Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of Rclone to exfiltrate data to a Wasabi cloud storage bucket. This technique was observed being used by the Iranian APT group Seedworm.
This rule detects network connections to known pastebin and text storage sites initiated by processes that are not common web browsers. This could indicate data exfiltration, staging of malicious code, or command and control activity where sensitive information is uploaded or retrieved by non-standard applications.
Detects the use of curl.exe where the User-Agent string contains a URL pointing to temp.sh. This specific TTP was observed in the Notepad++ supply chain attack (Chrysalis infection chain) to exfiltrate system information and signal the uploaded file's location to the C2 server.
This rule detects network communication with known AI model providers by checking `RemoteUrl` against a list of AI API URLs from an external CSV file. It aims to identify potential unauthorized use of AI services, data exfiltration to AI models, or to monitor AI usage within an environment.
Detects when a user generates an unusually high number of prompts to Copilot within a short period (e.g., 50 prompts in an hour). This could indicate automated activity, data exfiltration attempts, or misuse of the Copilot service.
With OAuth 2.0 Device Code Flow phishing campaigns actively targeting M365 environments in financial services and beyond, I built a cross-phase KQL detection rule that moves beyond the obvious deviceCode protocol filter — because the real damage happens in tables most hunts never look at.
The rule correlates three phases across both SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs:
Phase 1 catches victim-side device code authentications, filtering out primaryRefreshToken (enrolled devices) and known low-risk resources to cut noise at the source.
Phase 2 surfaces non-interactive single-factor token replay activity — this is where the attacker's stolen OAuth token actually appears, silently blending into background API traffic.
Phase 3 identifies post-compromise Graph/mail resource access across anomalous IP counts — the data exfiltration and BEC staging layer.
The key design decisions that make it production-ready: a cross-phase inner join so only users appearing in Phase 1 and Phase 2 surface at all, a MinutesToReplay temporal constraint (>= 0 and <= 2880) to eliminate false correlations where phases are coincidental rather than causal, and a composite risk score with banded severity output.
Tested against 90 days of real tenant data. Came back clean after tuning — which is the outcome you want before deploying as a scheduled analytics rule.
The rule correlates three phases across both SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs:
Phase 1 catches victim-side device code authentications, filtering out primaryRefreshToken (enrolled devices) and known low-risk resources to cut noise at the source.
Phase 2 surfaces non-interactive single-factor token replay activity — this is where the attacker's stolen OAuth token actually appears, silently blending into background API traffic.
Phase 3 identifies post-compromise Graph/mail resource access across anomalous IP counts — the data exfiltration and BEC staging layer.
The key design decisions that make it production-ready: a cross-phase inner join so only users appearing in Phase 1 and Phase 2 surface at all, a MinutesToReplay temporal constraint (>= 0 and <= 2880) to eliminate false correlations where phases are coincidental rather than causal, and a composite risk score with banded severity output.
Tested against 90 days of real tenant data. Came back clean after tuning — which is the outcome you want before deploying as a scheduled analytics rule.
Detects network connections from the Claude Code CLI ('claude' or 'claude.exe') to a destination other than the official 'api.anthropic.com' endpoint. This indicates that the 'ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL' environment variable has likely been overridden by a malicious '.claude/settings.json' configuration file in an attempt to intercept and exfiltrate API keys, as described in CVE-2026-21852.
Detects network traffic to a known StegaBin C2 IP address or specific URI paths used for data exfiltration. This activity is associated with multiple modules of the StegaBin infostealer toolkit.
Detects the execution of rsync using GSocket-based user-space tunnels (gs-dbus, gs-netcat) as the transport shell. This is a core, stealthy exfiltration technique used by the ShadowHS framework to bypass traditional network inspection and firewall rules.
This rule detects various indicators associated with a developer-targeting campaign, including Node.js fetching remote JavaScript from untrusted PaaS domains, dynamic loader behavior in next.config.js, repeated beaconing to C2 paths, detached child Node interpreters, directory enumeration and exfiltration behavior, and suspicious access to sensitive files on developer machines.
This rule detects suspicious code search queries within Azure DevOps audit logs that may indicate an adversary is attempting to find sensitive information such as passwords, API keys, tokens, or private keys. It specifically looks for keywords like 'password', 'secret', 'token', 'apikey', 'api_key', 'connectionstring', 'connstring', 'credential', 'private key', and 'BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY' in code search queries.
This rule set detects various stages of activity related to the 'OpenClaw' malware family and associated campaigns. It includes detection for OpenClaw process execution, exposure of a specific administrative port, execution of shell commands via curl (ClawHavoc delivery), outbound webhook exfiltration, and infostealer access to OpenClaw configuration files.
Detects network connections to known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure associated with the APT37 Ruby Jumper campaign. This includes the C2 IP address for the FOOTWINE backdoor and the Zoho WorkDrive Client ID used by the RESTLEAF implant for exfiltration.
This rule detects when public or anonymous access is enabled for an Azure Storage Account. This configuration change can lead to potential data exposure, as it allows unauthenticated users to access blobs within the storage account. The rule specifically looks for 'STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITE' or 'STORAGEACCOUNTS/BLOBSERVICES/WRITE' operations that successfully modify the storage account configuration to allow public access.
This rule detects PowerShell commands used to encode data (like hostnames) into hexadecimal strings and exfiltrate it via DNS queries to known Out-of-Band Application Security Testing (OAST) domains. This technique is used by attackers to bypass egress filtering and confirm system compromise, as seen in the exploitation of CVE-2026-1731.
Detects the creation of files within hidden folders on removable media that are designed to mimic the Windows Recycle Bin ($RECYCLE.BIN or $RECYCLE.BIN.USER). This technique is used by APT37's THUMBSBD and VIRUSTASK malware to stage malicious files (.rb, .dat) for bridging air-gapped networks.
This rule detects a high volume of Azure resource deletions by a single user within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is indicative of a destructive attack or wiper activity, where an adversary attempts to delete critical cloud infrastructure to disrupt operations or cause data loss. The rule specifically looks for 'delete' operations that were successful and counts them per caller and IP address, triggering an alert if the count exceeds a defined threshold.
Detects outbound network traffic to a known Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) command and control (C2) server. This activity is associated with the exfiltration of stolen data, such as credentials, browser data, and system information, compressed into a ZIP archive.
Detects outbound SMTP connections from processes that are not typical mail clients, a technique used by malware like Agent Tesla to exfiltrate stolen data. This rule specifically looks for .NET utilities known to be abused in process hollowing attacks.
Detects action of git clone or git push in a repo where the source actor is not coming from a Corp IP Space. (Add your IP Blocks as needed to the filter)
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling or data exfiltration by identifying high volumes of DNS queries with unusually long subdomains from a single process on a device. It aggregates DNS connection inspection events, extracts the subdomain length, and then summarizes the count of queries, unique domains, and average subdomain length within a 10-minute window. An alert is triggered if the query count exceeds 100 or if more than 50 unique domains are observed, combined with subdomain lengths greater than 30 characters.
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