Operation Poisson Analysis: C2-Independent Persistence Using Tailscale
Score: 8/10

Operation Poisson Analysis: C2-Independent Persistence Using Tailscale

A threat actor known as Poisson utilized Havoc C2 and Tailscale VPN to establish persistent, secondary access into French automotive and individual targets for credential theft.

Executive Summary

Operation Poisson describes a 33-day intrusion campaign conducted by a French-speaking junior operator against French individuals and a small automotive business. While the actor exhibited poor operational security—leaking local directories and playbook details in public storage buckets—they successfully maintained access through innovative use of legitimate tools. The primary objective was credential theft targeting banking and government portal logins.

The technical workflow involved a multi-stage fileless attack deploying the Havoc 'Demon' agent, followed by the installation of a Python-based keylogger. Notably, the attacker installed OpenSSH and Tailscale VPN as a backup persistence layer. This allowed the actor to regain access to compromised systems 18 days after their primary C2 infrastructure went offline, demonstrating that standard C2 takedowns are insufficient for full remediation when legitimate mesh-VPN services are abused for persistence.

The campaign highlights a growing trend of low-skill operators leveraging advanced persistence techniques that evade traditional file-based detection by using signed, legitimate binaries and encrypted tunnels.

Key Details

Threat Name

Operation Poisson

Affects

MongoDB version 3.4+, MongoDB version 3.6+, MongoDB Atlas

Adversary

Poisson Other Adversaries and Aliases: APT31; Scattered Spider

Malware/Tools

Havoc, Demon, RustDesk, senti.dll, KeyL.zip, sys.vbs, Thal.exe, RevS.ps1, PhantomBackdoor, TencShell

Report Score

8out of 10
Quality Score
Good
IOC Quality9
TTP Details9
Detection Guidance7
Enterprise Relevance8
Clarity & Structure9
Technical Depth8

Sources