Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications or deletions of Conditional Access policies in an environment. This includes disabling policies or altering key configurations like users, groups, applications, platforms, or locations, which could be indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass security controls or maintain persistent access.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of operations related to GitHub Enterprise repositories, such as adding users, creating teams, pushing to repositories, or changing permissions, within a short timeframe. This could indicate a compromised account or automated malicious activity targeting source code repositories.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the creation or update of managed identities and the assignment of highly privileged roles (Contributor, Owner, User Access Administrator) to them. It specifically looks for multiple such assignments within a one-hour window to managed identities associated with automation, runbook, or function resources, indicating potential privilege escalation or malicious access.
Detects a new mailbox rule that deletes, moves, redirects, or marks as read messages containing security, sign-in, MFA, alert, or administrator terms. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to hide their activities or prevent detection by preventing security notifications from reaching the user.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules that automatically mark emails as read and move them to a folder. This behavior is commonly used by adversaries to hide phishing replies or other malicious email activity from the victim's primary inbox.
This rule detects when a user successfully grants five or more OAuth2 permissions within a five-minute window, specifically looking for sensitive scopes such as 'Mail.Read', 'Calendar.Read', 'User.Read.All', or 'Directory.Read.All'. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to gain broad access to an organization's data through a compromised application or user account.
Detects rogue device registration with default naming conventions commonly used by threat actors (DESKTOP-[0-9A-F]{6,8}). This pattern is often observed in device code phishing attacks where adversaries register new devices with generic names to maintain persistence or access.
Detects specific URI patterns used by Storm-2949 to enumerate users, indicating automated directory reconnaissance. The rule specifically looks for Microsoft Graph API calls that include both '$select=displayName,userPrincipalName,jobTitle' and '$top=50' in the RawEventData, which are indicators of user enumeration.
Detects the command line sequence used by Miasma to restore passwordless sudo for the 'runner' user in GitHub Actions by overwriting sudoers via a Docker container. This specific pattern targets the Miasma Alpine container payload.
Detects the creation of a new deviceManagementScript or deviceShellScript object in Intune, indicating a PowerShell (Windows) or Shell (macOS/Linux) script has been uploaded to the Intune management platform. This is considered a high-fidelity indicator of script-based abuse as these scripts execute as SYSTEM on targeted endpoints and leave minimal forensic traces. The rule also identifies script creation initiated by service principals that might bypass human-UPN-based monitoring.
This rule identifies rapid, multi-category reconnaissance activity against the Microsoft Graph API. It specifically looks for bursts of 20 or more requests across 4 or more unique Graph API endpoints within a one-minute window, particularly when those requests include parameters like '$top=999', '$count=true', or target '/beta/' endpoints, which are indicative of attempts to extract maximum data or use less common API versions. This behavior is typified by threat actors like Tycoon 2FA operators.
This rule detects suspicious administrative activities in Azure AD, Microsoft Graph, SharePoint, Exchange, or Teams when performed by accounts that are not explicitly identified as 'admin' or 'service' accounts. It looks for a combination of at least 5 operations and 2 unique operation types within a 2-hour window, targeting group, application, or service principal related resources. This could indicate an attacker using compromised non-privileged accounts to perform administrative actions or escalate privileges.
Detects a spike in successful operations related to Azure Storage Account Keys by a single caller within a one-hour window. This could indicate an adversary attempting to enumerate, access, or exfiltrate storage account keys, or a legitimate user performing multiple key management activities.
Identifies HTTP POST requests indicative of rogue administrator account creation patterns ('dev_xxxxxx' or 'developer_api1') used in the OptinMonster, TrustPulse, and PushEngage supply chain attack. This rule specifically looks for POST requests to WordPress user creation endpoints containing attacker-controlled account names in the URI query.
Detects bursts of Google Workspace device registrations for a single user in a short window, specifically when 3 or more devices are registered within a 1-minute interval for the same account.
This rule detects queries made within ServiceNow by accounts classified as 'Guest' or 'Unknown'. This could indicate unauthorized access or unusual activity from unprivileged or unidentifiable accounts attempting to query data within the ServiceNow environment.
This rule detects queries made within ServiceNow by accounts classified as 'Guest' or 'Unknown'. This could indicate unauthorized access or unusual activity from unprivileged or unidentifiable accounts attempting to query data within the ServiceNow environment.
Detects post-compromise inbox rule creation that moves security/phishing alerts to a folder and marks them as read. This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to hide their activities or prevent detection.
Detects an administrative content rule that combines strategic research or defence collection terms with an external BCC, forward, or redirect destination. GTIG reported that the Patroit rule matched subjects related to medical research, Chikungunya, artificial intelligence, cyber programmes, Indo-Pacific operations, defence, and uncrewed systems before silently forwarding the messages.
Detects deletion of MFA configurations to enable authentication bypass
Detects unusual communication patterns from executive accounts in Office 365, specifically looking for mail activity, inbox rule creation, or mailbox modifications combined with keywords related to wire transfers, payments, or urgent financial actions. The rule flags scenarios where multiple such activities occur within a short timeframe (3 hours) or if new inbox rules are created, indicating potential deepfake/synthetic impersonation or Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempts.
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