Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

3,004 detections

Detects Microsoft Teams chat creation events originating from an external sender whose user ID or display name impersonates IT support (e.g., IT Support, Help Desk, Service Desk), often used in social engineering or phishing attempts.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
2 days ago
11021
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Exchange Online that target financial-related keywords and hide/delete mail, or rules that mark all incoming mail as read and delete them, which may indicate a Business Email Compromise (BEC) attack or mailbox evasion technique.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
4 days ago
12129
Detects a potential password spraying attack characterized by multiple authentication failures across numerous users from a single IP address, followed by a successful sign-in from that same IP, culminating in a privileged role or credential change performed by the compromised account.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
3 days ago
6015
Detects modifications to Certificate Authority (CA) trust stores, configuration files, or blocklists on Linux and macOS endpoints, followed by trust store update commands within a 30-minute window.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
6 days ago
10021
Hunting query for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) application credential abuse reported in October 2026. It returns three signals, sorted by a Priority column. First, sign-ins by the seven ConnectWise and SkyKick application IDs from a public IP address. ConnectWise states the Cloud Backup app normally signs in from Azure private IPv6 addresses. Second, service principals that sign in from a public IP address in a country not seen in their 14-day baseline. This signal evaluates apps with at least 20 prior sign-ins. Third, Entra audit events initiated by applications. These include an application adding itself or another non-user identity to a directory role, an application adding or changing credentials for the first time in the baseline window and any credential change by an application named ConnectWise or SkyKick. Role additions with an unidentified target appear with Review priority. Audit events initiated by applications carry no source IP, so the IP indicator applies to the sign-in signals only. Routine credential changes by Azure services can still appear with Review priority. The query follows the Microsoft Defender advanced hunting schemas and runs without errors in Advanced Hunting. The audit signal was exercised against live Entra audit events in a Microsoft 365 tenant. Indicator columns are short-lived and used for enrichment only.
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Goksel Atakan@gokselatakan
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Detections.ai Community
11 days ago
61183
Detects post-exploitation behavior where a PaperCut server Java process spawns local account creation or administrator reset followed closely by Active Directory enumeration on the same host, indicating potential post-RCE meterpreter activity.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
4 days ago
105
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
2 days ago
103
Detects a sequence of security-sensitive events in GitHub repositories where branch protection rules are modified or removed, followed closely by a force push to the protected repository, and subsequent workflow activity involving the Berri-AI/litellm repository or similar context. This pattern often indicates malicious tampering with repository controls to introduce unauthorized code.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
8 days ago
6013
Hunting query for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) application credential abuse reported in October 2026. It returns three signals, sorted by a Priority column. First, sign-ins by the seven ConnectWise and SkyKick application IDs from a public IP address. ConnectWise states the Cloud Backup app normally signs in from Azure private IPv6 addresses. Second, service principals that sign in from a public IP address in a country not seen in their 14-day baseline. This signal evaluates apps with at least 20 prior sign-ins. Third, Entra audit events initiated by applications. These include an application adding itself or another non-user identity to a directory role, an application adding or changing credentials for the first time in the baseline window and any credential change by an application named ConnectWise or SkyKick. Role additions with an unidentified target appear with Review priority. Audit events initiated by applications carry no source IP, so the IP indicator applies to the sign-in signals only. Routine credential changes by Azure services can still appear with Review priority. The query follows the Microsoft Defender advanced hunting schemas and runs without errors in Advanced Hunting. The audit signal was exercised against live Entra audit events in a Microsoft 365 tenant. Indicator columns are short-lived and used for enrichment only.
chris tano@christano
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Detections.ai Community
10 days ago
23018
Detects successful administrative login events originating from IP addresses outside of configured trusted management networks on Fortinet devices.
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Kjetil Fjas@Kjefjas
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Detections.ai Community
8 days ago
4010
Detects GCP audit log write operations involving settings, IAM, or metadata modifications (such as setMetadata, setIamPolicy, setServiceAccount) that either originate from a known attacker IP or are performed by a default GCP service account from a public caller IP.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
8 days ago
207
Detects deletion or modification of Azure backup items, vaults, recovery points, VM snapshots, or soft-delete configurations within AzureActivity logs, which may indicate an adversary attempting to inhibit system recovery or cover tracks.
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F S@Fsdr
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Detections.ai Community
9 days ago
208
Detects a potential password spraying attack characterized by multiple authentication failures across numerous users from a single IP address, followed by a successful sign-in from that same IP, culminating in a privileged role or credential change performed by the compromised account.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
3 days ago
001
Detects a suspicious sequence of activities in GCP Compute Engine where a principal creates a new VM instance, attaches a disk, and creates a disk snapshot or new disk within a short window, potentially indicating data staging or exfiltration preparation.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
8 days ago
405
Detects a sequence where a SharePoint application pool worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) related to SharePoint, followed shortly (within 1 hour) by high-fidelity lateral movement tooling or remote execution techniques (such as PsExec, WMI, PowerShell remoting, or scheduled tasks) on the same host.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
9 days ago
108
Detects the creation or renaming of the 'ESX Admins' Active Directory security group combined with the addition of members to it, which is often used for privilege escalation or persistence in VMware ESXi environments managed via Active Directory.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
12 days ago
0017
Detects a successful AWS IAM CreateRole event whose trust policy allows sts:AssumeRole by a principal in another AWS account or by a wildcard
principal.
This configuration may provide persistent access if the principal can assume the role. The event alone does not establish that the role was assumed or that its creation was unauthorized.
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
10 days ago
009
Alerts whenever a default SAP administrative account (e.g., SAP*, DDIC, TMSADM) logs into the system. These accounts should be locked and used only for emergency 'break-glass' scenarios
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Google SecOps@GoogleSecOps
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Google SecOps Detection Rules
14 days ago
4023
Detects a potential app-only tenant-takeover sequence associated with Storm-3119 (YAM Store), where a single service principal performs an administrative password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window.
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Tim Peck@timpeck
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Detections.ai Community
15 days ago
7024
Detects potential abuse of WordPress application passwords by correlating an authorization mint request (authorize-application.php) from an administrator's browser with a subsequent REST API page creation request to the same destination server from a different source IP address within a short time window.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
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Detections.ai Community
6 days ago
002
This rule queries the ExposureGraphNodes table to identify and summarize assets that are configured as internet-facing or exposed to the internet.
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F S@Fsdr
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Detections.ai Community
14 days ago
12017
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