Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a spike in successful Azure Load Balancer operations from a single caller within an hour. A count of 3 or more successful operations from the same caller within a one-hour window will trigger this alert. This could indicate automated activity or unusual configuration changes related to load balancers.
Detects a successful self-service password reset for a privileged or high-value account when the initiating context does not match an approved helpdesk workflow. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain access to an account by resetting its password without proper authorization.
Detects the GitLab Runner process (gitlab-runner-windows-amd64.exe) spawning PowerShell with command-line arguments indicative of a C2 framework or manual operator interaction, such as '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', and '-Command'. The rule specifically targets instances where these processes are executed under the SYSTEM account, a behavior commonly associated with exploiting CI/CD runners for persistent command execution.
This rule detects when the Windows Security Event Log (Event ID 1102) or the System Event Log (Event ID 104) has been cleared. Clearing event logs is a common tactic used by adversaries to remove evidence of their activities on a compromised system.
This rule detects when the Windows Security Event Log (Event ID 1102) or the System Event Log (Event ID 104) has been cleared. Clearing event logs is a common tactic used by adversaries to remove evidence of their activities on a compromised system.
Detects successful Device Code authentication followed immediately by a new device registration, a tactic used to extend access via PRT generation. This behavior is indicative of an attacker using a stolen device code to register a new device, thereby gaining persistent access to the user's account.
Detects attempts to modify or delete Conditional Access Policies in Microsoft Graph. This could indicate an adversary attempting to weaken security controls to facilitate unauthorized access or persistence.
Detects successful retrieval of storage account access keys by a user identity rather than an established deployment or backup service. This activity can indicate an attacker attempting to gain access to sensitive data stored in Azure Storage Accounts.
Detects credential abuse patterns from FortiGate logs including administrative changes, tunneling activity, and anomalous source-IP behavior.
This rule detects the connection of USB devices identified as suspicious based on a curated list of Vendor IDs (VIDs) and Product IDs (PIDs). It monitors 'PnpDeviceConnected' events, extracts VID and PID from the device information, and cross-references them with an external list of known suspicious USB device identifiers. The rule aims to identify potentially malicious or unauthorized USB devices being connected to endpoints.
Monitors Cisco SD-WAN (vManage, vBond, vSmart) appliance logs for authentication events against management accounts. It specifically identifies logins from known malicious IP addresses associated with threat actor activities and flags anomalous authentication methods such as PAM/keyboard-interactive and unvalidated administrative access.
This rule monitors Cisco SD-WAN logs (vManage, auth, and syslog) for suspicious administrative activity including credential manipulation, unauthorized password changes, successful vManage-admin SSH logins, and potential configuration exfiltration via vManage API calls.
This rule detects administrative changes to Cisco SD-WAN environments, including policy pushes, template attachments, device onboarding, and tunnel modifications. It uses a risk-scoring mechanism based on the type of change and whether the activity occurs outside of standard business hours (06:00 to 22:00). High-risk events (score >= 65) trigger an alert, highlighting potential unauthorized infrastructure modifications or malicious device insertion.
This rule detects attempts to exploit MyBB administrative controls. It monitors for two primary patterns: unauthorized privilege escalation where a limited ACP account creates a new Administrator (usergroup=4) user by bypassing access controls, and unauthorized access by limited ACP accounts to restricted administrative modules such as template and plugin management.
Detects the attacker leveraging a stolen session token to create or modify inbox rules that move finance or payroll related emails to the Archive or Trash folders, or delete them, as observed in Tycoon2FA phishing campaigns.
This rule detects a POST request to the MyBB administrative interface (specifically the user-users module) that contains parameters indicating an attempt to escalate a limited administrative user to a full administrator by assigning the 'usergroup=4' or 'gid=4' identifier, which corresponds to the default Administrator group in MyBB.
Detects potential privilege escalation within the MyBB Administrative Control Panel (ACP). The rule identifies POST requests to user management modules that set a user's group ID (gid) or usergroup to 4, which typically corresponds to the administrator group in MyBB. It verifies the escalation by correlating it with a prior session that lacked administrator privileges and identifying a subsequent login event.
Detects unauthorized attempts to escalate privileges within the MyBB Admin Control Panel (ACP) by creating a new account or modifying an existing one to belong to the administrator group (gid=4). This is indicative of an attacker attempting to gain full administrative control by bypassing module-level access restrictions.
Detects the registration of a new authentication method (phone, authenticator app, passkey, or security key) in Azure Active Directory after a session exhibits unusual location or token behavior, indicated by a high or medium risk level, anonymous proxy usage, or unfamiliar features.
Detects a mail forwarding or redirect rule created from a session that recently exhibited token replay or unusual client changes. This rule specifically looks for operations related to Inbox Rules in Exchange or Office 365 audit logs that contain keywords indicating forwarding or redirection.
Detects the creation or starting of a Windows service on a remote host using the Service Control Manager (sc.exe) utility. This is a common method for lateral movement and remote execution of malicious payloads.
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