Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of the rclone.exe utility with copy, sync, move, or copyto command-line arguments, correlated with outbound network connections to Wasabi S3 or MEGA cloud storage domains.
Detects when a user authenticates via device code flow or performs device registration/ownership addition, followed by a bulk download of SharePoint or OneDrive files (25 or more distinct files) within a 60-minute window. This behavior can indicate session hijacking or unauthorized access where an attacker uses device code phishing to gain access and quickly exfiltrate cloud documents.
Detects script-driven (curl, wget, python) outbound connections to
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
The following analytic detects HTTP POST requests containing heavily encoded data in the post body, specifically looking for sequences of hex-encoded bytes or base64-encoded strings.
It leverages Zeek HTTP logs to identify POST requests where the body contains eight or more consecutive hex escape sequences or sixteen or more consecutive base64 character groups.
This activity is significant as adversaries commonly use hex or base64 encoding to obfuscate C2 communication, exfiltrate data, or deliver encoded payloads.
It leverages Zeek HTTP logs to identify POST requests where the body contains eight or more consecutive hex escape sequences or sixteen or more consecutive base64 character groups.
This activity is significant as adversaries commonly use hex or base64 encoding to obfuscate C2 communication, exfiltrate data, or deliver encoded payloads.
Detects a sequence where a device runs a staging/archiving utility (such as WinRAR, 7-Zip, or a copy script) followed within 4 hours by a file transfer or synchronization tool (such as rclone or FileZilla), which is indicative of data staging prior to exfiltration.
Detects the execution of Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools followed closely (within 1 day) by potential data exfiltration activity using tools like WinSCP or Rclone, or connections to cloud storage providers (OneDrive, Google Drive) from the same device.
Detects a sequence where a device exhibits Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool execution followed by high-volume outbound network connections to consumer cloud storage services (such as OneDrive or Google Drive) from the same device, potentially indicating data exfiltration via RMM.
Box Shield Anomalous Download
Cortex XDR
Surfaces Box Shield anomalous download alerts with full context extraction, including download delta, historical baseline vs anomaly period comparison, and source IPs.
Detects a data loss prevention violation. DLP telemetry is widely collected and
almost never written against as detection content — it is usually treated as a
compliance report rather than a security signal, which means repeated violations by
one user often go unexamined.
The file hash and process are both recorded, so a violation can be pivoted into
endpoint telemetry directly.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, file, hash, process, threat, srcip
almost never written against as detection content — it is usually treated as a
compliance report rather than a security signal, which means repeated violations by
one user often go unexamined.
The file hash and process are both recorded, so a violation can be pivoted into
endpoint telemetry directly.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, file, hash, process, threat, srcip
Correlates a device code flow sign-in event with bulk file downloads from SharePoint or OneDrive by the same user account within a 1-hour window. This behavior can indicate potential account compromise or misuse where an adversary uses device code phishing to authenticate and subsequently exfiltrate sensitive files.
Detects files transferred with a visibility or ownership change on the MFT platform.
Widening who can retrieve a file is the quietest possible exfiltration route: the
data never leaves the platform in a way the network would notice, it simply becomes
reachable by someone new.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT'
| groupby user, targetuser, file, filetype, visibility, owner
Widening who can retrieve a file is the quietest possible exfiltration route: the
data never leaves the platform in a way the network would notice, it simply becomes
reachable by someone new.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT'
| groupby user, targetuser, file, filetype, visibility, owner
Detects when a USB mass storage device is connected to a host and is followed shortly thereafter by a large volume of file creations or modifications on a removable drive, which may indicate data exfiltration or staging.
Detects potential data staging and exfiltration where sensitive or investigation-related files are compressed using archive utilities or PowerShell, followed closely by upload activities to Backblaze B2 cloud storage via CLI tools, rclone, or direct API connections.
Detects permitted transfers from a user who was recently blocked. Repeated blocks
followed by a success means a channel was found that the policy does not cover —
the user, or the attacker operating as them, worked out what gets through.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='PACKET_ALLOWED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app
followed by a success means a channel was found that the policy does not cover —
the user, or the attacker operating as them, worked out what gets through.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='PACKET_ALLOWED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app
Detects a substantial outbound transfer from a Meraki-protected site. Branch
locations have predictable, modest traffic profiles, which makes a sustained upload
unusually visible against that baseline compared with the same transfer leaving a
datacentre.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='SESSION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, txlen
locations have predictable, modest traffic profiles, which makes a sustained upload
unusually visible against that baseline compared with the same transfer leaving a
datacentre.
Onboarding: CISCO-MERAKI is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 300).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=firewall where sourcename='CISCO-MERAKI' and action='SESSION_ESTABLISHED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, dstport, app, txlen
Detects a high volume of file creation events (greater than 200 files) on an external USB mount session by a non-system account, which may indicate potential data exfiltration or staging to removable media.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity where a device first exhibits usage of a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, followed by the execution of known data transfer or exfiltration utilities such as WinSCP or Rclone.
Detects an export from Zendesk. Support platforms accumulate exactly what an
attacker wants for the next stage — customer names, contact details, account
references, and the content of conversations in which people routinely paste
things they should not. An export takes all of it at once.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=ticket-requested where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='EXPORTED'
| groupby user, srcip, sourceclassification, sourcelabel
attacker wants for the next stage — customer names, contact details, account
references, and the content of conversations in which people routinely paste
things they should not. An export takes all of it at once.
Onboarding: ZENDESK is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 831).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/zendesk-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=ticket-requested where sourcename='ZENDESK' and action='EXPORTED'
| groupby user, srcip, sourceclassification, sourcelabel
Detects potential data exfiltration to popular public paste-sites and code-sharing services (such as Pastebin, Paste.ee, Hastebin, Ghostbin, ControlC, Dpaste, Rentry.co, Privatebin) using HTTP POST or PUT requests based on upload frequency and volume thresholds.
Detects one account downloading many files through GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer.
MFT platforms sit between organisations and hold exactly the data worth stealing —
payment files, payroll, partner exchanges — and have been the target of mass
exploitation campaigns precisely because they are internet-facing and rarely watched.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 20
MFT platforms sit between organisations and hold exactly the data worth stealing —
payment files, payroll, partner exchanges — and have been the target of mass
exploitation campaigns precisely because they are internet-facing and rarely watched.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT' and action='DOWNLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, distinct_count(file)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 20
Detects one user triggering DLP repeatedly in a short window. A single violation is
usually a mistake; a pattern is either someone systematically working around the
control or an attacker testing which channels are permitted before using the one
that is.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action in ('THREAT_DETECTED', 'THREAT_BLOCKED')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
usually a mistake; a pattern is either someone systematically working around the
control or an attacker testing which channels are permitted before using the one
that is.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action in ('THREAT_DETECTED', 'THREAT_BLOCKED')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
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