Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where Microsoft Teams (ms-teams.exe, Teams.exe) or its associated WebView2 process spawns a command or script interpreter (such as PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta, Wscript, Cscript) with suspicious download-and-execute arguments, which is commonly associated with ClickFix social engineering attacks or similar initial access tactics.
Detects reconnaissance commands (whoami, systeminfo) and PowerShell execution spawned as children of remote-access tools (such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer/QuickAssist variants, etc.), followed shortly by an outbound network connection to a .top domain from the same device.
Detects process command lines containing C2 operator start flags or strings alongside reconnaissance tools or platforms like fofa or skynet.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, reconnaissance, and command execution originating from web server and PHP lineage processes, indicating potential webshell activity or compromised web applications.
Detects non-browser clients or runtimes (such as curl, python, node, or Electron-based apps) successfully connecting to or referencing compromised eMudhra certificate status checker hosts, indicating systems that still trust compromised intermediate certificates.
Detects potential staging and execution of files from the Microsoft Vault directory within AppData, often associated with adversary tooling or credential theft.
Detects cmd.exe launching curl.exe with TLS verification disabled, redirect following, an output file, and forced hostname-to-IP resolution, or the PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest with a certificate-check bypass switch, often associated with malicious trojan droppers.
Detects a sequence where an Apache HTTP server spawns a shell (sh, bash, dash) followed within a 6-hour window by network connections to internal ports (LDAP, SMB, Kerberos) from the same device, indicative of web shell activity and potential internal reconnaissance or relay attempts.
Detects when typical discovery commands (whoami, id, uname, ipconfig) are executed under a web server or PHP process parent, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity following a web application compromise. The rule aggregates distinct commands within a 15-minute window to reduce false positives.
Detects AnyDesk being silently installed with the --install and --silent flags or having an unattended-access password configured via the --set-password and _unattended_access parameters, typically piped via stdin from a batch dropper using cmd.exe.
Detects post-exploitation activity targeting PaperCut servers, including shells spawned by the PaperCut Java process or the creation of malicious files (such as .class files in lib/ or .txt webshells in custom/web/) by the Java application.
Detects attempts to download the cache_base file using various command-line utilities (wget, curl, node fetch) on a single device, correlating multiple download methods within a 10-minute window or matching known malicious mirror IOCs.
Detects modifications to Certificate Authority (CA) trust stores, configuration files, or blocklists on Linux and macOS endpoints, followed by trust store update commands within a 30-minute window.
Detects behavior where PowerShell or pwsh executes msiexec.exe to silently install an MSI file located in a temporary directory with a GUID-prefixed filename, optionally following a recent download from a remote URL.
Detects PHP SAPI processes accessing /proc/self/mem (or equivalent memory mapping) and subsequently spawning a Unix shell, which is characteristic of web shell activity or exploitation of PHP memory corruption/injection vulnerabilities like zif_system.
Detects the execution of two or more distinct Active Directory discovery, credential extraction, or coercion tools (such as NetExec, Kerbrute, noPac, PetitPotam, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, or Impacket scripts) on the same device within a 1-hour window.
Detects files written under Magento pub/media/custom_options/quote by a web server or PHP process, and flags when a subsequent process command line references the uploaded file, indicating potential web shell activity.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects an SSH process establishing local port forwarding to a Unix socket (such as docker.sock) or a path containing a socket, followed shortly after (within 15 minutes) by non-administrative tool access to sensitive files like /etc/shadow or Docker sockets on the same device.
Detects command-line execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA) spawned via Windows Explorer containing download primitives and URLs, followed by immediate external network connections.
The KQL rule detects a ClickFix-style technique in which script hosts reference files disguised with an f_* naming pattern in browser profile cache directories. The key behavioural indicators are:
- Script hosts such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, and mshta.exe referencing browser cache paths.
- Suspicious parent processes, including Explorer, command shells, and script hosts.
- Creation, modification, or renaming of t.vbs under the user's Temp directory by Windows Script Host.
- Script hosts such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, and mshta.exe referencing browser cache paths.
- Suspicious parent processes, including Explorer, command shells, and script hosts.
- Creation, modification, or renaming of t.vbs under the user's Temp directory by Windows Script Host.
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