kernel mode driver using the `sc.exe` command. The detection leverages process execution logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically focusing on command-line details. Adding a kernel driver is an uncommon activity in regular operations and can indicate an attempt to gain low-level access to the system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with high privileges, potentially compromising the entire system and evading traditional security measures.
The following analytic identifies the execution of RemCom.exe, an open-source alternative to PsExec, used for lateral movement and remote command execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, original file names, and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and control over additional systems within the network.
The following analytic identifies attempts to stop services on a system using `net.exe`, `sc.exe` or the "Stop-Service" cmdlet. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity can be significant as adversaries often terminate security or critical services to evade detection and further their objectives. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security defenses, facilitate ransomware encryption, or disrupt essential services, leading to potential data loss or system compromise.
The following analytic detects the use of net.exe to update user account policies to set passwords as non-expiring. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "/maxpwage:unlimited" or "/maxpwage:49710", which achieve a similar outcome theoretically. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, evade defenses, or facilitate lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to maintain long-term access to compromised accounts, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
The analytic detects `CertUtil.exe` performing a backup of the Certificate Store. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attempt to steal authentication certificates, which are critical for secure communications. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the stolen certificates to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive data, or gain unauthorized access to systems, leading to severe security breaches.
The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'export-certificate' executed via the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. Exporting certificates is significant as it may indicate credential theft or preparation for man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive communications, or gain unauthorized access to systems and data.
The analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet `Export-PfxCertificate` on the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate authentication certificates, which can be used to impersonate users or decrypt sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows built-in tool netsh.exe to display the state, configuration, and profile of the host firewall. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. Monitoring this activity is crucial as netsh.exe can be used by adversaries to bypass firewall rules or discover firewall settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate firewall configurations, potentially leading to unauthorized network access or data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the execution of Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, which may indicate an attempt to download remote files or perform privilege escalation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify malicious use of a native Windows script for unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized file downloads or elevated privileges, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic identifies instances of the WinDBG process spawning AutoIt3. This behavior is detected by monitoring endpoint telemetry for processes where 'windbg.exe' is the parent process and 'autoit3.exe' or similar is the child process. This activity is significant because AutoIt3 is frequently used by threat actors for scripting malicious automation, potentially indicating an ongoing attack. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to automate tasks, execute arbitrary code, and further compromise the system, leading to data exfiltration or additional malware deployment.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to obtain the password policy in a Windows domain. This activity indicates potential enumeration of domain policies, a common tactic for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to understand password policies, aiding in further attacks such as password spraying or brute force attempts.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-DomainPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to retrieve password policies in a Windows domain. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gather domain policy information, which is crucial for planning further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive domain configurations, aiding in privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.
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