Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,004 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,442
479
390
321
192
Contributors
650
521
286
272
264
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
3,004
Platforms
1,199
673
623
512
218
Products / Services
880
726
311
257
229
MITRE Techniques
1,661
1,109
905
468
464
CVEs
6
5
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
49
13
6
3
2
IDS Protocols
40
31
1
Detects instances where an interactive user initiates a password change attempt as captured by Windows Security Event ID 4723. The rule filters out non-interactive accounts (ending with '$') and common service account naming patterns to focus on human-driven account modifications.
Detects the deletion of a storage bucket immediately followed by the creation of a new bucket with the same name across different cloud providers (GCP, AWS S3, Azure). This rule specifically flags scenarios where the deleting actor or project differs from the creating actor or project, indicating a potential cross-account hijack or data exfiltration attempt.
This rule detects a potential Azure storage account name hijacking scenario. It identifies instances where a storage account is deleted and then recreated with the exact same name in a different subscription within the same Azure tenant, all within a 60-minute window. This activity could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data via Azure Monitor diagnostic settings by taking over a previously used storage account name.
Detects when fodhelper.exe, a legitimate Windows utility, is used to spawn processes other than cmd.exe or conhost.exe. This behavior is commonly associated with UAC bypass techniques where fodhelper.exe is abused to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges without a UAC prompt.
This rule detects attempts to manipulate user or service principal names (SPN/UPN) in Active Directory by adding non-ASCII or zero-width characters. Such modifications can be used by adversaries for obfuscation, to bypass detection mechanisms, or to create stealthy persistence. The rule specifically looks for Event IDs 4738 (User Account Changed) and 5136 (Directory Service Object Modified) where the 'servicePrincipalName' or 'userPrincipalName' attributes contain characters outside the standard ASCII range or zero-width characters like U+200B, U+200C, U+200D.
Detects when five or more user accounts are deleted within a one-hour period by a single user. This activity can indicate malicious intent to disrupt operations or cover tracks.
Detects execution of 'schtasks.exe' spawned by 'ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe'. This pattern is often associated with remote management or administrative tasks, but can be leveraged by adversaries to establish persistence or remote execution.
This rule monitors for administrative VMware operations (cloning, snapshotting, or process manipulation) performed on sensitive infrastructure servers (such as Domain Controllers, PKI, Vault, or ADFS) that occur outside of a designated maintenance window by non-authorized accounts. It leverages tools like vim-cmd, esxcli, or govc to detect potential unauthorized VM manipulation that could lead to data theft, snapshot-based credential extraction, or unauthorized system changes.
Detects the creation of a local user account named 'admin' with the password 'germania' using the native 'net.exe' utility. This specific command pattern has been associated with pre-ransomware activity during the 'Prinz Eugen' campaign to establish persistence and unauthorized administrative access.
This rule detects suspicious activities related to AWS S3 buckets that could indicate a bucket hijacking attempt or unauthorized replication to an external account. Specifically, it looks for two scenarios: 1) an S3 bucket being deleted and then recreated by a different AWS account within a one-hour window, suggesting a namespace hijacking, or 2) an S3 bucket being deleted while a PutBucketReplication event references an external AWS account, indicating an attempt to exfiltrate data or maintain access through replication.
Detects potential GCP logging sink bucket hijacking by monitoring for the deletion of a Google Cloud Storage bucket followed closely by an update to a logging sink configuration that points to a GCS destination. This pattern is characteristic of attackers attempting to intercept cloud log streams by recreating a target destination bucket in an environment they control.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a highly privileged on-premises synchronized user account signs into Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) and immediately performs sensitive administrative actions (role assignment or OAuth application consent grant) within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of credential abuse by the Storm-2372 actor to escalate privileges within a tenant.
Detects bulk reconnaissance against multiple Microsoft Graph API endpoints (users, groups, roles, etc.) by scripting clients, correlated with a recent device registration event by the same user principal. This behavior is indicative of a Storm-2372 conditional access bypass strategy followed by rapid directory environment enumeration.
Detects cross-tenant service principal authentications that leverage blueprint-derived identities. This rule specifically looks for client_credentials grant types using client_assertion (JWT bearer) or client_secret targeting sensitive scopes like 'api://AzureADTokenExchange/.default' or 'AgentIdentity.CreateAsManager' from a foreign tenant service principal. This activity could indicate an attempt to establish persistence or gain unauthorized access across Azure AD tenants.
This rule detects when an application role assignment or delegated permission grant is successfully added to a service principal in Azure Active Directory, specifically looking for highly privileged permissions such as 'RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory', 'UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All', 'UserAuthMethod-TAP.ReadWrite.All', or 'User.Read.All'. This could indicate an adversary attempting to gain elevated access or persistence within the Azure AD environment.
This rule detects the creation of Azure DNS zones by callers who have no prior history of writing to DNS zones within a specified lookback period. This behavior can indicate an attempt at DNS zone takeover, as observed in campaigns like 'Borrowed Trust' or 'link99', where adversaries might create orphaned DNS zones to redirect traffic or host malicious content.
Detects successful retrieval of storage account access keys by a user identity rather than an established deployment or backup service.
This rule detects potential abuse of Group Policy Objects (GPOs) by identifying multiple changes (3 or more) to GPO-related objects within a short timeframe. It specifically looks for Event ID 5136 (Directory Service Changes) where the ObjectClass is either 'groupPolicyContainer' or 'gPCFileSysPath'. This could indicate an adversary modifying GPOs to achieve persistence, privilege escalation, or other malicious objectives.
This rule detects the creation (EventID 4720) or deletion (EventID 4726) of user accounts within the Security Event logs. It summarizes these activities by the subject user name and time generated, providing an hourly count of account management actions.
This rule detects a high volume of group membership changes (additions or removals) by a single user within a one-hour window. Event IDs 4728 (A member was added to a security-enabled global group), 4729 (A member was removed from a security-enabled global group), and 4730 (A member was removed from a security-enabled universal group) are monitored. A count of 5 or more such events by the same user within an hour is flagged as suspicious, potentially indicating malicious account manipulation or privilege escalation attempts.
This rule detects when a single user makes multiple changes to security groups within a short timeframe (binned hourly). Specifically, it looks for Event IDs 4752 (A security-enabled global group was changed), 4753 (A security-enabled local group was changed), or 4754 (A security-enabled universal group was changed). This could indicate an attempt to manipulate group memberships for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
Page 76 of 144