Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors Linux system logs for attempts to modify the /etc/sudoers file, utilize sudoers.d configurations, or execute commands with NOPASSWD privileges. These activities are common precursors to privilege escalation or persistence through elevated command execution.
Detects the creation or modification of AWS IAM policies that grant administrative-level access (Action '*' on Resource '*') to a role, user, or group. This is a common technique used by attackers to gain or escalate privileges to full administrator access following initial foothold acquisition.
Detects the creation of an AWS IAM access key (CreateAccessKey) for the root account or identities with administrative naming conventions. This activity can indicate persistence establishment by an attacker who has gained high-privileged access, as new access keys provide a durable way to maintain programmatic control that bypasses standard session-based security controls.
Detects high-risk administrative actions within a Kubernetes environment, specifically: users executing or attaching to running pods (potential container access), the creation of privileged pods (potential container escape), or modifications to Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) objects such as roles and role bindings which could lead to privilege escalation.
Detects Azure Activity Log events where a Storage Account is modified to enable public network access, public blob access, or container-level public access. Such misconfigurations can lead to unauthorized data exposure and exfiltration by internet-based actors.
Detects the creation or modification of Kubernetes RoleBindings or ClusterRoleBindings that grant highly privileged roles (e.g., cluster-admin or wildcard permissions) to a subject. The detection includes behavioral analysis to identify ServiceAccount usage from unusual source IP addresses within a short timeframe, which may indicate account compromise and unauthorized privilege escalation.
Detects usage of AWS CloudShell followed by S3 data-plane activity (GetObject/PutObject) from users without a documented baseline or exhibiting geographic anomalies. This pattern is indicative of potential misuse of a pre-authenticated execution context to perform unauthorized data staging or access, often evading host-based EDR monitoring.
This rule detects modifications to AWS IAM policies via PutUserPolicy, PutRolePolicy, AttachUserPolicy, or AttachRolePolicy where the policy grants excessive permissions (wildcard Actions and Resources) or attaches an AdministratorAccess policy. The rule also flags rapid escalations occurring within 15 minutes of new user, role, or access key creation to identify potential self-escalation or unauthorized privilege escalation attempts by existing identities.
Detects unauthorized sharing of AWS EBS snapshots or RDS snapshots to external, unapproved AWS accounts. This activity is often a precursor to data exfiltration, where an adversary creates a snapshot of a production resource and shares it with an account under their control to bypass existing identity-based access controls.
Detects the creation of new AWS IAM access keys, with specific filtering for cross-principal creation, creation for sensitive accounts (e.g., service, admin), or excessive key creation activity. This pattern is often used by adversaries for persistence or privilege escalation in cloud environments.
This rule detects suspicious activities targeting cloud management hierarchy, specifically identifying attempts to remove AWS accounts from organizations, disable policy enforcement, create rogue accounts, or hijack Azure subscriptions through unauthorized transfers or tenant changes. Such actions are often used by adversaries to bypass security guardrails, remove organizational visibility, or establish persistent unauthorized access within a cloud environment.
Detects high-privilege IAM role assignments in Google Cloud Platform and Microsoft Azure environments. The rule specifically monitors for assignments of overly permissive roles (e.g., Owner, Global Administrator, or wildcard actions) that could allow for full environment compromise or persistence.
Detects potential abuse of Cloud Shell to persist access in cloud environments. For GCP, it monitors the injection of SSH keys into instance or project metadata from a Cloud Shell session. For Azure, it detects a pattern involving Cloud Shell storage provisioning followed by a subsequent VM run-command or SSH public key update, indicating potential unauthorized management of virtual machines.
Detects the creation of new service principal credentials in Azure AD or GCP service account keys targeting identities holding highly privileged administrative roles. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism where an adversary establishes long-term access to a cloud environment by creating new, controlled credentials for an existing privileged identity.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege application permissions (e.g., Mail.ReadWrite, full_access_as_app, Files.ReadWrite.All, Sites.FullControl.All) to a service principal. This pattern is indicative of an attacker who has compromised an Application Administrator account and is attempting to establish long-term, unattended access to cloud resources such as mailboxes and SharePoint sites via OAuth client-credential flows.
Detects when a high-privileged administrative role is assigned to an Azure Service Principal. This technique is often used for persistent, stealthy control over a tenant, as service principals are not subjected to user-centric access reviews or MFA challenges. The rule triggers on both permanent and PIM-eligible role assignments.
Detects the addition of a new federated domain or a modification to an existing domain's authentication settings to Federated, where the domain was not previously verified within a standard verification window. This technique is often used by adversaries to establish persistence and perform self-issued token forgery (e.g., SAML/JWT) by trusting an attacker-controlled identity provider.
Detects changes to federation settings on an Entra ID domain, including modifications to IssuerUri, ActiveLogOnUri, MetadataExchangeUri, or SigningCertificate, as well as transitions between Managed and Federated authentication types. Such changes can facilitate 'Golden SAML' attacks by allowing an adversary to forge authentication tokens for the tenant.
Detects the addition of a new federated domain or a modification to an existing domain's authentication settings to Federated, where the domain was not previously verified within a standard verification window. This technique is often used by adversaries to establish persistence and perform self-issued token forgery (e.g., SAML/JWT) by trusting an attacker-controlled identity provider.
Detects when a user is added as an owner to an Azure AD Application or Service Principal, specifically highlighting instances where the new owner does not currently hold a privileged directory role. This pattern is often used as a persistence mechanism to maintain long-term access to an environment without requiring high-level administrative credentials.
Detects when a Service Principal is assigned to a highly privileged administrative role in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID). This activity can be an indicator of an adversary establishing persistence or escalating privileges by leveraging non-human identities.
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