Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential DCSync attacks by monitoring for Windows Event ID 4662 (Object Access) where a non-domain controller account exercises directory replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) against Active Directory domain objects. This identifies unauthorized attempts to pull sensitive credential data directly from a Domain Controller.
This rule detects potentially malicious modification or configuration changes to Azure Function Apps. It monitors for operations such as creation, updates, and configuration changes that contain suspicious indicators like hardcoded credentials (TOKEN, SECRET, PASS), potential reverse shell patterns, or large Base64 encoded payloads. The rule specifically excludes known CI/CD pipeline callers to minimize false positives.
Detects instances where a user or service principal is assigned to high-privilege roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Owner) without utilizing the Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) service. This is indicated by the absence of 'PIM' in the LoggedByService field for a successful 'Add member to role' operation, which could signify an attempt to bypass established access controls and gain unauthorized elevated persistence.
This rule detects potentially malicious modification or configuration changes to Azure Function Apps. It monitors for operations such as creation, updates, and configuration changes that contain suspicious indicators like hardcoded credentials (TOKEN, SECRET, PASS), potential reverse shell patterns, or large Base64 encoded payloads. The rule specifically excludes known CI/CD pipeline callers to minimize false positives.
Detects potential DCSync attacks by monitoring for Windows Event ID 4662 (Object Access) where a non-domain controller account exercises directory replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) against Active Directory domain objects. This identifies unauthorized attempts to pull sensitive credential data directly from a Domain Controller.
This rule monitors for two distinct suspicious activities: 1) Inbound emails where the sender display name matches a list of executive titles, commonly indicative of Business Email Compromise (BEC) or executive impersonation attacks; 2) The creation of cloud service accounts with names mimicking administrative or IT support roles, which may indicate an adversary establishing persistent, privileged access.
Monitors GitHub audit logs for suspicious or high-risk activities within CI/CD pipelines, including actions triggered by forks, workflow approvals, branch policy overrides, self-hosted runner registration, and sensitive secret access.
Detects Event 5136 where msDS-KeyCredentialLink is added to an AD object, indicative of Shadow Credentials abuse via Whisker/DSInternals. The rule filters out MSOL_ sync accounts and computer-to-computer self-writes to reduce false positives.
Detects suspicious app installations, custom app creation, and bot additions within Microsoft Teams. This rule identifies activities such as sideloaded app installations, which can bypass standard vetting processes and serve as a persistence mechanism for attackers. It also flags custom app creation outside of typical development teams, which could indicate the deployment of command and control (C2) bots or data exfiltration applications. Additionally, the rule looks for the addition of bots to teams and suspicious keywords in app names that might suggest impersonation or malicious tooling.
Detects the creation or deletion of Kubernetes namespaces and nodes via the API server. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence, expand their control, or disrupt the environment within a Kubernetes cluster.
Detects attempts to list, read, create, update, or delete Kubernetes secrets via the Kubernetes API server. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive information or manipulate the environment.
Detects rapid high-volume file and messaging operations across multiple Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Teams, Exchange) within a compressed 10-minute window from a single identity and IP address. This behavior can indicate data exfiltration or reconnaissance by an adversary.
Detects modification of domain trust relationships via LDAP for privilege escalation
Detects broad assignments of administrative roles or specific deletion permissions for cloud storage buckets in GCP, AWS, and Azure. This includes granting 'storage.admin', 'storage.objectAdmin', or 'storage.buckets.delete' in GCP, 's3:DeleteBucket' in AWS IAM policies, or 'Storage Account Contributor'/'Owner' roles in Azure. Such assignments to service accounts or non-administrative identities could enable 'Universal Bucket Hijacking' or unauthorized data deletion.
Identifies the creation of an Exchange transport rule or mailbox setting that forwards all incoming emails to an external, attacker-controlled address.
Detects collection of service principals, app role assignments, delegated grants, and ownership data via Microsoft Graph API, which can identify privilege escalation paths. The rule specifically looks for a high volume of GET requests (35 or more within a 15-minute window) to URIs associated with enumerating service principals, app role assignments, oauth2 permission grants, and owned objects.
Detects attempts to modify or delete Microsoft Graph API conditional access policies. This could indicate an adversary attempting to weaken security controls to facilitate unauthorized access or persistence.
Detects successful Device Code authentication followed immediately by a new device registration, a tactic used to extend access via PRT generation.
Detects high-impact configuration changes to Azure management groups or subscriptions (e.g., write/delete operations) that are performed by non-privileged accounts or outside of defined business change windows. This activity can indicate unauthorized privilege escalation, resource manipulation, or reconnaissance by an adversary.
Detects anomalous activity where multiple distinct Living-off-the-Land (LotL) binaries (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wmic.exe, tasklist.exe, systeminfo.exe) are executed on the same device within a single hour. This threshold of 4 unique administrative or discovery tools being used in a short timeframe is often indicative of reconnaissance, lateral movement, or post-exploitation environment assessment by an adversary.
Detects the threat actor creating inbox rules to delete or archive emails containing keywords like "deposit", "payroll", "HR", "Workday", or "ADP" to hide their tampering, often associated with the Storm-2755 campaign.
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