Executive Summary
In November 2026, a highly obfuscated multi-stage JavaScript loader was identified targeting Windows environments to deploy unauthorized ScreenConnect Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) clients. The attack begins with a large JavaScript file—initially disguised with legitimate-looking Envoy xDS service mesh terminology—which performs extensive environment fingerprinting to ensure it is running in a Microsoft JScript/Windows Script Host (WSH) environment.
The loader utilizes complex structural obfuscation, including the storage of its payload in thousands of numeric pairs across 56 arrays, which are decrypted at runtime using custom PRNG-based keystreams. Once active, the script uses Windows COM objects (ActiveX) and curl.exe to download an MSI installer from attacker-controlled infrastructure fronted by Cloudflare. This campaign notably leverages newly registered domains (e.g., adobdoc[.]icu) imitating Adobe document branding to deceive users and security filters.
This threat is critical because it utilizes legitimate RMM software (ScreenConnect) for persistent remote access, a technique that often bypasses traditional antivirus signatures. The infrastructure used is recently established (early November 2026) and maintains a low detection rate across major security vendors.
