Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
128 detections
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Detects System-process (PID 4) registry writes or deletions targeting Windows Defender tamper-protection values or Run/RunOnce persistence keys, indicating use of the BTR.sys kernel registry-write primitive to disable protections or establish persistence.
Flags direct registry staging of a Boot Bus Extender service (SERVICE_SYSTEM_START) whose Args value contains ':changelist', bypassing the Service Control Manager, where the driver image lies outside the Defender platform folder or uses a randomized 8-character filename — the SCM-bypass pattern used to stage BTR.sys for boot-time or immediate execution.
Correlates a Sysmon DriverLoad event matching known BTR.sys hashes with a subsequent System-process (PID 4) deletion of specific Defender binaries or WdFilter/WinDefend registry keys within a 10-second window — the definitive Defender self-destruction signature of the kernel primitive.
Correlates the hardcoded BootClean.log creation-then-deletion lifecycle (performed by the System process) with a preceding anomalous or hash-matched BTR.sys driver load within a tight time window, reducing the otherwise high false-positive rate of alerting on the log artifact alone.
Detects msagent.sys kernel driver load events immediately followed by targeted module/filter enumeration (driverquery/fltmc) referencing the same driver.
Detects a randomly-named 8-character .sys file created outside standard driver/staging paths and then loaded from a non-standard user or temp directory shortly after — matching the pattern of BTR.sys being extracted from MpEngine.dll's embedded resource and executed outside its normal location.
Detects process command lines matching the documented BTR_CLI.exe flag combinations (-chain/-item, -trigger now|boot, -cleanup) used to orchestrate chained kernel file/registry operations via the BTR.sys primitive.
Detects known BTR.sys driver binaries via SHA-256 hash match, or the co-occurrence of the hardcoded RC4 key fragment, the FEE1DEAD magic value, and the embedded BOOTTIMETOOL resource marker in .rdata.
Detects hash-matched BTR.sys driver loads that are validly signed by Microsoft but not initiated by a legitimate Windows Defender platform process (MsMpEng.exe/MpCmdRun.exe or the Defender Platform folder) — indicating the driver is being loaded by an unauthorized process to abuse its kernel-level file/registry operation primitive.
Detects creation of the ':changelist' configuration stream or a feedback (*.dat) stream written onto a .sys driver file itself, distinguishing the abuse pattern (feedback stream on the driver) from legitimate Defender remediation, which writes feedback to a standalone ProgramData path.
Correlates BTR_CLI arbitrary-write invocations (Action 3) targeting System32\drivers with a resulting file write of a known-malicious hash (e.g., mimidrv.sys) or an unsigned/non-Microsoft-signed binary — detecting the kernel write primitive being used to plant a malicious driver into a protected directory.
Detects the backdoor's put-command file-drop evasion: RtkNGUI64.exe creates tempcache.tmp then renames it to the target path before patching the corrupted MZ header bytes.
Detects the full process-hollowing sequence (suspended process creation, SetThreadContext, ResumeThread) executed against the same target PID for wab.exe or MSBuild.exe within a short window — the ACRStealer campaign's injection technique.
Detects the StopAndProtect two-stage PowerShell chain: stage 1 downloads/executes stage 2, which reflectively loads a base64-encoded .NET assembly and invokes an Execute method.
Detects the Gatekeeper-bypass sequence used by AmnesiaStealer's dropper: chmod +x, ad-hoc codesign (--sign -), and xattr -cr run together against a recently staged binary to defeat quarantine and code-signing checks before execution.
Detects the AmnesiaStealer TCC-bypass chain: correlated Time Machine local snapshot creation/mounting (recycling CVE-2020-9771), hidden snapshot marker files, and direct SQLite injection into a mounted TCC.db copy to grant Full Disk Access, followed by killing tccd to force a reload.
Detects the BYOVD kill chain for the DCRCVDrv.sys driver: drop to C:\Windows\Temp\, DCRCVDRV_U/LEGACY_DCRCVDRV_U service installation, device open, and IOCTL 0x2205c0 invocation used to terminate security/EDR processes from kernel context.
Detects APC injection into dllhost.exe unbacked/private memory via NtQueueApcThread correlated with a subsequent outbound network connection from the same process — the ACRStealer injection-and-C2 pattern.
Detects creation of a zero-byte C:\ProgramData\desktop.ini by RtkNGUI64.exe, the crash artifact left behind when the implant's config has not been staged on a host.
Detects wscript.exe executing OptiDrive.vbs from the %LOCALAPPDATA%\DriveOptimize Technologies\ masquerade directory to invoke the renamed AutoIt interpreter OptiDrive.exe — the ACRStealer staging/masquerade technique.
Detects RtkNGUI64.exe being launched via a WMI consumer using the 8.3 short-path form (Progra~1\Realtek\Audio), the same masquerading binary used for backdoor persistence.
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