Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,004 detections
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Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
Detects the addition of new members to a GitHub organization or team outside of standard business hours. This behavior is correlated with potential subsequent grants of repository administrative access or read access to secrets, characteristic of attacker patterns attempting to gain unauthorized access to cloud environments and OAuth tokens via CI/CD pipelines or VCS platforms.
Detects anomalous anti-forensic behavior where a Salesforce Bulk API query job is deleted shortly after its creation or completion. This sequence is often associated with efforts to obscure data exfiltration activities by removing the metadata trail of bulk data exports.
Detects the creation of new Entra ID applications or service principals that use display names similar to well-known SaaS vendors but lack a verified publisher status, followed within 24 hours by a consent grant for high-privilege permissions. This pattern is characteristic of OAuth-impersonation campaigns aimed at gaining persistent access to cloud resources.
Detects additions, updates, or modifications to External Authentication Methods (EAM) or federated identity providers in Microsoft Entra ID. This activity is consistent with the TrustSink technique, where an adversary registers a malicious OIDC MFA provider to facilitate authentication bypass or persistence.
Detects successful authentication to administrative identity provider consoles that are flagged by identity-provider risk engines as anomalous (e.g., unfamiliar location, new device, or suspicious sign-in properties). This pattern monitors for potential account takeovers or compromised insider activity targeting critical administrative infrastructure, as observed in attacks utilizing recruited or purchased credentials.
Detects successful authentication to administrative identity provider consoles that are flagged by identity-provider risk engines as anomalous (e.g., unfamiliar location, new device, or suspicious sign-in properties). This pattern monitors for potential account takeovers or compromised insider activity targeting critical administrative infrastructure, as observed in attacks utilizing recruited or purchased credentials.
Detects high-privilege account management actions in Entra ID (password resets or MFA modifications) performed by service or admin accounts, which are characteristic of social engineering (vishing) attacks targeting IT helpdesks to gain unauthorized access.
Detects unauthorized attempts to delete or purge critical Salesforce audit logs, including the Setup Audit Trail, Login History, and Event Monitoring log files. This behavior is indicative of anti-forensic activity, often utilized by threat actors such as ShinyHunters to destroy audit evidence following unauthorized access, data export, or credential manipulation.
Detects modifications to Entra ID Conditional Access or Okta authentication policies that introduce MFA exclusions, trusted network bypasses, or authentication-strength downgrades. This activity is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistence or bypass MFA following a successful initial account compromise.
Detects suspicious account management activities, such as password resets or MFA re-enrollment, performed by an operator on a high-privileged or administrator account outside of typical business hours (06:00-20:00). This behavior is often indicative of help-desk impersonation or credential takeover attempts targeting Identity Provider (IdP) administrative roles.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects a precursor pattern identified as JADEPUFFER, where a failed 'ListKeys' operation (indicating an attempt to discover or access keys for a non-existent storage account) is immediately followed by a burst of destructive delete operations on critical cloud resources (e.g., storage, databases, key vaults) by the same actor.
Detects sensitive cPanel/WHM administrative commands or system file modifications occurring within one hour of a suspected authentication bypass event, indicative of potential post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2026-41940.
Detects autonomous AI agents triggered by routine, non-interactive workflows (such as scheduled tasks, tickets, or calendar invites) that subsequently invoke sensitive tools. The rule correlates these invocations with content hashes previously flagged as containing malicious indirect prompt injections, indicating an attack where a payload remains dormant until processed by an automated agent.
Detects autonomous AI agents triggered by routine, non-interactive workflows (such as scheduled tasks, tickets, or calendar invites) that subsequently invoke sensitive tools. The rule correlates these invocations with content hashes previously flagged as containing malicious indirect prompt injections, indicating an attack where a payload remains dormant until processed by an automated agent.
Detects the creation of new administrator or technician accounts within the SimpleHelp Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) platform via API calls. This activity is often associated with unauthorized persistence creation by an adversary who has gained access to the platform.
Detects instances where a Google Cloud Config Connector (KCC) service account performs a SetIamPolicy operation that grants high-privilege roles (roles/owner or roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin) at the organization or folder scope. This activity often indicates an out-of-band configuration change, a compromised CI/CD pipeline, or an unauthorized escalation, as legitimate KCC changes should be tracked via GitOps records.
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