Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a Slack login from a source address without prior history for that account.
A compromised Slack account gives an attacker the organisation's informal channel —
where credentials, links and internal detail are shared far more freely than in
email — and is an effective base for internal phishing.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='SLACK' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto, reason
A compromised Slack account gives an attacker the organisation's informal channel —
where credentials, links and internal detail are shared far more freely than in
email — and is an effective base for internal phishing.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='SLACK' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto, reason
Detects a successful network admission following repeated posture compliance
failures for the same endpoint. The expected outcome of failing posture is
remediation then access; failures followed by success without remediation suggests
the check was bypassed, disabled, or satisfied by spoofed posture data.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, policy, reason, srcip
failures for the same endpoint. The expected outcome of failing posture is
remediation then access; failures followed by success without remediation suggests
the check was bypassed, disabled, or satisfied by spoofed posture data.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, policy, reason, srcip
Detects a privileged account authenticating to destinations outside its established
pattern. Privileged accounts are usually scoped to a defined estate — a database
admin reaches databases, not workstations. Appearance outside that scope is lateral
movement using legitimate credentials, which endpoint tooling will not flag.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, dstip, srcip, authproto
pattern. Privileged accounts are usually scoped to a defined estate — a database
admin reaches databases, not workstations. Appearance outside that scope is lateral
movement using legitimate credentials, which endpoint tooling will not flag.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, dstip, srcip, authproto
Detects use of a vaulted privileged credential from a source address with no prior
history for that account. Privileged accounts operate from a narrow and stable set of
jump hosts; a new origin means either an undocumented access path or an attacker
operating the credential from their own foothold.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='PASSWORD_USED'
| groupby user, targetuser, srcip, role
history for that account. Privileged accounts operate from a narrow and stable set of
jump hosts; a new origin means either an undocumented access path or an attacker
operating the credential from their own foothold.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='PASSWORD_USED'
| groupby user, targetuser, srcip, role
Detects a privileged database login brokered through Arcon ARCOS from a source
address without prior history. ARCOS sits in front of database administrative access,
so it observes privileged DB sessions that database-native auditing often misses
entirely.
The extractor exposes a deliberately narrow field set — user, source address and
authentication protocol — so this detection is intentionally simple.
Onboarding: ARCOS-DBEVT is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 225).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ARCOS-DBEVT' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
address without prior history. ARCOS sits in front of database administrative access,
so it observes privileged DB sessions that database-native auditing often misses
entirely.
The extractor exposes a deliberately narrow field set — user, source address and
authentication protocol — so this detection is intentionally simple.
Onboarding: ARCOS-DBEVT is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 225).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ARCOS-DBEVT' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects and monitors sign-in events for specific high-privilege or sensitive accounts, such as break-glass accounts, within Microsoft Entra ID.
Detects instances where an OAuth token is used from a new IP address and a new country within 24 hours of a successful device-code sign-in for the same user, potentially indicating token theft or abuse.
Detects successful Google Workspace logins from an IP address or user agent not previously seen for the user within a 24-hour window.
Detects successful OAuth device-code flow sign-ins where the user completed multi-factor authentication (MFA) from a non-compliant/unmanaged device using an IP address never seen in their 30-day baseline history. This behavior can indicate device-code phishing or token abuse.
Detects authentication to the BIG-IP management interface. These interfaces should
be reachable only from a management network; a login from anywhere else indicates
either an exposure that should not exist or an attacker who has already reached the
management plane.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
be reachable only from a management network; a login from anywhere else indicates
either an exposure that should not exist or an attacker who has already reached the
management plane.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects a successful device-code sign-in whose session is replayed successfully within 60 minutes from a different IP and ASN. Only successful replays count (interrupt codes removed) and Microsoft first-party ASN egress is excluded.
This rule monitors Entra ID Sign-in logs for authentication events flagged by risk detections related to anonymizing infrastructure, such as VPNs, TOR exit nodes, or proxies. It identifies successful logins and aggregate sign-in volume from these IP addresses, flagging successful logins as critical due to the potential for valid account abuse through multi-hop proxy chains.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in followed within 60 minutes by non-interactive replay from a different IP AND a persistence action (inbox rule, app consent, device add) from a non-original IP. Persistence is now mandatory (inner join) instead of optional, and the retired AADSignInEventsBeta table is replaced by EntraIdSignInEvents.
Detects credential stuffing in Entra ID sign-in logs: one source IP failing against many distinct accounts within an hour, then succeeding on a small number of them.
An account was unlocked and then authenticated from the same IP as the account that unlocked it
A privileged SAP account attempted logons across multiple systems or clients from a single source IP address within a 6-hour window, potentially indicating credential compromise or lateral movement.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity for users by comparing current successful login attempts against a 14-day historical baseline. The rule flags logins originating from new IP addresses, new applications, or new geographic locations, specifically identifying instances where at least two of these parameters deviate from the established historical norm for the specific user.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
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