Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects mailbox permission changes (FullAccess, SendAs) or abnormally high volume of mailbox item access events occurring shortly after a risky, non-interactive, or unusual location sign-in. This pattern indicates a potential follow-on activity from a successful session hijacking or token theft attack.
Detects mailbox permission changes (FullAccess, SendAs) or abnormally high volume of mailbox item access events occurring shortly after a risky, non-interactive, or unusual location sign-in. This pattern indicates a potential follow-on activity from a successful session hijacking or token theft attack.
Detects a user account adding a new client secret or certificate to an Azure AD application/service principal, followed by a sign-in event from that same service principal originating from an IP address not observed in the prior 14 days. This behavior is indicative of potential persistent access creation by an adversary using newly generated credentials.
This rule detects Entra ID Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role activations that occur with missing or generic justification, correlated with a sign-in session that has been flagged as risky (high/medium risk) or non-interactive. This combination suggests a potential session hijacking scenario where an adversary is attempting to elevate privileges using a compromised, legitimate user session.
This rule monitors for suspicious administrative modifications to identity federation settings within Entra ID (Azure AD) and potential unauthorized alterations to on-premises Active Directory objects related to the 'AZUREADSSOACC' account. These activities are indicative of persistence mechanisms or credential manipulation in hybrid identity environments, potentially used to subvert authentication processes.
Detects instances where a risky Azure AD sign-in (e.g., token replay or confirmed compromise) is closely followed (within 24 hours) by sensitive application or service principal credential modifications by the same user account. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence establishment via account manipulation.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox or transport rules that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as external forwarding, movement to hidden or system folders, automatic deletion/marking as read, or rules containing keywords related to financial fraud. The rule specifically monitors for activities occurring via non-standard or automated clients to increase detection fidelity.
Detects when a user account assigned to a highly privileged directory or cloud role performs the assignment shortly after exhibiting signs of compromise, such as risky sign-ins, anomalous locations, or suspected session token reuse.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) PIM or Just-In-Time role activations that occur without a proper approval workflow, are self-approved, or coincide with identified risky sign-in signals.
Detects instances where a risky Azure AD sign-in (e.g., token replay or confirmed compromise) is closely followed (within 24 hours) by sensitive application or service principal credential modifications by the same user account. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence establishment via account manipulation.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox or transport rules that exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as external forwarding, movement to hidden or system folders, automatic deletion/marking as read, or rules containing keywords related to financial fraud. The rule specifically monitors for activities occurring via non-standard or automated clients to increase detection fidelity.
Detects when a user account assigned to a highly privileged directory or cloud role performs the assignment shortly after exhibiting signs of compromise, such as risky sign-ins, anomalous locations, or suspected session token reuse.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) PIM or Just-In-Time role activations that occur without a proper approval workflow, are self-approved, or coincide with identified risky sign-in signals.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange inbox rules that involve suspicious actions, such as forwarding or redirecting emails to external domains, deleting messages, or marking messages as read. These actions are common indicators of persistent access or data exfiltration attempts following a mailbox compromise.
Detects mailbox configuration changes in Exchange Online where email forwarding (ForwardingSmtpAddress, ForwardingAddress, or DeliverToMailboxAndForward) is enabled to an external, non-tenant domain. This technique is commonly used for persistence and data exfiltration following account compromise, allowing attackers to redirect incoming communications to an external mailbox even after the original account credentials have been reset.
Detects the addition of new credentials (certificates, secrets, or keys) to Azure AD Service Principals or Applications, occurring outside of standard business hours (6 AM to 8 PM). This pattern is often indicative of an adversary establishing or maintaining persistent access to an enterprise cloud environment.
Detects the addition of new credentials (certificates, secrets, or keys) to Azure AD Service Principals or Applications, occurring outside of standard business hours (6 AM to 8 PM). This pattern is often indicative of an adversary establishing or maintaining persistent access to an enterprise cloud environment.
This rule detects when a user is assigned a highly privileged role in Azure AD (e.g., Global Administrator, Security Administrator) shortly after that user has performed a sign-in event flagged as risky. This behavior is a strong indicator of account takeover or malicious privilege escalation within the cloud environment.
Detects a sequence of events where a user account triggers a high-risk or anomalous sign-in (e.g., token-replay, AitM, impossible travel), followed within 12 hours by that same user modifying, deleting, or narrowing the scope of Conditional Access or identity security policies. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence, strip MFA requirements, or bypass location restrictions after gaining initial cloud account access.
Detects the assignment of a highly privileged administrative or directory role to a user or service principal following a high-risk or anomalous sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of potential session hijacking where an adversary attempts to escalate privileges within a cloud environment after gaining initial access to a compromised account.
Detects bulk mailbox export or content search operations performed by an identity shortly after a high-risk sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary attempts to harvest sensitive email data at scale for BEC or extortion.
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