Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of Named Locations within Conditional Access policies that include IP ranges. This behavior could indicate an attacker whitelisting their own IP addresses to maintain persistence or bypass Conditional Access security controls. The rule correlates changes with administrative context, such as non-standard business hours, weekends, or modifications by unexpected accounts.
Detects Azure Bastion RDP or SSH tunnel sessions initiated by users who have no history of using Bastion in the last 60 days, or by users connecting from a geographic location not observed in their recent sign-in history. This behavior may indicate account compromise and unauthorized lateral movement attempts.
Detects the creation or modification of Named Locations within Conditional Access policies that include IP ranges. This behavior could indicate an attacker whitelisting their own IP addresses to maintain persistence or bypass Conditional Access security controls. The rule correlates changes with administrative context, such as non-standard business hours, weekends, or modifications by unexpected accounts.
Detects modifications or deletions of Conditional Access policies in an environment. This includes disabling policies or altering key configurations like users, groups, applications, platforms, or locations, which could be indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass security controls or maintain persistent access.
This rule detects attempts to grant consent to OAuth applications, which could indicate an illicit consent grant attack. It specifically looks for successful operations related to consenting to applications, adding app role assignments to service principals, adding delegated permission grants, or adding OAuth2PermissionGrants within audit logs. The rule extracts details such as the target application, the user who consented, their initiating IP address, and the permissions granted.
Detects execution of PsExec or PsExec64 using the -accepteula flag targeting a remote host specified by a Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path. This pattern is commonly used for legitimate remote administration but is also a hallmark of lateral movement and remote code execution by attackers.
Detects execution of PsExec or PsExec64 using the -accepteula flag targeting a remote host specified by a Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path. This pattern is commonly used for legitimate remote administration but is also a hallmark of lateral movement and remote code execution by attackers.
Detects modifications or deletions of Conditional Access policies in an environment. This includes disabling policies or altering key configurations like users, groups, applications, platforms, or locations, which could be indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass security controls or maintain persistent access.
Detects high-velocity queries to Graph API regarding transitiveRoleAssignments, a Tycoon 2FA post-compromise activity. This activity is indicative of reconnaissance for role assignments within Microsoft Graph, potentially by an adversary like Volt Typhoon (Tycoon 2FA).
This rule detects successful additions or updates to service principal credentials or application certificates/secrets within Azure AD. This activity can indicate persistence establishment by an attacker who has compromised an account with sufficient permissions to manipulate application identities.
Detects access to sensitive Domain DNS objects in Active Directory, specifically targeting properties associated with domain controller replication metadata or sensitive object attributes. This activity is often used for reconnaissance or to facilitate further attacks against domain infrastructure.
This rule monitors for additions of users to highly sensitive Active Directory groups, such as Domain Admins or Enterprise Admins, by tracking specific Windows security events (4728, 4732, 4756). Unauthorized membership changes in these groups are a classic indicator of privilege escalation or persistence maintenance by an adversary.
Detects successful OAuth application consent events where the requested permissions include sensitive scopes such as Mail, Files, or User profile access. This is a common indicator of OAuth application-based phishing or persistence attempts, often referred to as 'Illicit Consent Grant' attacks.
Detects changes to the attributes of the AdminSDHolder object in Active Directory. The AdminSDHolder object is a template used by the Active Directory security descriptor propagator (SDProp) to enforce permissions on protected administrative groups. Modification of this object is a highly suspicious activity that can be used to establish persistence or grant excessive privileges by poisoning the security descriptors of all protected objects within the domain.
Detects when a single user initiates a high volume (5 or more) of external guest user invitations within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of reconnaissance or attempts to establish persistence by an compromised account by inviting external identities into the tenant.
Detects the clearing of Windows Security and System event logs, or Defender XDR audit logs, indicating potential adversary activity to remove traces of their actions.
Detects unauthenticated or anonymous access attempts to cloud storage buckets, specifically targeting Azure Blob Storage and AWS S3. The rule identifies access to publicly exposed buckets or those with anonymous access enabled, including specific bucket names associated with known OPSEC failures (pois43, w456w5, sentiwaw). This could indicate data exposure or reconnaissance by unauthorized actors.
Detects modifications or publication of Azure Automation runbooks by users or service principals other than known, pre-approved automation service principals. This activity may indicate an unauthorized user or compromised service principal attempting to inject malicious code into automation workflows.
Detects high-impact configuration changes to Azure management groups or subscriptions (e.g., write/delete operations) that are performed by non-privileged accounts or outside of defined business change windows. This activity can indicate unauthorized privilege escalation, resource manipulation, or reconnaissance by an adversary.
Detects suspicious OAuth application or service principal registration, or permission consent, performed by users who are not part of designated IT administrator groups. This rule flags high-privilege permission grants (e.g., Mail.Read, Directory.ReadWrite.All) or application consent events, which are common methods for establishing long-term persistence in cloud environments.
This rule detects successful administrative actions related to the creation, deletion, or modification of Azure Management Groups, Subscriptions, and resources within them. Such actions can indicate unauthorized structural changes to the environment, potential privilege escalation, or attempts to modify tenant-level governance.
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