Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the reactivation of a Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) service principal that has been inactive for 90 or more days, specifically flagging those that perform privileged Graph API operations after their return. This rule helps identify potentially compromised or stale service principals being leveraged by adversaries for persistent access.
Detects modifications to Microsoft 365 tenant configurations that weaken security posture, specifically the disabling of Security Defaults or the re-enabling of legacy/basic authentication methods (e.g., POP, IMAP, ActiveSync).
Detects the addition of new credentials (secrets or certificates) to an existing service principal or application within a cloud environment. This behavior is often associated with persistence or privilege escalation tactics in cloud identity platforms. The rule flags activity from potentially non-automated accounts and can correlate with recent administrative role assignments.
Detects when a new owner is added to an Azure/Entra ID enterprise application or service principal. This activity is a common persistence technique used by adversaries to gain long-term, high-privilege access, such as modifying application credentials or API permissions, without requiring directory administrator roles.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings. This rule alerts on changes that allow external tenants to interact with the environment, such as enabling inbound/outbound trusts, automatic redemption, or trusting MFA claims, which can be leveraged to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement between tenants.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings. This rule alerts on changes that allow external tenants to interact with the environment, such as enabling inbound/outbound trusts, automatic redemption, or trusting MFA claims, which can be leveraged to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement between tenants.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings. This rule alerts on changes that allow external tenants to interact with the environment, such as enabling inbound/outbound trusts, automatic redemption, or trusting MFA claims, which can be leveraged to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement between tenants.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings. This rule alerts on changes that allow external tenants to interact with the environment, such as enabling inbound/outbound trusts, automatic redemption, or trusting MFA claims, which can be leveraged to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement between tenants.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings. This rule alerts on changes that allow external tenants to interact with the environment, such as enabling inbound/outbound trusts, automatic redemption, or trusting MFA claims, which can be leveraged to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement between tenants.
Detects high-risk activities related to SAML token-signing certificates, including certificate export from Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) or Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and unauthorized configuration changes to enterprise application certificate management. These activities are potential precursors to Golden SAML attacks, where an adversary attempts to forge authentication tokens.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling policies, switching them to report-only mode, removing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) or grant control requirements, or expanding exclusion lists to exempt users, groups, or locations from security controls. Such modifications are often indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or bypass MFA requirements.
Detects the assignment of highly privileged Azure AD/Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Application Administrator) to a service principal. Assigning such roles to service principals is a common persistence technique, as these identities can be used to bypass conditional access policies and MFA through non-interactive authentication methods like client credentials.
Detects the assignment of highly privileged Azure AD/Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Application Administrator) to a service principal. Assigning such roles to service principals is a common persistence technique, as these identities can be used to bypass conditional access policies and MFA through non-interactive authentication methods like client credentials.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
Detects the assignment of highly privileged Azure AD/Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Application Administrator) to a service principal. Assigning such roles to service principals is a common persistence technique, as these identities can be used to bypass conditional access policies and MFA through non-interactive authentication methods like client credentials.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings. This rule alerts on changes that allow external tenants to interact with the environment, such as enabling inbound/outbound trusts, automatic redemption, or trusting MFA claims, which can be leveraged to establish persistence or facilitate lateral movement between tenants.
This rule detects instances where a user successfully activates a privileged role via Privileged Identity Management (PIM) in a cloud environment, despite the activation policy requiring approval. It flags cases where the 'Add member to role completed' event indicates that approval is required, but the 'approvalStatus' is absent, suggesting an attempt to bypass the formal approval workflow.
Detects the addition of a federated identity credential to an Azure AD / Entra ID application. Adversaries may use this technique to establish persistent, secretless access to an application's service principal by configuring trust with an external OIDC issuer under their control (e.g., a malicious GitHub repository or personal OIDC provider).
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