Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous post-authentication reconnaissance activities against the Microsoft Graph API, specifically the enumeration of directory objects, roles, or service principals. The rule triggers when a user account performs multi-endpoint enumeration via the Graph API within 30 minutes of a successful authentication session initiated via a device code flow that was flagged with elevated risk signals. This behavior is consistent with post-compromise reconnaissance techniques such as 'EvilTokens', where an adversary attempts to map the environment after gaining access.
Detects the creation, update, or activation of an external Identity Provider (IdP) or federated trust configuration within the Okta environment. This activity may indicate an attempt to establish a rogue federation trust, which allows an adversary to perform cross-tenant impersonation and authenticate as any user by minting assertions signed by attacker-controlled keys.
Detects changes to Entra ID (Azure AD) federation settings, specifically targeting updates to trust and authentication parameters such as IssuerUri, ActiveLogOnUri, and TokenSigningCertificate. These modifications are critical indicators of potential Golden SAML attacks, where adversaries forge SAML tokens to bypass MFA and impersonate users.
Detects when high-privilege application permissions (e.g., Directory.ReadWrite.All, Application.ReadWrite.All) are granted to a service principal via admin consent. This behavior can be used by attackers to gain persistent, stealthy administrative access to a Microsoft Entra ID tenant.
Detects modifications to Entra ID (Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings, including inbound/outbound trust settings and B2B collaboration configurations. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or facilitate unauthorized access by creating a trust relationship with an external tenant they control.
Detects modifications to Entra ID (Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings, including inbound/outbound trust settings and B2B collaboration configurations. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or facilitate unauthorized access by creating a trust relationship with an external tenant they control.
Detects anomalous Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role activations in Entra ID that deviate from standard patterns. This includes instances where roles are activated without required approvals, for unusually long durations, or when an account activates multiple distinct roles within a short time frame, potentially indicating account takeover or abuse of standing privileges.
This rule detects when a Service Principal or Application is assigned to highly privileged directory roles within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). Adversaries may perform this action to achieve persistence or escalate privileges within the cloud environment by granting high-level administrative access to a compromised or adversary-controlled service principal.
Detects the addition or update of federated identity credentials (FIC) on Entra ID applications or service principals that do not match an approved list of OIDC issuers. This technique, known as Workload Identity Federation, can be abused by adversaries for stealthy, token-less, secret-free persistence.
This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted sensitive Exchange Online permissions, such as 'full_access_as_app', 'Mail.Read', 'Mail.ReadWrite', or 'Mail.Send'. Granting these permissions allows an application to access mailboxes across the tenant without requiring a signed-in user context, which is a common persistence and data exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) and espionage campaigns.
This rule detects scenarios where an Azure application's permissions (scopes) are upgraded to high-risk levels after an initial period, a technique known as 'incremental consent'. This is often used by attackers to avoid triggering high-risk consent alerts during the initial application authorization process, subsequently escalating privileges over time.
This rule detects scenarios where an Azure application's permissions (scopes) are upgraded to high-risk levels after an initial period, a technique known as 'incremental consent'. This is often used by attackers to avoid triggering high-risk consent alerts during the initial application authorization process, subsequently escalating privileges over time.
Detects chained AWS STS AssumeRole/AssumeRoleWithSAML/AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity events where a principal assumes a role in a different account and then quickly performs another role assumption from that new context. This pattern, often referred to as 'role chaining' or 'role laundering', is frequently used to obfuscate identity tracking and facilitate lateral movement across AWS account boundaries.
Detects the use of iam:PassRole to attach a potentially highly privileged IAM role (e.g., Administrator, PowerUser, FullAccess) to newly created or modified compute or serverless resources (EC2 instances, Lambda functions, Launch Templates, or Auto Scaling Groups). This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to escalate privileges by granting a managed resource excessive permissions that the attacker can subsequently abuse.
Detects the creation of programmatic API credentials or service principal keys by highly privileged cloud identities across AWS, Azure, and GCP. Specifically monitors AWS Root, Azure AD Global/Company Administrators, and GCP Organization Owners, whose roles generally do not require long-term API access.
This rule detects the assignment of sensitive Microsoft Graph API application roles to a service principal, which can be an indicator of an adversary establishing a directory-wide backdoor in an Azure/Entra ID environment. This technique is often used to escalate privileges following an initial compromise of a low-privilege application registration.
Detects unauthorized modifications to federation trust configurations, such as IssuerUri, federationMetadataUrl, or signing certificate thumbprints, on a federated domain. Adversaries may manipulate these settings to establish credential-independent persistence or to forge SAML tokens (Golden SAML) by repointing the federation metadata to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects instances where an administrator has granted tenant-wide consent to an OAuth application requesting highly privileged Microsoft Graph permissions. This activity is a significant indicator of potential persistence or privilege escalation, as it allows the application to perform sensitive operations across the organization without requiring individual user interaction.
Detects modifications to the Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) token-signing certificate on a federated domain. This activity is a critical precursor to Golden SAML attacks, where an attacker replaces the legitimate signing certificate with one they control to forge SAML assertions and bypass authentication mechanisms. The rule excludes modifications initiated by applications identified as federation services.
Detects when a service principal is added as an owner to an application or another service principal. This activity indicates a potential privilege escalation or persistence attempt, where a compromised application gains administrative control over other identities or resources within the Azure environment.
Detects instances where an Entra ID (Azure AD) application is registered and subsequently granted consent by the same user within 30 minutes, specifically when the activity occurs outside of typical business hours (7 AM - 7 PM) or from disparate IP addresses. This behavior pattern is indicative of potential malicious OAuth application registration and subsequent token-granting by an attacker to maintain persistent access to an environment.
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